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I. INTRODUCTION
The focus of this Article is the federal-tax treatment of incorpora-
tion and its centerpiece, section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code.'
Compared to much of the arcane language contained in Subchapter C of
the Internal Revenue Code, the trip through the incorporation process is
almost refreshing; although complex and detailed, the law is relatively
coherent and sensible. It is, comparatively, an oasis of sanity. The Arti-
cle begins by outlining the statutory regime for tax-free incorporations.
It examines section 351's theoretical and policy underpinnings. It studies
1. I.R.C. § 351 (1986).
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the system's requirements. It evaluates two of the more complex subsys-
tems within the section 351 regime: liabilities and the "boot" rules.2 It
concludes with a discussion of two nettlesome problems associated with
the incorporation process: the relationship of section 351 with other
Subchapter C sections and midstream incorporation problems.
II. THE STATUTORY REGIME IN BRIEF
Section 351(a) of the Internal Revenue Code is the centerpiece of
Subchapter C's subcode regulating the tax consequences for the incorpo-
ration process-it sets out the requirements for achieving a tax-free in-
corporation of a business.3 If its conditions are satisfied, no gain or loss
is recognized by the parties contributing assets to the corporation in ex-
change for the transferee corporation's stock or securities.' It also trig-
gers a battery of other code sections5 that are part of the subcode that
implements section 351's policy underpinnings.
Generally speaking, section 351 provides for the nonrecognition of
gain or loss to a person or persons transferring property to a corporation
solely in exchange for stock or securities of that corporation, if that per-
son or persons are in control of the corporation immediately after the
exchange.' According to section 368(c) and its corresponding Treasury
Regulations, a person or persons are in control of a corporation if they
own at least 80% of the total combined voting power of the corporation
and at least 80% of the total number of shares of each class of nonvoting
stock.7 Section 357(a) states that the nonrecognition treatment accorded
by section 351(a) is not disallowed merely because the property trans-
ferred is subject to a liability or the corporation assumes a liability of a
transferor.8 If the corporation distributes cash or other property (boot)
to a transferor in addition to shares or securities, the transferor then rec-
ognizes a realized gain but only to the extent of the money and fair mar-
ket value of the boot.9 According to section 358, computing the basis of
shares or securities received in a section 351 transaction starts with the
basis the transferor had in the property he gave up, 10 i.e., a substituted
2. See infra text accompanying notes 373-570.
3. I.R.C. § 351(a) (1986).
4. Id.
5. See id §§ 357(a)(1), 357(c)(1)(A), 357(3), 358(a), 362(a)(1), 368(c), 1245(b)(3),
1250(d)(3).
6. Id. § 351(a).
7. I.R.C. § 351(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1967).
8. I.R.C. § 357(a).
9. Id. § 351(b)(1).
10. Id. § 358(a)(1).
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basis, but then requires four reductions and one addition. The reductions
are for: (1) the fair market value of boot property distributed to the
transferor; 11 (2) the amount of money paid to the transferor; 12 (3) the
amount of the transferor's liabilities assumed by the corporation; 13 and
(4) the amount of liabilities encumbering the property transferred by the
shareholder to the corporation. 14 The addition is to increase the trans-
feror's basis in his shares or securities by adding his recognized gain.' 5
The transferor takes a fair market value basis in the boot.
1 6
According to section 1032(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, no gain
or loss is recognized to a corporation on the receipt of money or other
property in exchange for its stock. 7 Additionally, no gain or loss is rec-
ognized to a corporation on the receipt of money or other property in
exchange for its own securities.' If the transfer of property to the corpo-
ration in exchange for its stock or securities meets the requirements of
section 351, section 362(a) requires the corporation to take a carryover
basis in the property it received, i.e., it uses the transferor's basis as its
basis in the property.19 The carryover basis is subject to one adjustment:
The corporation increases its basis by the amount of any gain recognized
to the transferor on the transfer.20
11. Id. § 358(a)(1)(A)(i).
12. Id. § 358(a)(1)(A)(ii).
13. Id. §§ 358(a)(1)(A)(ii), 358(d)(1). If the transferee corporation assumes a liability of a
transferor as part of a section 351 exchange, the liability is treated as money paid to the trans-
feror for purposes of computing his basis in the stock or securities received in the exchange.
Id. § 358(d)(1). Then he is required to decrease his basis in that stock or those securities by
the amount of money paid to him, which, due to section 358(d)(1), includes his liability as-
sumed by the corporation. Id. § 358(a)(1)(A)(ii).
14. Id. §§ 358(a)(1)(A)(ii), 358(d)(1). Liabilities encumbering transferred property are
treated in the same manner as liabilities of the transferor that are assumed by the transferee
corporation. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Id.
15. Id. § 358(a)(1)(B)(i).
16. Id. § 358(a)(2).
17. Id. § 1032(a). Application of section 1032(a) does not depend on the tax treatment
accorded the other party to the transaction, who, depending on the circumstances, can be
taxed in a variety of manners. For example, he or she might be entitled to nonrecognition
under section 351(a), be treated as a party to a fully taxable exchange under section 1001, or be
treated as the recipient of taxable compensation under section 61.
18. In tax law the term "securities" usually refers to debt only, and not to stock. See
Rands, The Closely-Held Corporation: Its Capital Structure and the Federal Tax Laws, 90 W.
VA. L. REV. 1009, 1017 n.28 (1988). No code section is needed to accord nonrecognition to a
corporation issuing its own debt to acquire property because the transaction is neither an ex-
change nor sale of property by the issuing corporation.
19. I.R.C. § 362(a)(1).
20. Id.
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III. THEORETICAL AND POLICY UNDERPINNINGS
The theoretical underpinning for the nonrecognition rule of section
351 and its related sections is that the placement of assets in a corpora-
tion as part of the incorporation process is a change in the form and not
in the substance of ownership.2" The same people own the same prop-
erty, only now they have pieces of paper called stock certificates to evi-
dence their ownership. Because they have not "cashed in" on their
investment in the property, the exchange should not be taxable to them
or to their controlled entity, the corporation.22 Inasmuch as they are in
the same position after the transfer as they were before it, they are re-
quired to continue their pretransaction basis in their investment by using
the basis they had in the transferred property as their basis in their shares
or securities.2 3 Similarly, since the placement of the assets in the corpo-
ration is considered merely a change in form of ownership, no reason
exists for changing the basis in the assets transferred to the corporation.
The transferors' basis in those assets is carried over to the corporation
which takes that basis as its own.24 The substituted basis in the shares or
securities and the carryover basis in the assets also serve to lock in any
appreciation (or diminution) in the value of the assets that went untaxed
(or not deducted) at the time of the section 351 transfer.25 Such appreci-
ation or diminution will be recognized on a subsequent disposition of
either the shares or securities or the transferred property.26 The carry-
21. See, eg., Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., 316 U.S. 527, 533 (1942); Hempt Bros.,
Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172, 1177 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974); E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Portland Oil
Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940); Hallibur-
ton v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1935); American Compress & Warehouse Co.
v. Bender, 70 F.2d 655, 657-58 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 293 U.S. 607 (1934); see also H.R. REP.
No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4017; S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921); 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 181, 188-89.
22. See sources cited supra note 21.
23. See I.R.C. § 358(a)(1) (1986). The substituted basis in the stock or securities is subject
to the adjustments described in notes 10-16 and accompanying text. See also id.
§ 358(a)(1)(A), (B) (gain recognized added to basis: cash boot, fair market value of other boot
property and liabilities transferred to corporation subtracted from basis).
24. Id. § 362(a)(1). The transferee corporation is entitled to increase the carryover basis
by the amount of any gain recognized by the transferror. Id.
25. See, eg., Hempt Bros., 490 F.2d at 1178-79 & nn.10-11; Barker v. United States, 200
F.2d 223, 228 (9th Cir. 1952); Consolidated Utility Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 548, 550
(5th Cir. 1936); T.W. Phillips Jr., Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 F.2d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 1933);
Newman Saunders & Co. v. United States, 36 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (Ct. CI. 1929), cert denied,
281 U.S. 760 (1930); Haas Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 528, 534 (1931).
26. If the transferee corporation in a section 351 exchange is a dealer in the property
transferred to it, naturally, it wants the highest basis possible in the property to minimize the
amount of its recognized income on resale. If a cost basis would be higher than a carryover
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over basis also assures that the corporation will have the same deprecia-
tion deductions27 that the transferors would have had, if they had not
transferred the property.
The theme that mere changes in form should trigger neither
favorable nor adverse tax consequences is ubiquitous within Subchapter
C.8 But in sharp contrast to some of the other transactions so treated in
Subchapter C,9 it usually makes sense in the context of the incorpora-
tion. The transfer of the assets of a proprietorship or partnership to a
controlled corporation during the incorporation process is nothing more
than a change in form. It ought not generate a gain or loss or a change in
basis. The same person or persons own the same business with the same
assets and in the same proportions.
Yet the change-in-form rationale is not always a perfect fit, and a
more policy-laden justification for the nonrecognition system is some-
times needed. For example, if two previously unrelated persons incorpo-
rate a new business, and each person transfers one asset in exchange for
stock,3" those two people have done more than change the form of own-
ership of their property. No longer is either individual the sole owner of
one asset. Now each party is a part-owner of an organization owning
two assets.31 Though it would not be accurate to state that they have
cashed in on their investments, since each has continued his interest in
his former asset by taking stock in the organization that owns it, still,
basis, which often is the case, then it will want section 351 not to apply. See, eg., Bradshaw v.
United States, 683 F.2d 365 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
27. Sometimes the stake in section 351 controversies is the depreciation deductions of the
transferee corporation. See, eg., Nye v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 203 (1968) (transferee corpo-
ration wanted section 351 not to apply so it could take higher cost basis and, therefore, higher
depreciation deductions).
28. The Code accords nonrecognition treatment to stock dividends, complete liquidations
of subsidiaries, certain transfers of property to controlled corporations, certain corporate divi-
sions and reorganizations. See I.R.C. § 305(a) (stock dividends); id. § 332(a) (liquidations of
subsidiaries); id. § 337(a) (liquidations of subsidiaries); id. § 351 (transfers of property to con-
trolled corporations); id. § 336(c) (corporate divisions); id. § 335 (same); id. § 354 (reorganiza-
tions); id. § 361 (same). Each of these sections is grounded at least in part on the theory that
the transactions governed thereby are mere changes in form.
29. For example, the merger of a small, privately held corporation into a publicly held
corporation may qualify as a tax-free reorganization, even though the shareholders in the
closely held corporation may exchange their illiquid stock for the marketable stock of the
publicly held corporation. See B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 14.01 (1987).
30. Any transferor of property is entitled to nonrecognition treatment under section 351(a)
if he is part of a group that transfers property and controls the corporation after the transfer.
S. LIND, S. SCHWARZ, D. LATHROPE & J. ROSENBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
TAXATION 58 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter LIND & SCHWARZ].
31. Id.
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they have changed their positions, and this change in position is signifi-
cant and could be taxed. But the section 351 nonrecognition system re-
flects the underlying basic policy that the United States tax law should
not inhibit capital formation.32 People should be permitted to form cor-
porations and transfer property to them without being taxed. Incorpora-
tion is not an appropriate time to impose a tax. To do so would inhibit
something of crucial importance to the United States: the start-up of
new businesses and the formation of capital.
IV. REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 351
Section 351 and its related sections apply only to transfers of prop-
erty to corporations that meet four basic requirements contained in sec-
tion 351(a):3 3 (1) there must be a transfer of property to the corporation;
(2) the transferors must receive stock or securities of that corporation; (3)
the shares or securities must be issued in exchange for the transferred
property; and (4) immediately after the exchange, the transferors must be
in control of the corporation,34 as control is defined in section 368(c). 35
As simple as section 351(a) seems to be, it leaves innumerable inter-
stices that Congress, the government and the courts have sought to fill
with other Internal Revenue Code provisions, 36 regulations, 37 revenue
rulings3" and court decisions. 39 Fortunately, the government is often
32. See S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 34 (1954); Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., 316 U.S. 527, 533 (1942). See also
H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1921); Hempt Bro&, 490 F.2d at 1177; LIND &
SCHWARZ, supra note 30, at 58; Worthy, IRS Chief Counsel Outlines What Lies Ahead for
Professional Corporation, 32 J. TAx 88, 90 (1970).
33. I.R.C. § 351(a) (1986).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 368(c).
36. Code sections other than section 351(a) are needed to deal with various other matters,
including boot, liabilities, the transferor's basis in the stock or securities, services rendered in
exchange for the shares or security and the tax treatment of the transferee corporation. See id.
§ 351(b) (treatment of recipient of boot); id. § 357 (impact of transferred liabilities on section
351 exchanges); id. § 358 (shareholder's and securityholder's basis in the stock, securities or
boot received in a section 351 exchange); id. § 351(d) (services not treated as property in sec-
tion 351 exchanges); id. § 362(a)(1) (transferee corporation's basis in assets received in section
351 exchange); id. § 1032(a) (nonrecognition treatment for transferee corporation issuing stock
in section 351 exchange).
37. The regulations, for example, contain a rule that permits the Commissioner to disre-
gard an exchange of property for stock or securities issued for property of relatively small
value in comparison to the value of the stock and securities already owned by the property
transferor, if the primary purpose of the transfer is to qualify exchanges of property with stock
or securities by other persons transferring property. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1)(ii) (as
amended in 1967). For operating rules considering the issuance of ruling letters about this
regulation, see Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
38. For example, the Treasury has been active in issuing revenue rulings on what consti-
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willing to issue advance rulings as to the applicability of section 351 to a
proposed transaction. It has even prepared a detailed checklist that tax
counsel can submit along with a request for a ruling.'
A. Transfer of Property to the Corporation
For section 351 and its related sections to apply, there must be a
transfer of property to the corporation.41 The term "property" includes
real,42 personal,43 tangible 4 and intangible45 property. It includes
tutes "property" for purposes of section 351(a). See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 80-228, 1980-2 C.B 115;
Rev. Rul. 79-288, 1979-2 C.B. 139; Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, 135; Rev. Rul. 69-156,
1969-1 C.B. 101.
39. The two most litigated section 351 areas are the definition of "stock" and "securities,"
see, e.g., Bradshaw v. United States, 683 F.2d 365 (Ct. Cl. 1982), and gauging the impact of the
step transaction doctrine on the control requirement. Compare Culligan Water Conditioning
of Tri-Cities, Inc. v. United States, 567 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1978) with S. Klein on the Square,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 786 (1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 127 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
824 (1951).
40. See app. for Treasury's checklist set out in Rev. Proc. 83-59, 1983-2 C.B. 575 11.
Revenue Procedure 86-3, 1986-1 C.B. 416 describes several section 351 issues for which the
Internal Revenue Service will not issue advance rulings. The most important is the tax effect
of an exchange when the transferor receives bonds, debentures or other debt and the term of
the debt is either less than ten years or a determination as to whether the debt is properly
classified as debt or equity is required in order to establish that the section 351 requirements
are met. Id at 420. The Internal Revenue Service has also suspended the issuance of advance
rulings for exchanges of widely held real estate or oil and gas interests in exchange for stock
when the exchange is the result of solicitation by promoters, brokers or investment houses for
the stock as issued in a form designed to render it readily tradeable. Id. at 422. Also excluded
from advanced rulings are exchanges of real property by a cooperative housing corporation for
the stock of a commercial real estate corporation. Id. at 421. Finally, the Internal Revenue
Service will not rule on the applicability of section 351 to certain failed reverse triangular
mergers. Id. at 422.
Revenue Procedures 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568 sets out the rules for issuing a letter ruling for
exchanges involving stock or securities issued for property of relatively small value in compari-
son to the value of stock and securities already owned by a property transferor. Id.
41. I.R.C. § 351(a) (1986).
42. See, eg., Burr Oaks Corp. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1966) (undeveloped
land), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967); Stanley, Inc. v. Schuster, 295 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.
Ohio 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.351-1(a)(2) (example (I)-manufacturing plant) (as amended in 1967).
43. See, e.g., D'Angelo Assocs. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 121 (1978) (transferred assets
included dentist's equipment); Connolly Tool & Eng'g Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1222 (1964) (inventory).
44. The cases cited supra notes 42 and 43 involved the transfer of tangible property.
45. See, e.g., Stafford v. United States, 611 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1980) (letter of intent and
loan commitment), on remand, 552 F. Supp. 311 (D. Ga. 1982), rev'd, 727 F.2d 1043 (lth
Cir. 1984); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211 (Ct. Cl. 1973)
(nonexclusive patent license); P.A. Birren & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 718 (7th Cir.
1940) (accounts receivable); Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1172 (M.D. Pa.
1973) (accounts receivable), aff'd, 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974);
H.B. Zachry Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 73 (1967) (carved-out oil payment); Treas. Reg.
FEDERAL TAX LAWS AND INCORPORATION
cash,4 6 accounts receivable,47 choses in action,48 equitable interests in
property,49 inventory,50 stock in trade,-5  patents, 52 technical know-
how, 3 leaseholds,54 trade names 5 and trademarks,5 6 goodwill, and com-
§ 1.351-1(a)(2) (example (l)--property included manufacturing plant plus patent) (as
amended in 1967).
46. See, e.g., Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (lst Cir.), cert denied, 310
U.S. 650 (1940); Halliburton v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1935); Holstein v. Com-
missioner, 23 T.C. 923 (1955); Rev. Rul. 69-357, 1969-1 C.B. 101. Someone who only pays
cash for the stock does not need to rely on a special section to obtain nonrecognition treat-
ment, because no gain or loss is ever recognized merely on the transfer of money. The signifi-
cance of the treatment of money as property is that the contributor of cash can be included as a
member of a group of transferors for purposes of determining whether the 80% control re-
quirement is met. KAHN & GANN, CORPORATE TAXATION AND TAXATION OF PARTNER-
SHIPS AND PARTNERS 559 (2d ed. 1984).
47. See, e.g., Hempt Bros., 490 F.2d at 1175; P.A. Birren, 116 F.2d at 719.
48. See, e.g., Roberts Co. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1 (1945) (lawyer's assignment of claim
to collect contingent fee); Ungar v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 766 (1963) (interest in
contract right to buy property assigned to corporation). If the chose in action is based on
services performed by the assignor, the Commissioner and courts sometimes are reluctant to
classify that chose in action as property, thereby taking the exchange out of section 351. See,
e.g., United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965), on remand, 269
F. Supp. 885 (W.D. La. 1967).
49. See, e.g., Florida Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Fahs, 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948); Ocean
Sands Holding Corp. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1 (1980), aff'd, 701 F.2d 167 (4th
Cir. 1983), cerL. denied, 464 U.S. 827 (1984); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Commissioner, 20
T.C. 636 (1953), aff'd, 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1955); Roberts, 5 T.C. at 1; Straubel v. Commis-
sioner, 29 B.T.A. 516 (1933), aff'd, 76 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1935).
50. See, eg., Connolly Tool, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1222; see also B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE,
supra note 29, 3.17.
51. See Connolly Tool, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1224 ("property under contract or earmarked
for customers"). Farmers have encountered problems when transferring growing crops to
their controlled corporation, though less with the definition of property than with the assign-
ment-of-income doctrine or with the clear reflection of income under sections 446 and 482.
See, e.g., Rooney v. United States, 305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962); Weinberg v. Commissioner,
44 T.C. 233 (1965), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 386 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 929 (1968).
52. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont, 471 F.2d at 1211; Magnus v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d 893 (3d
Cir. 1958); Rev. Rul. 71-564, 1971-2 C.B. 179; Rev. Rul. 69-156, 1969-1 C.B. 101; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.351-1(a)(2) (example (1)) (as amended in 1967).
53. The area of technical know-how is controversial, because much of its value is often
attributable to service performed either in the past or to be performed in the future by the
transferor. See infra text accompanying notes 690-93. Nevertheless, it has sometimes been
considered "property." See, e.g., E. Du Pont, 471 F.2d at 1211; Frazell, 335 F.2d at 490; Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996 (1985); Rev. Rul. 71-564, 1971-2 C.B. 179; Rev.
Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, modifying Rev. Rul. 55-17, 1955-1 C.B. 388; Rev. Proc. 74-36,
1974-2 C.B. 491, amplifying Rev. Proc. 69-19, 1969-2 C.B. 301.
54. See Lane & Nicholson, Corporations Pre-Organization Planning, 101-4th T.M., at A-6.
55. See Rev. Rul. 79-288, 1979-2 C.B. 139; see also B. BIrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note
29, 3.02 (1); H. ABRAMS & R. DOERNBERG, FEDERAL CORPORATE TAXATION 2.04
(1987).
56. See R. & J. Furniture Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 857 (1953), rev'd on other grounds,
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puter software.5 7 Stock or securities, however, are not to be considered
as issued in return for "property" for purposes of section 351 if they are
issued to pay for: (15 services rendered, or to be rendered, for the benefit
of the corporation;58 (2) a debt of the transferee corporation not evi-
denced by a security;59 or (3) interest on a debt of the transferee corpora-
tion which interest accrued on or after the beginning of the transferor's
holding period for the debt.' Outside of these three exclusions, then, the
term "property" includes virtually anything capable of being transferred
as a matter of state law.
Of the three excluded items, the exclusion of services is the most
important. Though the impact of the exclusion extends beyond what
happens to the person performing the services,61 its purpose is simple
enough-it assures that stock received in consideration for services ren-
dered to the corporation is taxable to the recipient as compensation to
221 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1955); Rev. Rul. 79-288, 1979-2 C.B. 139; see also B. BrTrKER & J.
EUSTiCE, supra note 29, 1 3.02(1); H. ABRAMS & R. DOERNBERG, supra note 55, 2.04.
57. See Rev. Proc. 74-36, 1974-2 C.B. 491.
58. I.R.C. § 351(d)(1) (1986).
59. Id. § 351(d)(2). The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 added section 351(d)(2) to the Code.
Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3406 (1980) (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 351(d)(2) (1988)). Its purpose is to allow creditors on open account to take an immediate
bad-debt deduction for their claim against an insolvent corporate debtor, even though they
take stock or securities of the corporate debtor. B. BrrrKER & J. EUsTICE, supra note 29, 1
3.02(2). Without section 351(d)(2), the open account creditor would probably be stuck with
the general section 351(a) nonrecognition rule and thereby be pretermitted from taking its loss
deduction. See Rev. Rul. 77-81, 1977-1 C.B. 97. Yet section 351(d)(2) could compel the trans-
feror of an open-account debt with little or no basis, e.g., cash basis trade creditor, to recognize
a gain on the exchange at that debt for the corporate debtor's stock, because section 351(d)(2)
is not limited to insolvency situations. I.R.C. § 351(d)(2).
Section 351(e)(2) exempts from section 351 nonrecognition treatment issuance of stock or
security to satisfy the indebtedness of a corporate debtor involved in a Chapter I 1 (or similar)
proceeding, whether or not the transferred debt is evidenced by a security. Id. § 351(e)(2).
Additionally, section 1276(d)(1)(C), added to the Code in 1986, taxes the accrued gain of
a transferor of a market discount bond, despite section 351. See id. § 1276(d)(1)(C); see also B.
BrrIrKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 29, 3.02(2).
60. I.R.C. § 351(d)(3). Like § 351(d)(2), this section was added to the Code by the Bank-
ruptcy Tax Act of 1980, but is not limited to insolvent corporate debtors. Bankruptcy Tax Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3406 (1980) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 351(d)(3) (1980)); see
also B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTiCE, supra note 29, at 3.02(3).
61. For example, someone who furnishes only services in exchange for his stock is not
counted among the "transferors of property" for purposes of determining whether persons
who did transfer property own enough stock after their transfers to satisfy section 351's 80%
control test. In one case, the tax court held that a 50% stockholder took his stock in return for
services. James v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 63 (1969). The result was that the whole transac-
tion failed to qualify under section 351, because the other stockholder was the only transferor
of property and he owned only 50% of the stock immediately after the exchange. Id. at 69; see
also Columbia Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 38 (1940), aff'd, 118 F.2d 459 (5th
Cir. 1941).
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the extent of the fair market value of the stock.62 Thus, the exclusion is a
corollary to the general tax-law rule that compensation is to be treated as
taxable income under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code.6" Unfor-
tunately, trying to ascertain whether the shares were issued for services
or property is often difficult. For one thing, the private sector is unlikely
to hoist a red flag to alert the government that the primary consideration
provided by a shareholder for his stock was the performance of services
and not the overvalued property that he listed on his tax return. More-
over, there are the gray areas of technical know-how, trade secrets, good-
will, customer lists and the like. Undoubtedly, such intangibles often
carry a high value and hence are assignable in the business world. Much
of their value, however, is often attributable to services performed in the
past, or to be performed in the future, by the transferor. If someone
conveys such an intangible in exchange for the shares or securities of a
controlled corporation, has he transferred "property" or has he been
compensated for services? Not an easy question!
A revenue ruling announced the government's acceptance of the
proposition that technical know-how at least can constitute property that
can be transferred, without recognition of gain or loss, in exchange for
stock or securities under section 351. 6' The revenue ruling held that the
term "property" includes anything qualifying as "secret processes and
formulas" within the meaning of section 861(a)(4) and 862(a)(4) of the
Internal Revenue Code and any other secret information as to a device,
process, or the like, in the general nature of a patentable invention, with-
out regard to whether it is patentable in the patent-law sense.6" Once it is
established that "property" has been transferred, the transfer is tax-free
under section 351, even though services were used to produce that prop-
erty.66 Where the information transferred has been developed specifi-
62. See, eg., Frazell, 335 F.2d at 489; Mailloux v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.
1963); James v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 63 (1969), aff'd, 118 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1971); Wash-
burne v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 577 (1968).
63. In an interesting switch, in Hempt Bros., 490 F.2d at 1177, the taxpayer wanted section
351 not to apply to an assignment of accounts receivable to a controlled corporation. One of
the taxpayer's arguments was "that income be taxed to him who earns it." Id. (citing Appel-
lant's Brief at 32, Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826
(1974)). The court, however, determined that, first, accounts receivable constitute "property"
that can be transferred tax-free under section 351. Id. at 1175. Second, it found that the
assignment-of-income doctrine does not override section 351 nonrecognition treatment for the
transfer of accounts receivable to the corporation. Id. at 1177-88.
64. See Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133; see also E.L Du Pont, 471 F.2d at 1218-19; Rev.
Rul. 71-564, 1971-2 C.B. 179; Rev. Proc. 74-36, 1974-2 C.B. 491; Rev. Proc. 69-19, 1969-2
C.B. 301; I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8243-226.
65. Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, 134.
66. Id.
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cally for the transferee, however, the revenue ruling stated that the stock
received in exchange for it must be treated as payment for services ren-
dered. 7 This result seems proper because the shares would then consti-
tute payment for hired work and ought to be taxed like any other form of
compensation. Where the transferor performs services that are merely
ancillary and subsidiary to the property transfer, the revenue ruling
would still allow nonrecognition treatment under section 351.68 For ex-
ample, the transferor is allowed to demonstrate and explain the use of the
property to promote the transaction.69
While these guidelines from the revenue ruling are helpful in de-
lineating how to deal with technical know-how developed in a manufac-
turing business, they do not offer much assistance in other contexts. For
example, suppose that Anne operates a proprietorship in a service indus-
try where client contacts are important and tangible assets are negligible.
Over the years she has developed a regular clientele. If she incorporates
her business with herself as sole shareholder, neither the government nor
anyone else is likely to assert that any part of the process of incorpora-
tion should be taxable to Anne. Section 351 would seem to be intended
to insulate exactly that type of a transaction from being deemed a taxable
event. Suppose, however, that an out-of-town partnership in the same
industry proposes that Anne join a consolidated business enterprise that
is to include both the partnership and Anne's proprietorship. Anne ac-
cepts the proposal, the consolidated enterprise incorporates, and Anne
transfers her few tangible business assets plus a customer list to the cor-
poration in exchange for a portion of its shares. The value of the shares
exceeds the value of the tangible assets. The new corporation promptly
hires Anne to manage its business in Anne's city. Is the customer list
"property" for purposes of section 351? Is it a disguise for an unwritten
promise by Anne to perform services for the newly formed corporation?
Is Anne transferring goodwill for her shares? Is goodwill "property" for
purposes of section 351?7o Do the answers to these questions depend on
whether anyone besides Anne can use the customer list? If no one else
can, isn't it true that the shares issued to Anne are for services to be
rendered by her in the future? Even so, Anne is still transferring her own
business assets to the corporation, though they may be negligible. Be-
cause she is transferring at least some property, can she be counted as a
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 134-35.
70. Certainly, goodwill sometimes can be "property" that can be transferred under section
351. See sources cited supra note 55.
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"transferor of property" for purposes of the section 351 control test?71 If
Anne's participation in the transaction involving the partnership is con-
sidered to be outside section 351, the tax treatment is contrary to the
nonrecognition treatment that Anne would get if she incorporates with
herself as sole shareholder. Is it logical to reach contradictory results in
these two situations? Unfortunately, none of these questions are easy to
answer. Clearly there are no pat generalizations. Tax counsel moves at
his own peril if he or she does not seek a private ruling when encounter-
ing these types of situations.
B. Transferors' Receipt of Controlled Corporation's Stock or Securities
Section 351(a) requires the transferor of property to the controlled
corporation to receive stock or securities in such corporation in exchange
for his property.72 To receive complete nonrecognition, he can receive
nothing other than the controlled corporation's stock or securities. If the
consideration paid to the transferor consists entirely of cash or a debt of
the corporation not amounting to a security (or both), the transacton is a
taxable sale not covered by section 351 at all with the transferor as the
seller and the corporation as the buyer.73 The seller usually recognizes
his gain74 (or loss if he can avoid falling under section 267). 7' Because it
is merely buying something, the corporation recognizes neither a gain
nor a loss and takes a cost basis in the purchased property.76 If the cor-
71. If Anne transfers no property at all, she is not among the group of transferors of
property who must "control" the corporation for section 351 to apply. If she transfers prop-
erty and performs services for her stock, she is considered one of the transferors and all the
stock she owns can be counted towards meeting the control test, provided the amount of stock
received for the property is not relatively insubstantial compared to the amount of stock re-
ceived for the services and she is not transferring property merely to accommodate others who
want section 351 treatment but own too little stock to qualify for control without her. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1967).
72. I.R.C. § 351(a) (1986).
73. See, eg., Bradshaw v. United States, 683 F.2d 372 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Piedmont Corp. v.
Commissioner, 388 F.2d. 886 (4th Cir. 1968); Burr Oaks Corp. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 24
(7th Cir. 1966); Aqualane Shores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1959); Lauger-
quist v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 530 (1987). Indeed, the sale/section 351 exchange
or capital contribution controversy has been heavily litigated.
74. See, eg., Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 371-72.
75. Section 267(a)(1) prohibits a deduction for a loss on the sale or exchange of property
between specified related parties. See I.R.C. § 267(a)(1) (1986). "Related parties" governed
by this rule include individuals owning 50% or more of the controlled corporation. Id. at
§ 267(b)(2). Furthermore, section 267 can trap the unwary. For example, the transferor of
loss property taking back only 79 percent of the stock might expect to recognize his loss be-
cause he lacks the 80 percent control required by section 351. Indeed, he is outside of section
351, but section 267 nevertheless prohibits a loss deduction for him because the loss was sus-
tained in a transaction between related parties.
76. The stake in many of these cases is the transferee corporation's basis in the transferred
June 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
poration uses any other sort of property (excluding its own stock or se-
curities) to pay for the acquired assets, the transaction is a taxable
exchange." The corporation as well as the other party to the exchange
recognize a gain or loss computed by using the fair market value of the
property received as the amount realized and subtracting from it the ad-
justed basis in the property given up.7 Each party takes a cost basis in
his new property.79
According to section 351(a), nonrecognition treatment is accorded
when property is transferred to the corporation solely in exchange for
stock or securities in such corporation.8 0 The word "solely" is mislead-
ing. One might infer that if the corporation distributes anything other
than its own shares or securities, the transaction will be outside section
351. However, this inference is incorrect; "solely" does not mean solely.
If the transferors, in addition to the stock or securities permitted to be
received under section 351(a), receive money or other property "to
boot," section 351 and its related sections still apply. However, under
section 351(b)-the "boot" section 8 1-the recipient of the other property
or money must recognize any realized gain to the extent of the money
and the fair market value of any other property he received." In addi-
tion, the transferee corporation recognizes a gain or loss if it transfers
recognition property other than cash or its own debt in exchange for the
acquired assets.8 3
The tax law adds a few wrinkles when the transferor of property
receives both stock and debt in the exchange. If the debt is treated as a
security, the transaction is nontaxable under section 351.84 If the debt is
property. Often, it wants a cost basis rather than a section 362(a) transferred (carryover) basis.
See, eg., Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 371-72; Stanley, Inc. v. Schuster, 295 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Ohio
1969).
77. It would be odd for a transferring corporation to use property other than its own debt,
stock or cash to acquire assets. If for some reason it did, the exchange would be taxable under
I.R.C. section 1001. One such possible exchange would be a corporate division that fails one
of the statutory or common-law requirements for tax-free status.
78. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 1972); see also Philadelphia Park Amuse-
ment Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
79. See Philadelphia Park, 126 F. Supp. at 188. The amount realized is a party's cost basis
in a taxable exchange.
80. I.R.C. § 351(a).
81. I.R.C. § 351(b).
82. Id. §§ 351(b), 358(a)(2); see also Winterburn v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 910,
915 (1968).
83. Without a nonrecognition section to exempt the exchange from taxation, the corpora-
tion must recognize a gain or loss under the normal rule of section 1001. Id. § 1001.
84. Section 351 provides for nonrecognition treatment to the transferor when he received
either "stock or securities." I.R.C. § 351(a) (emphasis added); see also Rands, supra note 18,
at 1084.
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reclassified as stock, the transaction is also nontaxable. s5 If the debt is
honored as a debt not amounting to a security, it is treated as boot with
the boot recipient recognizing any realized gain to the extent of the boot
received.86 The boot recipient takes a fair market value basis in the
boot, 7 which ordinarily ought to be the face value of the debt. Since
payments on retirement of debt are a nontaxable return of capital up to
the holder's basis in the debt and the holder's basis in the non-security
debt is probably face value, the debtholder is unlikely to have any addi-
tional taxable gain upon repayments of principal. Of course, interest
payments will be ordinary income. The transferee corporation's basis in
the transferred property will be an exchanged (carryover) basis plus the
gain recognized, if any, to the transferor on the account of the boot.
Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the regulations define
"stock" or "security."88 Those two terms have generated substantial law
review commentary,89 including some by this author,90 and innumerable
85. See Rands, supra note 18, at 1083.
86. I.R.C. § 351(b); see, eg., Wham Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 600 F.2d 1052, 1054
(4th Cir. 1979); Turner v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 922
(1962), on remand, 23 T.C.M. (CCII) 952 (1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1965); see also
Rev. Rul. 80-228, 1980-2 C.B. 115. See generally Rands, supra note 18, at 1084.
87. I.R.C. § 358(a)(2).
88. Section 385 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to
prescribe regulations to determine whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated as stock
or debt. Id. § 385(a). Section 385(b) sets forth five factors that "the regulation may include
among other factors." Id. § 385(b). Section 385 was hailed by leading commentators as "per-
haps the most important and potentially far-reaching corporate provision added by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969." B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 4.05. Its literature was
replete with predictions as to the contents of the regulations. Id. at 4-16 to 4-19; see also
Recommendations as to Federal Tax Distinction between Corporate Stock and Indebtedness,
N.Y. State Bar Assoc. Tax Section Committee on Reorganization Problems, 25 TAX LAW. 57
(1971). In March, 1980, the Treasury issued a lengthy, detailed and controversial set of pro-
posed regulations. 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957 (1980). These regulations promulgated in December,
1980, were to be effective for investments after April 30, 1981, but the Treasury twice extended
their effective date in the face of criticism from the tax bar and the special interest groups.
Extensive amendments were proposed in December, 1981, followed by still further extensions
of the extension date. In July, 1983, all versions of the regulations were withdrawn, and it is
likely that the entire project will be abandoned. See LIND & SCHWARZ, supra note 30, at 114.
89. See, e.g., Fisher, The Conversion of Ordinary Income to Capital Gain By Intentionally
Avoiding Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 32 Mo. L. Rav. 421, 436 (1967);
Griswold, "Securities" and Continuity of Interest, 58 HARv. L. REV. 705, 718-25 (1945); Ja-
cobs, Something Simple: A Tax-Free Incorporation, 37 TAX LAW. 133, 134-35 (1983); Kauf-
man, Securities Within the Tax-Free Reorganization and Exchange Provisions, 8th Ann.
N.Y.U. Tax Inst. 117, 117-22 (1950); Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corpo-
rate Debt. A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAx L. REv. 369 (1971); White, Sleepers
That Travel With Section 351 Transfers, 56 VA. L. REV. 37, 51 (1970); Comment, Section 351
Transfers to Controlled Corporations: The Forgotten Term- "Securities," 114 U. PA. L. REV.
314 (1965).
90. See, eg., Rands, supra note 18, at 1088-99.
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reported judicial opinions. 91
Nevertheless it is possible to make some generalizations about the
two terms. Stock generally refers to what is known in non-tax circles as
"equity securities.",92 It includes non-voting9 3 as well as voting94 and
preferred95 as well as common.9 6 The section 351 regulations declare
that the term "stock or securities" does not include rights or stock
warrants.9 7
As it is used in tax law, the term "securities" is limited to what is
known in non-tax circles as "debt securities."98 This limitation in defini-
tion is not found in the financial world where the term "securities" in-
cludes equity securities as well as debt securities.99 Unlike in the
financial world, in tax law a debtor-creditor relationship must exist for
an interest in a corporation to be counted as a "security."'I"° Addition-
ally, in tax law the term "security" contemplates a corporate debt that
amounts to an investment in the corporation-one that represents an
integral part of the corporation's long-term financial planning. 10 1 For
91. See, eg., Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Bradshaw
v. United States, 683 F.2d 365 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Dennis v. Commissioner, 473 F.2d 274 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Mills, 399 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Hertwig, 398 F.2d
452 (5th Cir. 1968); Neville Coke & Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 599 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 726 (1945); Commissioner v. Sisto Fin. Corp., 139 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1943);
D'Angelo Assocs. Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 121 (1978); Camp Wolters Enter. v. Commis-
sioner, 22 T.C. 737 (1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 826 (1956);
Wolf Envelope Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 471 (1951).
92. See, eg., H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 383 (2d. ed. 1983); see
also Federal Securities Act of 1934, § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(11); Federal Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. 101(l5)(A); cf B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 14.03; F. O'NEAL &
R. THOMPSON, O'NEAI'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1987).
93. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 92, at 449.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 403.
96. Where there is only one class of shares, such shares, regardless of how the class is
designated, are in effect "common shares." Id.
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1967).
98. See LIND & SCHWARZ, supra note 30, at 67. For a discussion of what constitutes debt
securities, see generally H. ABRAMS & R. DOERNBERG, supra note 55, at 28-30; W., CARY &
M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS at 1108-12 (5th ed. 1980); R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF COR-
PORATIONS 100-03 (1980); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 92, at 380.
99. See THE MCGRAw-HILL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 530 (2d ed. 1973);
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 92, at 379-80.
100. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 98, at 1106-12; F. O'NEAL & R. THOMP-
SON, supra note 92, at § 2.10; LIND & SCHWARZ, supra note 30, at 67; B. BrrrxER & J.
EUSTICE, supra note 29, at 4-13; see also Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir.
19r57), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959); Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11,
12 (2d Cir. 1935); Camp Wolters, 22 T.C. at 751.
101. See B. BrrITKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 3.03; see also Lagerquist, 53 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 535; Camp Wolters, 22 T.C. at 750-51.
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example, a debt owed by a corporation to a supplier on an open account
is not a security while a twenty year promissory note constituting a sig-
nificant portion of its capital structure is considered a security.
10 2
Despite protestations to the contrary,10 3 once it has been decided
that an instrument is bona fide debt and not equity, the term of the debt
is clearly the single most important factor in determining whether a debt
obligation amounts to a security."° Debt instruments payable in full
within five years usually are not considered securities,105 except under
unusual circumstances. 106 Such debts are too close to a cash equivalent
to be considered an investment in the business, a sine qua non for securi-
ties status.
In contrast, a debt instrument maturing at ten years or more is
likely to be considered a security,10 7 for then it is an integral part of the
corporation's capital structure. Though some commentators have con-
sidered debts maturing within a five to ten year period to be of questiona-
ble status,10 8 debts within that time frame generally have been classified
as securities.10 9 Debts calling for payments both before and after the five
year dividing line have been classified both ways, with authorities looking
at both the average term and the date of final payment.11 0
102. See Crofoot v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 97 (1945).
103. See, eg., Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 377; Sisto Fin. Corp., 139 F.2d at 255; Nye, 50 T.C. at
212; Camp Wolters, 22 T.C. at 751; see also Plumb, supra note 89, at 562.
104. See, e.g., Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 377 n.28; Dennis, 473 F.2d at 283; Hertwig, 398 F.2d
at 455; Campbell, 322 F.2d at 832-35; see also B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, % 3.04;
Plumb, supra note 89, at 562-63; Rands, supra note 18, at 1089.
105. See Pinellas Ice & Storage Co., 287 U.S. at 468-69; Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 377 n.28;
Neville Coke & Chem. Co., 148 F.2d at 602; Nye, 50 T.C. at 212 n.9; B. BrrrKER & J. Eus-
TicE, supra note 29, 3.04; Plumb, supra note 89, at 562-63; Rands, supra note 18, at 1089.
106. See Campbell, 322 F.2d at 832-35; Plumb, supra note 89, at 563; Rands, supra note 18,
at 1090.
107. Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 377 n.28; see, e.g., Hertwig, 398 F.2d at 455 (12 1/2 years);
Burnham v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1936)(10 years), cert denied, 300 U.S. 683
(1937); Parkland Place Co. v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Tex. 1964)(10 years),
aff'd, 354 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1966); Nye, 50 T.C. at 214 (10 year installments); see generally
Kaufman, supra note 89, at 119; Plumb, supra note 89, at 563; Rands, supra note 18, at 1089.
108. Kaufman, supra note 89, at 120; Plumb, supra note 89, at 563; Rands, supra note 18, at
1089.
109. See, e.g., Helvering v. Watts, 296 U.S. 563 (1935) (one to seven year bonds were securi-
ties); Parkland Place, 354 F.2d at 918 (ten year promissory note was security); Campbell, 322
F.2d at 834-35 (five year promissory note held to be security); Commissioner v. Freund, 98
F.2d 201 (3d. Cir. 1938) (six year serial bonds deemed to be security); Burnham, 86 F.2d at
777 (ten year promissory classified as security); Camp Wolters, 22 T.C. at 753 (installment
notes payable between five and nine years held to be security); see also Plumb, supra note 89, at
563-64; Rands, supra note 18, at 1089.
110. See Rev. Rul. 59-98, 1959-1 C.B. 76; Rev. Rul. 56-303, 1956-2 C.B. 193; see also Brad-
shaw, 683 F.2d at 377 n.28; Hertwig, 398 F.2d at 455; Nye, 50 T.C. at 213.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
The rationale for the stock or securities requirement is subtler than
that for some of the other requirements. After all, if the transferor con-
trols the transferee corporation, what difference should the type of con-
sideration he receives make? The transferor still owns the transferred
property, because he owns the corporation, no matter what he received in
exchange for the property. The rationale seems to be that at the heart of
the "stock or securities" requirement is the desire to make certain that
"sales" of properties are taxable to the seller. The tax law does not want
someone who has "cashed out" on his property to avoid recognition of
his gain. If the transferor is paid with cash or with property not amount-
ing to an ownership interest in the corporation, he owns something he
did not own before, cash or the other piece of property. The transferor is
"cashed out" on that property-he has turned it into something different
than the transferred property itself.
This rationale makes sense when all the transferor receives in ex-
change for his property is stock of his controlled corporation. At that
point he is neither cashed in on a hypothetical gain nor closed out on a
hypothetical loss. His position is essentially unchanged. Before the ex-
change he owned the piece of property. Afterwards he owns a corpora-
tion that owns the same piece of property. All that he got in the
transaction is a piece of paper that says he owns the corporation that
owns the piece of property that he transferred. The receipt of stock re-
quirement serves the purpose of separating a change in form-something
that should be nontaxable-from a sale, something that should be
taxable.
On the other hand, this rationale falters considerably for the trans-
feror in a section 351 exchange who takes securities rather than stock of
the controlled corporation. Indeed, it is curious that section 351 even
accords nonrecognition treatment for the recipient of securities. The
transferor of the property is making himself a creditor of the corporation
when before he-was the outright owner of the property that he conveyed
to the corporation. Other nonrecognition code sections in corporate tax
law make the change from an equity to a debt position a taxable event.II'
Is not that change akin to a sale? Whether or not it is, section 351 seems
to leave no doubt that transfers of property to a controlled corporation in
exchange for securities is tax free." 2 There could be a deeper policy rea-
son for allowing nonrecognition-perhaps the purpose is to accommo-
date the owners of a closely-held venture who, for non-tax reasons, often
desire some shareholder-held debt in their capital structure as a hedge
111. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(2)(ii), 355(a)(3)(A)(ii).
112. Id. § 351(a).
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against bankruptcy.' 13 Again, the United States wants to encourage the
formation of new business, and maybe this accommodation of the small
business owner will promote that policy, notwithstanding the weakness
of the change-of-form rationale, as applied to property-for-securities
transactions. 114
Two companion revenue rulings help to explain the role of securities
in section 351 exchanges."' In the first of these rulings, pursuant to a
plan, four individuals (A, B, C and D) each transferred property of equal
value to a newly organized domestic corporation." 6 A, B and C received
all of the stock in exchange for their property. D received securities but
no stock of the corporation in exchange for his property. 17 The govern-
ment opined that A, B and C would not recognize a gain or loss, because
they maintained a proprietary interest in the property transferred
through stock ownership which put them in control of the corporation
within the meaning of section 368(c). D, on the other hand, was not
covered by section 351, because he was not part of a group that "con-
trols" the corporation according to section 368(c), which is one of the
requirements for section 351 treatment.118 The ownership of securities in
such a corporation, even though representing a bona fide indebtedness,
provided him with no proprietary interest in the corporation, but rather,
with an interest only as a creditor. D failed to qualify under the con-
tinuity-of-interest principle and, accordingly, D was required to recog-
nize a gain or a loss." 9
When one bears in mind that section 351 unequivocally provides
nonrecognition treatment for the exchange of property for securities, one
might question the above revenue ruling which would tax D when he
exchanges his property for securities.' 20 The law is clear that a group of
transferors is to be treated as a single unit for purposes of the section 351
control test, provided it acts pursuant to a plan.' 21 D would seem to
meet all of the section 351 criteria, even though he received securities
only and no stock: (1) D transferred property to the corporation; (2) D
received securities in such corporation; (3) the securities were in ex-
change for the property transferred; and (4) because D and A, B and C
113. See generally Rands, supra note 18.
114. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
115. Rev. Rul. 73-472, 1973-2 C.B. 114; Rev. Rul. 73-473, 1973-2 C.B. 115.
116. Rev. Rul. 73-472, 1973-2 C.B. 114.
117. Id.
118. I.R.C. § 368(c).
119. Rev. Rul. 73-472, 1973-2 C.B. 114.
120. Id. at 116.
121. See I.R.C. § 318 (constructive stock ownership rules).
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acted as a group, D was part of the group that controlled the corporation
immediately after the transfer. 122 The primary source of authority cited
by the government in the revenue ruling was a 1940 Supreme Court deci-
sion 123 that declined to treat an exchange of all of the assets of one corpo-
ration for bonds of another corporation as a tax-free reorganization
under the Revenue Act of 1928.124 In that case, neither the selling cor-
poration nor its sole stockholder took any equity in the acquiring corpo-
ration. 125 Hence, the whole transaction failed under the continuity-of-
interest doctrine. 126 The facts of the revenue ruling are distinguishable in
that A, B and C did take stock in the controlled corporation 127 and thus
at least a major part of the transaction satisfied continuity-of-interest
principles. More importantly, unlike the Revenue Act of 1928,128 the
Internal Revenue Codes of 1954 and 1986 contain explicit rules in the
reorganization sections that make a change in status from stockholder to
securityholder a taxable event.129 Current section 351 has no corre-
sponding provision,1 30 even though the reorganization sections 131 show
that Congress was aware of the issue when it enacted the Codes.
132
In the other companion revenue ruling, 133 four individuals (A, B, C
and D again) already owned all of the outstanding stock of a domestic
corporation, which had been operating for a number of years. Each
122. Rev. Rul. 73-472, 1973-2 C.B. 115.
123. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940).
124. Id. at 419 (citing Revenue Act of 1928, § 112(i), c. 852, 45 Stat. 791, 818 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1) (1982)).
125. Id.
126. Id. For a discussion of the continuity-of-interest doctrine see infra notes 127-40 and
accompanying text. See also B. BITrER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 3.04.
127. Rev. Rul. 73-472, 1973-2 C.B. 115.
128. See LeTulle, 308 U.S. at 419 (citing Revenue Act of 1928, § 112(i), c. 852, 45 Stat. 791,
818 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 368(a)(1) (1982)).
129. See I.R.C. §§ 354(b)(1), 355(a)(3)(A).
130. Id. § 351. D did not retain a proprietary interest in the enterprise to which he trans-
ferred the property. See Rev. Rul. 73-472, 1973-2 C.B. 115. For cases supporting the govern-
ment's position, see, e.g., LeTulle, 308 U.S. at 419-21; Pinellas Ice & Col Storage Co., 287 U.S.
at 468-70; West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 494 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1974); Roebling v. Com-
missioner, 143 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 773 (1944); Commissioner v. Ameri-
can Light & Traction Co., 125 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1942); Helvering v. New President Corp.,
122 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1941). See generally Posin, Taxing Corporate Reorganizations: Purging
Penelope's Web, 133 U. PA. L. Rv. 1335, 1360 (1985); Turnier, Continuity of Interest-Its
Application to Shareholders of the Acquiring Corporation, 64 CAL. L. REV. 902, 921 (1976).
131. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1).
132. These comments are not intended to mean that the government's position is not fully
untenable. The courts probably would accept it. After all, looking at D and at D standing
alone, he fails the continuity-of-interest test. Perhaps the best way to put it is that the govern-
ment's position is debatable, though not necessarily wrong.
133. Rev. Rul. 73-473, 1973-2 C.B. 115.
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transferred property to the corporation in exchange solely for securities
of the corporation.13 4 The government held that no gain or loss was rec-
ognized to A, B, C or D, because each owned a proprietary interest in the
transferee corporation immediately after the transfer as represented by
their ownership of stock in the corporation. 135 While it might be strange
to accord nonrecognition treatment for this change from an equity to a
debt interest, the language of section 351 strongly supports this revenue
ruling.1 36 Section 351 clearly covers transfers of property to a controlled
corporation in exchange for securities of the corporation. 137 Unlike the
reorganization sections,1 31 section 351 contains no special rules that
make a taxable event the change from equity to debt. 139 The continuity-
of-interest principle is not violated, because A, B, C and D all own stock
in the corporation after the transaction is completed."4
C. Exchange of Property for Stock or Securities
For section 351 to apply, the transferee corporation must issue its
shares of securities in exchange for the transferred property.' Though
not usually controversial, this exchange requirement can generate dis-
putes when the transferor retains an interest in intangible property trans-
ferred to the corporation.'42 The issue closely parallels those involving
134. Id.
135. Id. at 116.
136. I.R.C. § 351(a).
137. Id.
138. See id. §§ 354(b)(1), 355(a)(3)(A).
139. Id. § 351.
140. Rev. Rul. 73-473, 1973-2 C.B. 116. The stock owned by A, B, C and D represent a
proprietary interest in the entity that owns the transferred property. For a discussion of the
continuity-of-interest doctrine, see generally Turnier, supra note 130, at 916-28.
141. I.R.C. § 351(a) (1986).
142. B. BrrTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 3.04, at 3-14. For decisions involving such
controversy, see First Victoria Nat'l Bank v. United States, 620 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1980); E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Magnus v. Com-
missioner, 259 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1958); Hickman v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 864 (1958); Claude
Neon Lights, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 424 (1937); see also I.R.C. § 1235 (transfers of
all substantial rights to a patent); id. § 1253 (transfers of franchises, trademarks and trade
names). while a transfer of franchise rights and the like to a controlled corporation in ex-
change for its stock could, on its face, be considered to constitute a prohibited "retained inter-
est" transfer under section 1253, that provision presumably ought not to be read to deny
section 351 nonrecognition treatment to incorporation transfers of such property in the ab-
sence of a clear congressional intent to this effect. The stated purpose of section 1253 was to
clarify the sale/license distinction in the case of a taxable transfer of franchises, not to prohibit
the tax-free incorporation of such items. See generally Olson, Federal Income Taxation of
Patent & Know-How Transfers, 28 ST. Louis U. L. J. 537 (1984); Stiner, The Tax Conse-
quences of Transferring Patent Rights in an Invention, 31 PRAc. LAW. 81 (1985).
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the definition of "property" discussed above.143 The concern of the gov-
ernment is that the retention of a substantial interest in the intangible
property might make the transfer itself no more than a granting of a
license to use the property, payments for which ordinarily are taxable
immediately as ordinary income. 4 Moreover, shares or securities con-
stitute capital assets to the transferor. 4 In the halcyon days of preferen-
tial treatment for long-term capital gains, if a transferor waited six
months before selling the stock, a transferor could have turned an ordi-
nary income item (the license) into a long-term capital gain.' 46 Hence,
the government has wanted section 351 not to apply and the shares 6r
securities to be treated as royalties, i.e., taxable immediately to the trans-
feror as ordinary income. 47 Emphasizing the presence of the word "ex-
change" within the statutory language of section 351, the government
has contended that the section 351 exchange requirement should be
equated with the concept of "sale or exchange" under the capital gains
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 148 Importing the definition of
the word "exchange" from the capital gains sections, the government
would require an "unqualified right in perpetuity ... of all substantial
rights in the property" for section 351 to apply.'4 9
The Court of Claims has rejected the government position.'50 In
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States,'5' a parent corporation
had granted its wholly-owned subsidiary a royalty-free, nonexclusive li-
cense to make, use and sell herbicides under patents belonging to the
parent, which retained all other rights to the patents.'52 In exchange for
143. See supra notes 42-71 and accompanying text.
144. See, eg., Rev. Rul. 71-564, 1971-2 C.B. 179 (transfer of know-how an "exchange"
under section 351, if term lasts until trade secret becomes public knowledge and no longer
protectable under local law of country of use); Rev. Rul. 69-156, 1969-1 C.B. 101 (transfer of
patent rights for stock held not to qualify as section 351 exchange because transferor retained
substantial rights in property); Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133 (transfer of industrial know-
how qualifies for nonrecognition under certain conditions).
145. Shares of stock are capital assets, except in the hands of dealers. I.R.C. § 1221(1)
(1986). See Rands, Closely Held Businesses: Tax Advantages and Disadvantages of the Differ-
ent Forms of Business Organizations, 91 COMM. L. J. 61, 108 n.405 (1986); see also Rands,
Closely Held Corporations: Federal Tax Consequences of Stock Transfer Restrictions, 7 J.
CORP. L. 449, 450 (1982). Moreover, section 1236 contains rules about whether gains by
dealers and securities count as capital gains or not. I.R.C. § 1236.
146. I.R.C. § 1222(3).
147. See Rev. Rul. 69-156, 1969-1 C.B. 101.
148. See Rothman, Transfers to Controlled Corporations: In General, 347 Tax Mgmt.
(BNA) at A-7 (1983); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(d) (1972).
149. See Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, 135; see also Rothman, supra note 148, at A-8.
150. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1212.
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this grant and in lieu of royalties, the parent corporation received stock
in the subsidiary. 153  The government took the position, described
above, 154 that the transfer of the licenses for the shares did not amount to
an exchange for purposes of section 351 because the transfer did not re-
sult in a complete divestiture of all of the parent's interest in the pat-
ents.155 The Court of Claims found a "compelling reason" for not
importing the capital gains exchange requirement into section 351-sec-
tion 351 and the capital gains sections have directly opposing aims. The
capital gains section stresses the completeness of disposition by the trans-
feror, while section 351 emphasizes the transferor's continuing dominion
over the property through its requirement that the transferor control the
transferee corporation. 6 The court stated that if continuation of con-
trol is the essence of section 351, it would be "odd to hold" that retention
of some of the economic rights in the transferred property by the trans-
feror ought to be a taxable event. 57 The transferor is then giving up less
than he would if he transferred all his rights in the property for shares or
securities, an exchange that undoubtedly would qualify under section
351.158
The government position was not completely without merit. Section
351 uses the word "exchange"' 59 and that word has a definite meaning in
the capital gains provisions of the Code."6  According to the drafting
rule of parallelism, it is good draftsmanship to give the same meaning to
the same word throughout one statute or document.' 61 Thus, it would
make sense that "exchange" means the same thing in different sections of
the Internal Revenue Code.
Nevertheless, the Court of Claims position in Du Pont seems supe-
rior.'62 It is improbable that Congress was thinking about the drafting
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
155. E.. Du Pont, 471 F.2d at 1213-15.
156. Id. at 1217-18.
157. Id. at 1218-19.
158. Id. at 1219.
159. I.R.C. § 351(a).
160. Sections 1222, 1231 and 1235, for example, all use the term "exchange." See I.R.C.
§§ 1222, 1231, 1235. For a discussion of the meaning of the term "exchange" in a capital gains
case, see E.L Du Pont, 471 F.2d at 1217-18.
161. The drafting rule described as parallelism is the fundamental concept of consistency in
drafting statutes, that words and expressions recurring through the statute be given the same
meaning. R. DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 11-12 (1965). When
words are used in a consistent and repetitious manner in statutes, the legislative intent may be
inferred that these words were intended to have the same meaning. A. RUSSELL, LEGISLA-
TIVE DRAFTING AND FORMS 13 (4th ed. 1938).
162. E.I. Du Pont, 471 F.2d at 1214.
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rule of parallelism when it used the word "exchange" in these two dispa-
rate sections of the Code, sections that have contrasting objectives. More
importantly, in Du Pont the patents had not yet earned any income for
the parent at the time of the transfer. 163 No outsider had paid anything
to use them. 164 The parent still owned all rights to the patents, although
a few of those rights had been dropped down to the subsidiary in ex-
change for shares of the subsidiary.1 65 Plainly the same taxpayer owned
the same assets, although part of it had been placed inside another corpo-
rate shell: There had yet to be a true cashing in on the patents. True, the
parent had exchanged an ordinary income item (a nonexclusive license)
for a capital asset (stock), but that sort of change is common in section
351 exchanges. Moreover, this change can hardly be said to be a tax
shelter. The transferred items retain their ordinary income status in the
hands of the transferee corporation,1 66 and the transferor's holding pe-
riod begins on the date of the exchange. 167 Assuming a regime favoring
long-term capital gains, any sale of shares within six months of the ex-
change would entitle the transferor to short-term capital gain (or loss)
only.1 68 Furthermore, the retention of some of the attributes of owner-
ship attached to a particular item of property by the transferor does not
preclude the transferred rights from constituting "property" for purposes
of section 351. The right to use property is "property" within the mean-
ing of the section.169 If accepted, the government's position would un-
dercut tax-free treatment for what is indeed an exchange of property for
shares of securities, a transaction that meets the literal requirements of
section 351. The government's importation of the definition of "ex-
change" from such an inapposite part of the Code as the capital gains
provisions, which have an objective diametrically opposed to that of sec-
tion 351, hardly justifies removing a transaction that facially meets the
section 351 requirements from the coverage of that section.
Is the taxpayer "safe" in assuming that the retention of some of the
attributes of ownership in intangible property will not disqualify a trans-
fer of several of the other attributes from tax-free treatment under section
163. Id. at 1212.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1219.
166. I.R.C. § 1221(1). The license on the patent would be used to produce stock in trade or
inventory, types of property expressly excluded from the term "capital asset." Id.
167. Id. § 1223(1).
168. Id. §§ 1222(1), (2).
169. See, eg., R. & J. Furniture Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 857, 865 (1953), rev'd on
other grounds, 221 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1955) (leasehold interest was held to be property for a
section 351 purpose).
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351? The answer to that question would have to be "no." While the
government has suffered losses in the courtroom, it has not budged from
its position that the transferor must give up substantially all rights in the
property for perpetuity. 171 Unless tax counsel is willing to march down
to the courthouse, perhaps he or she should either seek an advance ruling
from the government or transfer all rights connected with the intangible
property to the corporation in the section 351 transfer.
D. Control of the Transferee Corporation
1. Rationale
Section 351(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the non-
recognition of gain or loss to a person or persons transferring property to
a corporation solely in exchange for stock or securities of that corpora-
tion, but only if that person or persons are in control of the corporation
immediately after the exchange. 17 1 According to section 368(c) and the
regulations, that person or persons are in control of the corporation if
they own at least 80% of the total combined voting power of the corpo-
ration and at least 80% in number of the shares of all nonvoting classes
170. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 71-564, 1971-2 C.B. 179; Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B. 133.
171. I.R.C. § 351(a) (1986). For some of the literature on the control requirements, see
generally Baldwin, Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code and 'Mid-Stream' Incorporations,
38 U. CIN. L. REv. 96 (1969); Barnett, Problems in Incorporating the Going Business, 59
A.B.A. J. 1190 (1973); Blanchard, The Service's Recent Attack" Taxation of Section 351 Ex-
changes Between Shareholders and Newly Organized Holding Companies, 35 TAX LAW. 163
(1981); Bowen, The Reach of Section 351, 59 TAXEs 926 (1981); Chirelstein & Lopata, Recent
Developments in the Step-Transaction Doctrine, 60 TAxEs 970 (1982); Darrell, Corporate Orga-
nizations and Reorganizations Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 32 TAXES 1007
(1954); Ellis, Tax Problems in Sales to Controlled Corporations, 21 VAND. L. RaV. 196 (1968);
Fisher, Does Rev. RuL 77-449 Signal a Change in IRS Application of the Step-Transaction
Doctrine?, 51 J. TAX'N 76 (1979); Goldstein, Tax-Free Incorporations: Are Courts Today Tak-
ing Too Restrictive View of Section 351?, 39 J. TAX'3N 165 (1973); Jacobs, Supreme Court Fur-
ther Restricts the Step Transaction Doctrine, 29 J. TAX'N 2 (1968); Levin & Bowen, Taxable
and Tax-Free Two-Step Acquisitions and Minority Squeeze-Outs, 33 TAX L. Rav. 425 (1978);
Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. INT'L FED. TAX.
247 (1954); Posin, A Case Study in Income Tax Complexity: The Type A Reorganization, 47
OHIO ST. L. J. 627 (1986); Rands, Section 356(a)(2): A Study of Uncertainty in Corporate
Taxation, 38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 75 (1983); Rosenberg, Use of Section 351 by Minority Stock-
holders in Acquisitions Challenged by New Rulings, 54 J. TAX'N 76 (1981); Rothman, supra
note 143; Rothman, Transfers to Controlled Corporations: Related Problems, 348 Tax Mgmt.
(BNA) (1978); Samuels, The Limited Role of Section 351 in Corporate Acquisitions, 60 TAXES
955 (1982); Schwarz, Liquidation-Reincorporation: A Sensible Approach Consistent with Con-
gressional Policy, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 231 (1984); Steiner, Taxation of Corporate Distribu-
tions-Before and After TEFRA, 68 IOWA L. RaV. 937 (1983); Tillinghast & Paully, The
Effect of the Collateral Issuance of Stock or Securities on the Control Requirements of Section
351, 37 TAX L. REv. 251 (1982); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1) (1988).
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of stock.172  The purpose of the control requirement is to enforce the
continuity-of-interest principle that underlies the nonrecognition treat-
ment accorded by section 351.173 If the transferors of the property own
80% or more of the transferee corporation, they have preserved their
proprietary interest in the transferred property by virtue of their stock
ownership and ought not to be taxed for what amounts to a change in
form but not in substance of their ownership. 174 Inversely, a transfer of
property to a corporation not controlled by the transferors is more than a
change in the form of ownership because the transferors are giving up
their dominion over the transferred property. The transaction is no
longer an internal rearrangement of the transferor's own assets accompa-
nied by no sacrifice of control. 175 Instead, third parties-the other share-
holders in the corporate transferee-acquire a substantial, albeit indirect,
interest in the transferred property. Hence, the exchange is like a sale
and ought to be taxable to the transferors.
176
2. 80% requirement
Though it is by no means exclusive, 80% stock ownership is a com-
mon watershed in measuring a controlling stock interest in corporate tax
law. 17 7 In a sense it is arbitrary; it could just as well be 70% or 75% or
any other arbitrarily chosen percentage. It is more the product of line-
drawing, however, than capricious behavior by Congress. For example,
let us look at a person, Anne, who is the sole owner of a piece of prop-
erty. If she transfers that property to a corporation for 100% of its
shares, she has not given up any rights in that property. As sole share-
holder, she picks out whomever she wants to run the corporate affairs.
Thus, she retains control over the use of the property. Any income gen-
erated by the property inures solely to her benefit; she can either take it
out of corporate solution through dividends or salaries, or she can leave
it in the corporation to build up the book value of her shares. If she
172. I.R.C. § 368(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (as amended in 1986).
173. Six Seam Co. v. United States, 524 F.2d 347, 355 (6th Cir. 1975); E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211, 1214-16 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Portland Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
174. See Heverly v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1227, 1243 (3d Cir. 1980); E. Du Pont, 471
F.2d at 1214-18; Heberlein Patent Corp. v. United States, 105 F.2d 965, 968 (2d Cir. 1939).
175. See Six Seam Co., 524 F.2d at 355; E.L Du Pont, 471 F.2d at 1214.
176. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 318(a)(2)(C), (3)(C) (1986) (50% or more in value ownership test
to trigger the section 318 constructive stock ownership rules).
177. See, ag., I.R.C. § 332(b)(1) (liquidation of subsidiary); id. § 338(d)(3) (stock purchases
treated as asset acquisitions); id. § 355(a)(1)(D)(ii) (corporate divisions); id. § 368(a)(1)(B)
("B" reorganizations); id. § 368(a)(1)(C) ("C" reorganizations); id. § 1239(c)(1)(A) (sales of
depreciable property between 80% shareholder and his corporation).
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wants to cash in on the property, she can sell her shares. If she wants to
reconvert the property to her personal use, she can make the corporation
distribute the property to her (either as a dividend or a liquidating
distribution).
If Anne takes less then 100% of the shares of the corporate trans-
feree, however, she suffers a dilution in her rights in the transferred prop-
erty. Whereas before the transfer she owned 100% of the ownership
rights attributable to the transferred item, she now must share those
rights with the other shareholders of the corporate transferee. If she
takes anything more than 50% of the shares (even one share more than
50%), she probably is not giving up the power to control how the prop-
erty is used. State law normally vests the majority shareholder with the
power to elect the full board of directors and, hence, the power to deter-
mine corporate policy.178
Assuming that the transferor does have voting control over the cor-
poration, however, would not ownership of anything more than 50% of
the shares be a more logical measuring stick of control than the 80%
now in the statute?179 Probably not, because a reduction from 100% to
approximately 50% in the economic rights attributable to the transferred
property is significant. For example, if Anne takes 51% of the shares,
only 51% of the income generated by the property inures to her benefit.
Of course, there should be a quidpro quo for this percentage reduction-
presumably the 49% shareholders are contributing something of value to
the corporation. But the reduction in interest from 100% to 51% is too
large to consider the transaction a mere change in the form of ownership.
Anne is accepting a 49% reduction in her economic rights to her prop-
erty in exchange for a 51% interest in the property transferred by the
49% shareholders. The change in Anne's interest is too great not to be
considered a taxable exchange or sale. Of course, if Anne owns exactly
178. See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 92, §§ 3.12, 3.16, 4.02. A statement of
the Georgia Supreme Court is typical: "The majority stockholders, or the majority of the
directors... have the right to determine the business policy of the corporation." Regenstein v.
J. Regenstein Co., 213 Ga. 157, 159, 97 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1957); see also MeriUl v. Davis, 359
Mo. 1191, 225 S.W.2d 763 (1950); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 334, 189 N.E. 234,
238 (1934); Hand v. Dexter, 41 Ga. 454, 461 (1871). Of course, state law also permits majority
shareholders to cede part of the decision-making power to the minority shareholders, a conces-
sion that minority shareholders often insist upon as a prerequisite to their investment. F.
O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 92, at § 4.02-.03.
179. The Internal Revenue Code does contain several control tests set at 50% of stock
ownership. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 3120)(2) (allocation of earnings and profits within affiliated
group of foreign investment companies); idt § 318(a)(2)(C) (constructive stock ownership
rules); id. § 318(a)(3)(C) (same); id. § 542(a)(2) (stock ownership requirement for personal
holding companies).
1011
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
80% of the shares of the corporation (and thereby satisfies the control
test for purposes of section 351), her economic interest in the transferred
property is diminished, too, but only from 100% to 80%, which is not
such a substantial reduction.
Essentially then, the 80% line represents a compromise between re-
quiring 100% stock ownership in the corporate transferee, a requirement
that would allow for no dilution whatsoever in the transferors' interest in
the transferred property, and allowing a mere majority stock interest in
the corporate transferee to suffice, a rule that would allow a substantial
dilution in the economic rights attributable to property ownership.
3. Numbers, not value
The Internal Revenue Code has a variety of control tests that are
deceptively similar, and one needs to use care to differentiate among
them. For example, some tests require 50% stock ownership only."'
Others are measured by the value and not the number of shares held."'1
Other 80% tests exclude nonvoting, nonparticipating preferred shares.
1 8 2
The 80% test used for purposes of section 351 is contained in section
368(c) and is also used in reorganizations.1 3 It is measured by the
number and not the value of shares held by the transferors of property.
1 4
Moreover, except for transfers involving corporations that are part of an
affiliated group filing consolidated tax returns,18 5 none of the statutory
attribution of constructive ownership rules, elsewhere applicable in cor-
porate taxation, 186 apply to the control test of section 368(c).'
8 7
Tribunals have also rendered divergent decisions regarding control.
Several old cases have attributed shares held by trustees or estate repre-
180. See sources cited supra note 179.
181. See, eg., I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(C) (constructive stock ownership rules); id. § 318(a)(3)(C)
(same); id. § 1239(c)(1)(A) (sales of depreciable property between 80% shareholder and his
corporation).
182. See, eg., id. § 332(b)(1) (liquidation of subsidiaries); id. § 338(d)(3)(B) (qualified stock
purchase treated as asset acquisition).
183. See, eg., id. § 351(a) (corporate divisions); id. § 355(a)(1)(D)(ii) (same); id.
§ 368(a)(1)(B)-(D) (reorganizations); id. § 368(a)(2)(E) (same).
184. See Rothman, supra note 148, at A-14.
185. For purposes of measuring control in a section 351 exchange, a member of an affiliated
group, in a consolidated return year, must include stock owned by all other members of the
group in the transferee corporation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-34 (as amended in 1966).
186. The constructive stock ownership rules of section 318, for example, apply to transac-
tions in several other sections. See, eg., I.R.C. § 302(c)(1) (redemptions); id. § 304(c)(3) (al-
tered section 318 rules applicable to redemptions and sales of stock involving related
corporations); id. § 356(a)(2) (treatment of boot as dividends and reorganizations).
187. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-130, 1978-1 C.B. 114; Rev. Rul. 56-613, 1956-2 C.B. 212. See
also Rothman, supra note 148, at A-14.
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sentatives to the beneficial owners,"'8 but the persuasiveness of these
cases as precedent has been questioned."8 9 A recent Tax Court opinion
rejected a taxpayer's argument that, for purposes of measuring control,
shares held in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of others should be
aggregated with shares held by the same person but not in any fiduciary
capacity and instead in their own name and own right. 190 Deciding cor-
rectly on this issue, the Tax Court expressly refused to determine that the
shares held by a trustee should be attributed to the trust beneficiaries. 9 '
4. Stock entitled to vote
For corporations with more than one class of stock, the statutory
language is not a model of clarity. Section 368(c) provides: "[T]he term
'control' means the ownership of stock possessing at least 80% of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at
least 80% of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the
corporation." '92 With respect to the voting stock requirement, the sec-
tion has been interpreted to require the transferors to own shares enti-
tling them to at least 80% of the votes in the corporation.1 93 If the
corporation has more than one class of voting stock, the transferors are
not required to own 80% of each class of voting stock so long as they
own shares entitling them to 80% or more of the voting power.' 94 For
example, suppose that X Corp has two classes of voting stock-class A
and class B. Class A entitles its holders to 90% of the votes in the corpo-
ration. Class B entitles its holders to 10% of the votes. Anne transfers
assets to X Corp in exchange for class A shares. Immediately after the
transfer, she owns all of the class A shares, but none of the class B shares.
Because she owns stock possessing at least 80% of the total combined
power in the corporation (90% in her case), she meets the voting stock
requirement, even though she owns none of the class B shares. Where
188. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 636 (1953), aff'd, 220 F.2d 415
(8th Cir. 1955); The Griswold Co. v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 537 (1935); Ridgewood Ceme-
tery Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A., 626 (1932). But see Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S.
49, 51-53 (1963).
189. See, eg., Kamborian v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 847, 865 (1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 219
(1st Cir. 1972); see also Rothman, supra note 148, at A-14.
190. Kamborian, 56 T.C. at 865..
191. Id. at 865-67.
192. I.R.C. § 368(c)(1). See generally Corry, Preferred Stock Issued in Tax-Free Ex-
changes: Does Section 306 Apply?, 35 TAx L. REv. 113 (1980); Posin, supra note 130; Wong,
Controversy Regarding the Presence of "Boot" in a "B" Reorganization: The Reeves and
Heverly Decisions, 62 TAXEs 792 (1984).
193. Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 C.B. 115.
194. Id.
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each class of stock elects a specified number of directors, a weighing
formula is used.195 For example, suppose that X Corp has two classes of
voting stock-class A and class B. Each elects ten and five directors,
respectively. If Anne receives 90% of class A and 60% of class B, she
meets the 80% control requirement since she is deemed to control nine of
the class A directors and three of the class B directors, and therefore,
twelve of fifteen or 80% of all.
Unfortunately, neither the Code, the regulations nor the cases define
the term "entitled to vote." The results are some gray areas of interpre-
tation. For example, many states' corporation codes entitle shareholders
to vote on specified matters irrespective of whether the shares are given
voting power by the charter. 19 6 The holders of shares designated as non-
voting by the charter are likely to have a statutorily guaranteed right to
vote on charter amendments, 197 consolidations, 198 mergers, 99 distribu-
195. See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 92, § 4.08; Rothman, supra note 148, at
A-16 & n.89; see also Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977); Deskins
v. Lawrence County Fair & Dev. Corp., 321 S.W.2d 408 (Ky. 1959); Groves v. Rosemound
Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 413 So. 2d 925 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Bushnell v. Faith, 2 W.L.R. 272
(1970). For further discussion, see generally Ratner, The Government of Business Corpora-
tions: Critical Reflections on the Rule of "One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1970); cf. Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.21 (1984); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 700, 182 (West
Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-324 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212
(1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, 7.40 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 41 (West
Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450:1441 (1983); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200 (441) (Cal-
laghan 1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 612 (McKinney 1986); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.29 (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-15, 31, 33 (Michie 1987); Wis. STAT.
§ 180.25 (1988).
196. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 92, § 3.20. For a general discussion of ways
of achieving various control objectives through stock structure and voting power, see Herwitz,
Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in the Organization of a Close Corporation, 75
HARv. L. REv. 1098, 1113-40 (1962); Seadman, Maintaining Control of Close Corporations, 14
Bus. LAW. 1077, 1078-80 (1959). See Ham, The Close Corporation Under Kentucky Law, 50
Ky. L.J. 125, 143-44 (1961); Logan, Methods to Control the Closely Held Kansas Corporation,
7 KAN. L. Rlv. 405, 406-39 (1959).
197. See, ag., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. § 10.04 (Supp. 1988); CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 700, 903 (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 804 (McKinney 1986); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.69 (Anderson Supp. 1987); see State
ex rel. Chapman v. Urschel, 104 Ohio St. 172, 135 N.E. 630 (1922).
198. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, §§ 251(c), 242, 262 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE
§§ 1701.78-.85 (Anderson Supp. 1987); see also Barton, Business Combinations and the New
General Corporations Law, 9 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 738 (1976); Small, Corporate Combinations
Under the New California General Corporation Law, 23 UCLA L. REV. 1190 (1976). See
generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 92, § 3.20.
199. See, ag., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1101 (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 242, 251(c), 262 (1983); OHIO REv. CODE ANN., §§ 1701.16, 1701.78-.85 (Anderson Supp.
1987). See generally Barton, supra note 198; Small, supra note 198; see also F. O'NEAL & R.
THOMPSON, supra note 92, § 3.20.
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tions in partial liquidation," ° sale of all corporate assets,20 1 dissolution20 2
and perhaps other matters.20 3 Moreover, such holders may have the
right to vote by class if a proposed action adversely affects the relative
position of the shares in that class.' 4 It is generally thought that these
shares, which entitle holders to vote only upon extraordinary transac-
tions, should not be considered "stock entitled to vote" for purposes of
section 368(C).1 5 Otherwise, there would be no shares that would be
considered as nonvoting stock, and the distinction between voting stock
and nonvoting stock in section 368(c) would be meaningless.
A similar problem exists with respect to other classes of stock that
are nonvoting except upon the occurrence of a designated contingency.
For example, it is common for corporate charters to grant preferred
shareholders the right to vote for directors only after dividends have been
in arrears for a stipulated number of dividend periods.20 6 If the contin-
gency has occurred and the holders of such stock are indeed voting, such
classes of stock obviously are "entitled to vote" and ought to be consid-
ered voting stock for purposes of section 368(c). It is generally thought
that such shares are not voting stock, unless the designated contingency,
which triggers the right to vote, has occurred.20 7
The government could clarify these two uncertain areas by adopting
for section 351 transfers rules developed in analogous areas of corporate
tax law. One revenue ruling holds that the term "voting stock," in the
context of the consolidated return rules, means stock entitled to elect
directors.2 08 The regulations for the disproportionate redemption sub-
200. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1983); OHIO REv. CODE ANN., § 1701.74
(Anderson Supp. 1987); F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 92, § 3.20.
201. See, ag., Goodisson v. North Am. See. Co., 40 Ohio App. 85, 178 N.E. 29 (1931);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1000-1001 (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 262, 271
(1983); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.16, 1701.76 (Anderson Supp. 1987); F. O'NEAL & R.
THOMPSON, supra note 92, § 3.20.
202. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1900-1907 (West Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 271-275 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN., § 1701.86 (Anderson 1985); F. O'NEAL & R.
THOMPSON, supra note 92, § 3.20.
203. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 92, § 3.20.
204. See, eg., REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.04 (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 242(b)(2) (1983); Wis. STAT. § 180.52(2) (1957).
205. Rothman, supra note 148, at A-15, A-16; see also B. B1rTKnR & J. EUSTICE, supra
note 29, § 3.07; cf. Rev. Rul. 69-126, 1969-1 C.B. 218 (uses a similar approach in defining
"voting stock" for purposes of the consolidated return rules).
206. See, e.g., Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975), appeal
dismissed, 365 A.2d 136 (Del. 1976); Ellingwood v. Wolf's Head Oil Refining Co., 38 A.2d
743 (Del. 1944). See generally, W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 98, at 1135-36.
207. Rothman, supra note 148, at A-16; see also B. BrrTKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 29,
§ 3.07; cf. Rev. Rul. 66-339, 1966-2 C.B. 274; Treas. Reg. § 1.302-3(a)(3).
208. Rev. Rul. 69-126, 1969-1 C.B. 218. Section 1504(a)(2)(A), the section explained in this
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section of section 302 declare that stock that does not grant voting rights
"until the happening of an event.., is not voting stock until the happen-
ing of the specific event."2"9 Though the revenue ruling and the regula-
tion both are interpreting a different statutory term ("voting stock"
instead of section 368(c)'s "stock entitled to vote"), their rationale seems
suitable for section 368(c) purposes and should reinforce two of the rec-
ommendations made above:21 (1) stock that votes only on extraordinary
matters would not be considered "stock entitled to vote"; and (2) stock
with contingent voting rights should be considered "stock entitled to
vote" only after the contingency occurs and the holders are voting for
directors.
A more difficult question involves classes of nonvoting stock or se-
curities that are convertible into voting stock. Unlike the preferred share-
holder who has voting rights only upon the occurrence of events beyond
his control, for example, arrearages in dividends, the holder of a convert-
ible issue has the power to become a voting shareholder at any time.
Perhaps such issues should be considered voting stock, because the hold-
ers have within their discretion the power to vote, even if they have yet to
exercise it. However, prevailing authority, though taken from other ar-
eas of corporate tax law, is to the contrary. Convertible securities are not
even considered stock,21' much less voting stock. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has deemed warrants, devices resembling a conversion
feature, not to be "voting stock" for purposes of B reorganizations.212
The section 351 regulations are in accord; stock warrants and stock
rights are not to be considered "stock or securities" for section 351 pur-
poses.213 Furthermore, some authority holds that the ownership of vot-
ing stock constitutes control, even when the shares are subject to
shareholder voting agreements that result in someone else doing the vot-
revenue ruling, uses slightly different terminology ("total voting power of the stock of such
corporation") than section 368(c)(1) ("total combined voting power of all classes of stock enti-
tled to vote"). Compare those two code sections. It is hard, however, to see why these sections
should be interpreted differently.
209. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-3(a) (1960). Like section 368(c)(1), section 302(b)(2) uses the ter-
minology "total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote." See I.R.C.
§§ 302(b)(2)(B), 368(c)(1) (1986). Section 302(b)(2) also uses another term ("all of the voting
stock of the corporation"). Id. § 302(b)(2)(C). But it is difficult to see why this latter language
should be interpreted differently than the language in sections 302(b)(2)(B) or 368(c)(1).
210. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
211. The cases, revenue rulings and regulations uniformly honor convertible debt as debt,
until it is converted into stock. See Rands, supra note 18, at 1062.
212. See Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942); see also infra notes
631-34 and accompanying text.
213. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1967).
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ing instead of the actual holder.214
5. All other classes of stock
Section 368(c) requires the transferors to own, in addition to voting
stock, "at least 80% of the total number of shares of all other classes of
stock of the corporation."21 A 1959 revenue ruling interpreted this
poorly worded language to require ownership of at least 80% of the total
number of shares of each class of nonvoting stock.21 6 The revenue rul-
ing's interpretation reflects what the statutory language probably was in-
tended to say, and everyone seems quite content with it.
6. Groups of transferors
Section 351 clearly covers transfers of property made by more than
one person.217 When the transfers are made by a group of persons, the
control requirement is measured by the stock owned by the group as a
whole.218 In other words, the members' shares are aggregated to see
whether they own 80% or more of the stock entitled to vote and 80% of
each class of nonvoting stock. For example, suppose that Anne, Bob,
Charles and Dorothy have agreed to form a new corporation, X Corp
with each of the four persons to transfer property to X Corp in exchange
for 25% of X Corp's stock. If the stock interests were not allowed to be
aggregated, none of the four people would satisfy the 80% stock owner-
ship test of section 368(c). When they are treated as a group and their
shares are aggregated, they own 100% of the stock of X Corp and
thereby satisfy the 80% stock ownership requirement.
The regulations declare that the phrase "immediately after the ex-
change" does not require simultaneous exchanges by the members of a
group, but generally anticipates the situation where the rights of the par-
214. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 636 (1953), aff'd, 220 F.2d
415 (8th Cir. 1955); Federal Grain Corp. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 242 (1929).
215. I.R.C. § 368(c)(1).
216. Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 C.B. 115.
217. I.R.C. § 351(a). Section 351 provides for nonrecognition treatment when property is
transferred to a corporation by "one or more persons." Id.
218. See, eg., Houck v. Hinds, 215 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1954); Bassick v. Commissioner, 85
F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 592 (1937); American Compress & Warehouse Co. v.
Bender, 70 F.2d 655 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 607 (1934); Miller Bros. Elec., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 49 T.C. 446 (1968); Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 374
(1967), aff'd, 415 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 988 (1970); Stevens Pass,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 532 (1967); Rev. Rul. 79-194, 1979-1 C.B. 145; Rev. Rul. 78-
294, 1978-2 C.B. 141; Rev. Rul. 73-473, 1973-2 C.B. 114; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,011,071 (Dec. 20,
1979); Gen. Couns. Mem. 3,748 (March 28, 1978); Gen. Couns. Mem. 37, 409 (Feb. 9, 1978);
see also Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(2), (b)(1) (as amended in 1967).
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ties have been previously defined by agreement and the execution of the
agreement proceeds expeditiously.2 19 Moreover, if the exchanges do not
occur on approximately the same date and if the taxpayers want an ad-
vance ruling on the applicability of section 351 to their proposed transac-
tion, they need to describe their "plan" and to give a "full explanation."
The cases show a far greater liberality, expecting no more than a genera-
lized understanding between the parties that the members of the group
will transfer property to the corporation. Indeed, in the case of transfers
to close corporations, only the most ingenuous among us are likely to
believe that two or more transfers that take place within a relatively short
time period are not part of an integrated transaction.
When the corporation has multiple classes of stock, there is no re-
quirement that each member of the group receive some of each class of
stock.22 ° The transfers are not disqualified for nonrecognition treatment
under section 351 because, for example, some members of the group get
only common stock and other members of the group get only preferred
stock.221 The regulations also make it clear that section 351 does not
require each member of the group to receive an interest in the corpora-
tion that is proportionate to his interest in the transferred property.222
Where the interest in the corporation is disproportionate to the transfer-
ors' previous interest in the property transferred, the government will
scrutinize the transaction to discover its true nature.22 3 The regulations
offer the example of a father and son who organize a corporation with
100 shares of common stock. The father transfers property worth $8,000
in exchange for 20 shares of stock and the son transfers property worth
$2,000 in exchange for 80 shares of stock. No gain or loss is recognized
219. See, eg., Treas. Reg. § 1.351(a)(1) (as amended in 1967).
220. See Burr Oaks Corp. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1007 (1967); Guss Russell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 965 (1961); Holstein v. Com-
missioner, 23 T.C. 923 (1955); Skouras v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 1024 (1941); Eaton v.
Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 715 (1938).
221. See Burr Oaks Corp., 365 F.2d at 27-28; Guss Russell, 36 T.C. at 969; Holstein, 23 T.C.
at 924-26.
222. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1967); see also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1954). Prior to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, nonrecognition treat-
ment was accorded to multiple transferors only when the stock and securities received by them
were substantially proportionate to their interest in the transferred property. I.R.C.
§ 112(b)(5) (1939). The proportionate interest requirement was eliminated with the enactment
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 39
(1954); S. REP. No. 1522, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1954).
For a full discussion of pre-1954 law, see generally Rothman, supra note 148, at A-10, A-
12.
223. See Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b)(1), (2); S. RFP. No. 1522, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1954);
Rev. Rul. 76-454, 1976-2 C.B. 102.
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under section 351, but, if the facts reflect a gift, i.e., donative intent on
the part of the father, the government will restructure the transaction
according to its true nature-as if the father and son received shares in
direct proportion to the value of the property being transferred to the
corporation, 80 shares for the father and 20 shares for the son, and the
father then made a gift of 60 shares to the son. 24
7. Stock owned prior to the exchange
The control test is measured by the percentage of stock owned by
the transferor immediately after the transfer.22 5 The stock owned by the
transferor at this point includes previously owned stock as well as stock
received in exchange for the transferred property. Therefore, if the trans-
feror owns any stock in the transferee corporation at the time of the
transfer, he aggregates this old stock with any new stock he receives in
the exchange to measure his percentage of control for section 351 pur-
poses. For example, suppose that Anne, the holder of 40 of X Corp's 60
issued and outstanding shares, transfers property to X Corp in exchange
for an additional 40 X Corp shares. In measuring Anne's control imme-
diately after the transaction, Anne aggregates her original 40 shares with
her 40 new shares. She thus owns 80% of X Corp's 100 issued and out-
standing shares, making her an 80% shareholder and thereby satisfying
the section 368(c) control test.
Section 351 also applies to the transferor who had control prior to
the transfer. For example, suppose that in the preceding hypothetical
Anne originally had owned 48 of X Corp's 60 issued and outstanding
shares. Her percentage of stock ownership prior to the transfer would
have been exactly 80%. If she transfers property in exchange for an ad-
ditional 40 shares, she aggregates her original 48 shares with her 40 new
224. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b)(2) (example (1)). In the example in the text, since both the
father and the son transferred property to the corporation and, together, owned 100% of the
stock immediately after the transaction, it is easy to see that the requirements of section 351
are met. In other situations, however, a restructuring of the transaction can have an impact on
whether or not the transaction meets the section 351 requirements. For example, in the exam-
ple in the text, suppose that the son had transferred no property to the corporation. Should
the exchange between father and the corporation fall outside section 351, since a non-trans-
feror of property ended up with 80% of the stock? Or should the transaction be regarded as
the issuance of 100% of the stock to father followed by a gift of 80% of the stock to the son?
Arguably, the exchange of the father's assets for 100% of the stock satisfies the control test,
because the father controlled the corporation "immediately after the exchange." Moreover, he
was under no legal compunction to pass on the stock to his son. For conflicting answers,
compare Wilgard Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 514 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
655 (1942) with D'Angelo Assoc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 121 (1978).
225. I.R.C. §§ 368(c), 351(a).
1019
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
shares. She thus owns 88 of X Corp's 100 issued and outstanding shares,
making her an 88% shareholder and thereby satisfying the section 368(c)
control test. The newly issued shares need not push the transferor past
the 80% stock ownership mark for section 351 to apply.
8. Issuing stock or securities for service's and the control requirement
It is a common practice in the business world for a corporation to
issue its shares or securities (especially its shares) for services rendered or
to be rendered to the corporation. If there is no more to the transaction,
it falls completely outside of section 351. Section 35 l(d)(1) states clearly
that stock (or securities) shall not be considered as issued in return for
"property" for purposes of section 351, if it is issued to pay for services
rendered, or to be rendered, for the benefit of the corporation.226 In
some instances, however, issuing of shares or securities as payment for
services is merely one part of a larger transaction that includes transfers
of property to the corporation in exchange for its shares or securities.
The purpose of this section is to discuss the impact that issuing of shares
in payment for services has upon these larger transactions.
The person who receives his or her stock or securities solely in ex-
change for services rendered for the corporation cannot be counted as
part of the group that is required to own 80% or more of the transferee
corporation's stock for the whole transaction to qualify under section
35 1.227 For his shares to be counted towards meeting the 80% control
test, he would have had to have transferred some property to the corpo-
ration. Accordingly, the people who did transfer property must them-
selves own 80% or more of the shares. They cannot include the shares of
the person only performing services to meet the 80% control test, even if
that person's role in the transaction was an integral part of a defined,
preconceived plan. The following examples better illustrate this rule.
Example L Anne and Bob transfer property to a newly formed cor-
poration in exchange for 78% of its stock. Charles receives the other
22% of the stock for marketing services performed for the corporation.
No part of the transaction qualifies under section 351, because, immedi-
ately after the transaction, the transferors of property, Anne and Bob,
own only 78% of stock and hence do not have the "control," i.e., 80%
stock ownership, required by section 351 and section 368(c). The 22% of
the shares owned by Charles cannot be aggregated with the shares owned
by Anne and Bob since Charles is not a transferor of property and is
226. Id. § 351(d)(1).
227. LIND & SCHWARZ, supra note 30, at 66; B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 1
3.02; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1 (as amended in 1967).
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outside the coverage of section 351.228
Example 2. Anne and Bob transfer property to a newly formed cor-
poration in exchange for 85% of its stock. Charles receives the other
15% of the stock for marketing services performed for the corporation.
The part of the transaction involving Anne and Bob meets the section
351 requirements, because, immediately after the transaction, the trans-
ferors of property, Anne and Bob, own more than 80% of the stock of
the transferee corporation and hence meet the "control" requirement of
sections 351 and 368(c). 229 The part of the transaction involving Charles
is outside section 351 because Charles is not a transferor of property.
The person who transfers property and performs services in ex-
change for stock or securities of the transferee corporation is counted as
part of the group that is required to own 80% or more of the transferee
corporation's stock.2 30 His shares are included because he is a transferor
of property. In fact none of his shares are excluded, even though it would
be easy enough to allocate between shares issued for the services and
shares issued for the transferred property and thus to exclude the shares
issued for the services. In other words, all the shares owned by this per-
son immediately after the transaction are counted in measuring the 80%
control test just as if he had only transferred property and had not per-
formed services. 31 The fact that stock issued to a particular transferor is
partly for services does not result in denial of section 351 treatment so
long as that transferor did indeed transfer some property and he is part
of a group of transferors that satisfy the 80% control test.23 2 The follow-
ing example illustrates this rule.
Example 3. Anne and Bob formed a new corporation called X
Corp. Anne transferred property worth $60,000 in exchange for 600 X
Corp shares worth $60,000. Bob performed marketing services worth
$4,000 for X Corp. He also transferred property worth $36,000 to X
Corp. In exchange for the services and the transferred property, X Corp
issued 40 shares worth $40,000 to Bob. Each of the described transac-
tions was pursuant to a definitive agreement between Anne and Bob.
Since immediately after the transaction, the transferors of property-
228. See, eg., Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(2) (example (2)); see also B. BITrKER & J. EuSTICE,
supra note 29, 3.02, at 3-7.
229. I.R.C. §§ 351, 368(c).
230. See Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(2) (example (3)); see also LIND & SCHWAIZ, supra note
30, at 66; B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 3.02 at 3-6; Rothman, supra note 148, at
A-51.
231. See Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(2) (example (3)); see also B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTiCE, supra
note 29, 3.02, at 3-6; Rothman, supra note 148, at A-51.
232. See I.R.C. § 368(c).
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Anne and Bob-owned 80% or more of the outstanding stock of X
Corp, 100% in their case, no gain or loss is recognized upon the ex-
changes of property for stock. While the payment for services does gen-
erate other income tax consequences for Bob who must treat stock
received for the services as taxable compensation, e.g., Bob realized
$4,000 of ordinary income, all of the stock owned by Bob after the trans-
action is counted in measuring the stock owned by the transferors for
purposes of the 80% control test.
The regulations contain a two-pronged exception to this rule.233
The exception is designed to impede the use of a nominal property trans-
fer to boot-strap a non-qualifying transaction to one covered by section
351. According to the regulations, stock or securities issued for property
of relatively small value, (1) as compared to the value of stock and securi-
ties already owned by the transferor234 or (2) as compared to the value of
stock or securities to be received for services performed by the transferor,
is not to be treated as having been issued in return for property if the
primary purpose of the transfer is to qualify the transaction under section
351.235 For purposes of advance letter rulings, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice does not consider transferred property to be of "relatively small
value," if its fair market value equals or exceeds 10% of the fair market
value of the stock or securities already owned or to be received for serv-
ices by such person. 236 The following three examples illustrate these
rules.
Example 4. X Corp has 900 shares of issued and outstanding stock,
all of which is owned by Anne and is worth $90,000. Anne and Bob have
agreed in principle that Bob will transfer an asset worth $10,000 and
with a basis of $3,000 in his hands to X Corp in exchange for 100 X Corp
shares which are worth $10,000. Because Bob would own less than 80%
of the X Corp shares (100 of 1000 shares or 10%), the exchange would
not be covered by section 351 and Bob would be compelled to recognize a
taxable gain of $7,000 ($10,000 stock received minus $3,000 basis). To
prevent recognition of Bob's gain, Bob has suggested that Anne transfer
an asset worth $100 to the corporation for one X Corp share worth $100.
Bob still would transfer his asset for 100 X Corp shares. If the transac-
tion is completed as suggested by Bob, Anne and Bob both will have
233. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1)(ii).
234. Id.
235. Id.; see also B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 3.02, at 3-6 n.15; LIND &
SCHWARZ, supra note 30, at 66; Rothman, supra note 148, at A-52; cf Kamborian v. Commis-
sioner, 56 T.C. 847 (1971), aff'd 469 F.2d 219 (Ist Cir. 1972).
236. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568; see also B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 1
3.02, at 3-6; LIND & SC-WARZ, supra note 30, at 66; Rothman, supra note 148, at A-52.
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transferred property solely in exchange for stock or securities of X Corp,
the transferee corporation, and together they will own 100% of the X
Corp stock. Thus, they literally would meet all of section 351's require-
ments for nonrecognition treatment. The only share of X Corp stock
issued to Anne, however, would be of relatively small value when com-
pared to the value of the stock already owned by her (0.11% or 100/
90,000), and the primary purpose of Anne's transfer would be to qualify
Bob's exchange for nonrecognition treatment under section 351. The
regulations would require the share issued to Anne to be considered as
not having been issued in return for property, i.e., being outside the cov-
erage of section 351. The result is that Bob would be the only transferor
of property and would own an insufficient percentage of stock (9.99% or
100/1001) to meet the control test. Hence, he would have a taxable gain
of $7,000. Curiously, the transfer by Anne would seem to be a taxable
event also, since her transfer is deemed to be outside section 351.
Example 5. Anne is an expert in a high technology industry. Bob
owns equipment that could be used to start up a business in that indus-
try. He has a basis of $4,000 in the equipment; it is worth $50,000. Anne
and Bob have agreed in principle that they will incorporate a new busi-
ness in that industry and that each of them will take 50% of the stock of
the newly created corporation. Each 50% stock interest will be worth
$50,000. They both understand that the primary consideration provided
by Anne for her shares is services to be rendered for the corporation.
Unless Anne transfers property to the corporation in exchange for part of
her shares, Bob's transfer of the equipment to the corporation for stock
will fall outside the coverage of section 351 for failure to meet the 80%
control test. To help Bob attain nonrecognition treatment, Anne is will-
ing to transfer an asset owned by her and worth $100 as partial consider-
ation for her stock. Because Arine and Bob would then both be
transferors of property, the transferors of property would own 100% of
the X Corp stock immediately after the exchange. According to the reg-
ulations, however, the stock issued to Anne would not be considered as
having been issued in return for property because it would be of relatively
small value when compared to the value of the stock to be received for
her services (2% or $1001$50,000) and the primary purpose of her trans-
fer would be to qualify Bob's transfer for nonrecognition treatment under
section 351.237 The result would be that Bob would be the only trans-
feror of property and would own an insufficient percentage of stock
(50%) to meet the control test. Hence, he would have a taxable gain of
237. See Treas. Reg. § 1.351 (as amended in 1967).
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$46,000 ($50,000 stock received minus $4,000 basis in the equipment).
The transfer of property by Anne would seem to be a taxable event also,
since her transfer is deemed to be outside section 351. Regardless of the
applicability of section 351, Anne must treat the stock received in ex-
change for services as compensation, i.e., ordinary income to the extent
of its fair market value.
Example 6. X Corp has 500 shares of issued and outstanding stock,
all of which are owned by Anne and are worth $50,000. Anne and Bob
have agreed in principle that Bob will transfer property worth $40,000
with a basis of $6,000 in his hands to X Corp in exchange for 400 X Corp
shares worth $40,000. However, because Bob would own less than 80%
of the X Corp shares, the exchange would not be covered by section 351
(400 of 900 shares or 44.4%), and Bob would be compelled to recognize
a taxable gain of $34,000 ($40,000 minus $6,000). To prevent recogni-
tion of the gain by Bob, Anne has agreed to transfer property worth
$10,000 to X Corp in exchange for an additional 100 X Corp shares. The
Internal Revenue Service would not consider the property transferred by
Anne to be of "relatively small value" within the meaning of the regula-
tions, because its fair market value ($10,000) exceeds 10% of the fair
market value of the stock already owned by Anne (10% x $50,000 =
$5,000). Thus, for purposes of issuing an advance ruling, the Internal
Revenue Service would consider Anne to be a transferor of property.
The transferors of property, Anne and Bob, then would own 100% of the
X Corp stock immediately after the exchange, thereby meeting the 80%
control test, and the whole transaction would be accorded nonrecogni-
tion treatment under section 351.
9. "Immediately after the exchange"
Section 351 requires the transferors of property to be in control of
the corporation "immediately after the exchange." '238 Thus, the focus of
the statutory language is a point in time. One might infer that momen-
tary control, even followed by a prompt and predetermined loss of con-
trol, should satisfy section 351.239 On occasion, however, courts have
recognized that this interpretation undercuts the continuity-of-interest
principle that constitutes the basic supposition for the nonrecognition
238. I.R.C. § 351(a).
239. See, eg., Stanton v. United States, 512 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1975); Portland Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940); see also B. BrIIKER
& J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, % 3.09 at 3-31; LIND & SCHWARZ, supra note 30, at 62.
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treatment accorded by section 351:24 The same people own the same
property, only now they have pieces of paper called stock certificates to
evidence their ownership.241 Despite some early cases to the contrary,
242
it seems to be settled that momentary control is insufficient under at least
some circumstances. 243 However, it is unsettled just what those "some
circumstances" happen to be.
The key in this genre of cases usually is the step transaction doc-
trine. 2' That doctrine applies where a series of transactions, independ-
ent in form, are so dependent in substance as to require the tax
consequences to be measured by viewing the overall transaction from be-
ginning to end without according any independent significance to the
steps in between.245 The doctrine sometimes is invoked to try to take a
series of transactions outside of section 351246 and sometimes to try to
put a series of transactions inside section 351.247 At times it is the private
sector that invokes it248 and at other times it is the government. 249 The
courts have preferred three tests25 0 -end result,
251 interdependence 2 2
240. See, e.g., Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 309 U.S. 694 (1940); Pinellas Ice & Cold
Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
241. See Portland Oil, 109 F.2d at 488.
242. See id. at 489; B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 3.09, at 3-31; LIND &
SCHWARZ, supra note 30, at 56.
243. B. BrrTKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 29, 3.09, at 3-31; see, e.g., Hazeltine Corp. v.
Commissioner, 89 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1937); Intermountain Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 65
T.C. 1025 (1976); Manhattan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 1032 (1957); Rev. Rul. 70-
225, 1970-1 C.B. 80; Rev. Rul. 70-522, 1970-2 C.B. 81. For a general discussion, see generally
Keller, The Tax Effects of a Shareholder's Post-Incorporation Sale of Stock A Reappraisal, 2
TAX L. J. 89 (1985).
244. See generally Chirelstein & Lopata, supra note 171; Mintz & Plumb, supra note 171;
Rothman, supra note 148, at A-17. For a further discussion of the "step-transaction doctrine,"
see D. KAHN, BAsIc CORPORATE TAXATION § 10.25, at 407-10 (3d ed. 1981).
245. Rothman, supra note 148, at A-17.
246. See, eg., Intermountain Lumber, 65 T.C. at 1033; Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 48 T.C. 374 (1967), aff'd, 415 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1969); American Bantam Car Co.
v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert denied, 339 U.S.
920 (1950); Independent Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 194 (1946); W & K Holding Corp. v.
Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 830 (1938); Omaha Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 26
B.T.A. 1123 (1932).
247. See, e.g., Edlund Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1961); Scientific Instru-
ment Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1253 (1952), aff'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.
1953).
248. See, e-g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,727,005 (Mar. 18, 1987).
249. In general, the IRS will apply the step-transaction doctrine more readily than the
courts have. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-130, 1978-1 C.B. 114; Rev. Rul. 75-382, 1975-2 C.B. 121;
Rev. Rul. 73-16, 1973-1 C.B. 186; Rev. Rul. 70-225, 1970-1 C.B. 80; Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1
C.B. 73; Rev. Rul. 67-274, 1967-2 C.B. 141; Rev. Rul. 54-96, 1954-1 C.B. 111; see also, Roth-
man, supra note 148, at A-20.
250. The three tests are: (1) end result, (2) interdependence, and (3) binding commitment.
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and binding commitment 25 3 -for deciding when to use the step transac-
tion doctrine. All three tests have been applied to section 351 transac-
tions at one time or another.254 In addition to the tests, time is an
important factor. 55 The closer in time the series of transactions are, the
more likely the step transaction doctrine applies.256 Additionally, the
parties must have intended an integrated transaction for the step transac-
tion doctrine to apply, 5 7 although the parties' conduct may be more pro-
bative of their intent than their testimony.
A 1978 Ninth Circuit opinion, Culligan Water Conditioning v.
United States,2" 8 illustrates the most commonly encountered problem-
at the exact point in time of the exchange the transferors owned 80% or
more of the shares, but soon thereafter they relinquished their control by
selling a stock interest of 20% or more to an outsider.25 9 In Culligan, a
proprietor named Kramis incorporated a company called Kennewick on
October 4, 1964. The evidence was unclear as to the exact date that he
transferred the proprietorship assets in exchange for the Kennewick
stock.2" The court found only that the exchange occurred sometime be-
tween October 1, 1964, and mid-April, 1965.261 In January, 1965,
Kramis began negotiating for the sale of the Kennewick business with an
The courts have examined the parties' intent at the beginning of the transaction as to what the
end result will be.
251. See, e.g., Ericsson Screw Mach. Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 757 (1950); see
also Chirelstein & Lopata, supra note 171, at 970.
252. See, e.g., South Bay Corp. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1965); American
Wire Fabrics Corp. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 607 (1951); American Bantam Car, 11 T.C. at
405; see also Chirelstein & Lopata, supra note 171, at 970; Rothman, supra note 148, at A-18.
253. See, eg., Hazeltine Corp., 89 F.2d at 513; Bassick v. Commissioner, 85 F.2d 8 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 592 (1936); Manhattan Bldg., 27 T.C. at 1032; S. Klein on the
Square, Inc. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 786, aff'd, 188 F.2d 127 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
824 (1951); American Bantam Car, 11 T.C. at 406; see also Chirelstein & Lopata, supra note
171, at 971.
254. See Chirelstein & Lopata, supra note 171, at 971; Rothman, supra note 148, at A-17 to
A-19.
255. The courts traditionally consider as relevant the length of time that elapses between
the two transactions. See ROTHMAN, supra note 148, at A-18; MINTz & PLUMB, supra note
171, at 249.
256. See, e.g., Love v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1940); see also Mintz & Plumb,
supra note 171, at 249.
257. See, eg., Ericsson Screw Mach. Prods., 14 T.C. at 763; see also Minnesota Tea Co. v.
Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938); Thurber v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1936);
Vest v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 128 (1971), aff'd, 481 F.2d 238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1092 (1973); Kind v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 600 (1970); Rothman, supra note 148, at A-18.
258. 567 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1978).
259. Id. at 868.
260. Id. at 870.
261. Id.
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outsider who subsequently formed his own corporation, "Tri-Cities," to
acquire Kennewick.262 On April 4, 1965, Kramis, by then the sole share-
holder of Kennewick, sold all of his Kennewick stock to Tri-Cities.263 In
June, 1965, Tri-Cities liquidated Kennewick.2" Tri-Cities did not want
section 351 to apply to Kramis' prior transfer of assets to Kennewick for
the Kernewick shares.2 65 It insisted that Kramis had a plan to part with
control at the time he formed Kennewick and transferred assets to it.
Furthermore, Tri-Cities claimed that this first part of the transaction was
merely the first step of an integrated transaction that resulted in a sale of
those assets rather than a transfer to a controlled corporation.2 6 6 To the
chagrin of Tri-Cities, it could not prove that at the time the assets were
transferred to Kennewick there existed an obligation or plan for Kramis
to part with control of Kennewick. 267 The evidence about a precon-
ceived plan, which the court felt was a sine qua non for applying the step
transaction doctrine, was too "murky" for that doctrine to apply.268 Sec-
tion 351 (and its related sections) covered Kramis' transfer of his propri-
etorship assets to Kennewick, even though Kramis sold his Kennewick
stock to Tri-Cities within a relatively short time period (seven months at
most and probably even less).269
Culligan demonstrates how difficult it can be to pin down exactly
what has happened inside close corporations, which are notoriously un-
kempt in their record-keeping.27 If a court is determined to deem a
preconceived plan or a binding commitment as a prerequisite for apply-
ing the step-transaction doctrine, it is likely to become frustrated when
presented with an amorphous set of facts that do not tend to prove any-
thing. The more unsettled the facts, the more unlikely a court will be
able to find that plan or commitment. The "murky" records are most
likely to work against the taxpayers who want the step-transaction doc-
trine to apply. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, placed the burden on the




265. Tri-Cities wanted Kennewick, its wholly-owned subsidiary, to have the highest possi-
ble basis in its assets. That basis would have been higher if the acquisition of the assets by
Kennewick was treated as a purchase so it could take a "cost" basis rather than a section 351
exchange with a carry-over basis.




270. See D'Angelo Assocs., 70 T.C. at 133.
271. Culligan, 567 F.2d at 870.
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amorphous record problem is less likely to impede the government when
it invokes the step-transaction doctrine. Most courts are cognizant of the
degree of informality with which these closely held business enterprises
operate.272 They are aware that the parties in the private sector may
make oral as well as written plans and can intentionally obfuscate their
own plans when it is to their advantage in court.273
Revenue Ruling 79-70274 provides an intriguing, though questiona-
ble, interpretation of the impact of the step-transaction doctrine on the
section 351 control requirement. The situation addressed in the revenue
ruling is the following: X transferred property to a newly organized cor-
poration, Newco, in exchange for all of Newco's stock. Pursuant to a
prearranged binding agreement, X sold 40% of its Newco stock to Y, and
Y purchased securities for cash from Newco. Because the sale of the
Newco stock by X to Y was an integral part of the incorporation and
pursuant to prearranged binding agreement, the control requirement was
determined after that sale. The Internal Revenue Service reaffirmed its
long-standing position that the section 351 control requirement is not
satisfied where, pursuant to a binding agreement entered into prior to the
transfer of property to the corporation, a transferor loses control of the
corporation by sale of stock received in the transfer to a third party who
does not transfer property to the corporation. After the sale was com-
plete, X owned 60% of the Newco stock and Yowned 40%. Since Y was
not a transferor of property to Newco with respect to Newco stock, Y's
40% ownership of the Newco stock could not be counted in determining
whether the transferors of property met the control requirement.275
If Y had not paid cash for Newco securities, the rationale in Reve-
nue Ruling 79-70 would be unassailable. X would have been the only
transferor of property, and he would have owned only 60% of the Newco
stock after completion of the transaction. The revenue ruling would be
in complete accord with case law.27s But Y did transfer property (cash)
to Newco. He did end up owning stock and securities in Newco.2 7 7 If
the step transaction is to be used, it is hard to see why section 351 should
not cover the transaction. Two persons, X and Y, formed a new corpora-
tion (Newco). Each transferred property to the corporation. Together
they owned 100% of the Newco stock as a result of the transaction. Y
272. See, ag., id.; Intermountain Lumber, 65 T.C. at 1033.
273. See, e.g., Culligan, 567 F.2d 869; Wilgard Realty, 127 F.2d at 516; D'Angelo Assoc,
70 T.C. at 135-36.
274. Rev. Rul. 79-70, 1979-1 C.B. 144.
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received Newco securities, 8 but that should not disqualify him from
being treated as part of the control group, because he also received
stock.2 79 X received cash, but he, too, received stock. 8 ° The cash pay-
ment to X had exactly the same economic effect for him as a cash pay-
ment made to him by Newco, i.e., a boot distribution, which would be
allowable under section 351.281 True, Y and not Newco paid the cash to
X, but the party actually making the disbursement seems insignificant, as
the step-transaction doctrine requires the tax consequences to be mea-
sured by viewing the overall transaction without according independent
significance to any particular step. 82 The transaction should be stepped
together as follows: Y pays cash to Newco for securities and 40% of the
Newco stock, and X transfers property to Newco in exchange for 60% of
Newco's stock and cash. That is the substance of the transaction, and it
fits neatly within section 351(b). 83
A second problem involves a sale of shares by one transferor of
property to another transferor of property. The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice offered its opinion in Revenue Ruling 79-194.284 Z and "a group of
investors," pursuant to a binding agreement, transferred property to
Newco in exchange for all of Newco's stock. Z received 80% of the
Newco stock. The investors took the other 20%. Pursuant to the agree-
ment, Z sold 31% of the Newco stock to the investors, thereby lowering
Z's stock ownership to 49% and raising the investors' interest to 51%.
Because Z's sale of 31% of the Newco stock to the investors was an
integral part of the incorporation and pursuant to a binding agreement,
the control requirement of section 35 1(a) was determined after the sale.
According to the ruling, the fact that there was a shift in the ownership
of stock among the transferors after the exchanges with Newco did not
affect the applicability of section 351, because the persons transferring
property to Newco in exchange for Newco stock owned 100% of the
Newco stock immediately after the exchange.28
Revenue Ruling 79-194 implied that the result would have differed
had Z sold the 31% of the Newco stock to pre-existing shareholders who
278. Id. at 144.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See I.R.C. § 351(b).
282. Rev. Rul. 79-70, 1979-1 C.B. 144.
283. The cash can be treated as "boot" pursuant to section 351(b), thus not denying nonrec-
ognition treatment to Y under section 351. See I.R.C. § 351(b).
284. Rev. Rul. 79-194, 1979-1 C.B. 145.
285. Id. at 146.
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did not transfer property to Newco as part of the same transaction. 2 6
These other shareholders then could not be counted as transferors of
property and could not be included as part of the control group. Z
would then own only 49% of the stock immediately after the transaction,
and the transaction would fall outside section 351 for failure of the trans-
ferors to meet the 80% control test.
28 7
A third issue involves the interplay between outstanding options to
purchase the transferee corporation's stock and the "immediately after
the exchange" language of section 351. For example, suppose that Anne
transfers property to X Corp in exchange for X Corp stock. Immediately
after the exchange Anne owns 100% of X Corp's issued and outstanding
shares. At the time of the exchange, however, Bob has an option to
purchase 30% of the X Corp stock. He promptly exercises his option
and takes the 30%. Does the purchase of the shares by Bob result in
Anne not having control "immediately after the exchange" as required
by section 351? Should the answer depend on whether Bob purchased
the shares from Anne or from X Corp?288 The cases are insufficient in
number289 to provide definitive answers to these issues. Moreover, they
are contradictory.290
For example, in Harder v. Commissioner,291 a sole proprietor trans-
ferred his business assets to a newly formed corporation in exchange for
all the transferee corporation's stock on January 2nd.292 Simultaneously
the proprietor granted an option to purchase part or all of his stock to
three other people.293 The option was exercisable "from time to time on
or after July 3. " 294 The Tax Court concluded that the proprietor's trans-
fer of property in exchange for stock qualified as a tax-free exchange
under section 351's predecessor. 29  Distinguishing another case where
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See Rothman, supra note 148, at A-25.
289. See, e.g., Barker v. United States, 200 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1952); Commissioner v. First
Nat'l Bank of Altoona, 104 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. dismissed, 309 U.S. 691 (1940);
Penn-Dixie Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 837 (1978); Harder v. Commissioner, 17
T.C.M. (CCH) 494 (1958); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 636 (1953),
aff'd, 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1955); Federal Grain Corp. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 242
(1929).
290. Compare National Bellas Hess, 20 T.C. at 637 (transferor acquired the requisite control
for the transfer to be granted nonrecognition status under section 351) with Barker, 200 F.2d
at 232 (transferors held to have relinquished their unrestricted control over their stock).
291. 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 494 (1958).
292. Id. at 494.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 497, 499.
295. Id. at 499.
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the outsider was clearly obligated to purchase the transferor's stock si-
multaneously with or immediately after the transfer,2 96 the court empha-
sized that the three optionees "were under no obligation whatever to buy
any of the corporation's stock" from the proprietor.2 97 What happened
on or after July 3 thus had "no bearing" on the case.298 The proprietor
had control immediately after the January 2 exchange and that was what
counted.299
A 1952 Ninth Circuit opinion, Barker v. United States,3° took a
contrary stance. Two groups of investors transferred their stock in a Cal-
ifornia corporation to a newly formed Delaware corporation.30' Group 1
received all of the common stock of the Delaware corporation in the ex-
change.30 2 Group 2 received all of the preferred stock of the Delaware
corporation (divided into two classes-first and second preferred) in the
exchange.30 3 Group 2 promptly sold approximately 50% of the first pre-
ferred to an investment banker and furthermore gave the investment
banker an option to acquire the remaining first preferred.30 4 The invest-
ment banker promptly exercised the option to acquire the remaining first
preferred shares from Group 2.305 Both the sale and option were pursu-
ant to a prearranged contract.30 6 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
transferors of property, Group 1 and Group 2, failed to satisfy the 80%
control requirement.30 7 The court might have based its conclusion solely
on the prearranged sale of the first preferred stock to the investment
banker, but it did not. It said that by granting the option, Group 2 had
relinquished its power to dispose of the shares as it otherwise might have
wished. 08 Such a restriction upon its freedom of action deprived it of
unrestricted control of the stock. Since the restriction affected more than
20% of the first preferred stock, the transaction was held not to qualify
as a tax-free exchange for failure of the transferors of property to meet
the 80% control test. 0 9
296. Id. citing May Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 200 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1953).
297. Harder, 17 T.C.M. (CCH) at 499.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. 200 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1952).
301. Id. at 226-27.
302. Id. at 226.
303. Id. at 226-27.
304. Id. at 227.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 226-27.
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What should the law be? Let us review a series of transactions:
(1) If the option is granted in favor of someone who is also a trans-
feror of property, the existence of the option probably ought not to result
in disqualifying the transfer from section 351 treatment. Whether or not
the option is exercised, the end result is that transferors of property own
80% or more of the stock of the corporate transferee (assuming that the
initial transferors satisfy the control test). Query: What if the optionor
(a) is himself a transferor and has transferred what amounts to a large
percentage of the corporate assets in exchange for his shares, e.g., 50%,
(b) held a large block of stock in the transferee corporation, e.g., 50%,
and (c) is divested of all of his stock by a prompt exercise of the option?
Doesn't the transaction closely resemble a sale of the optionor's interest
in this property, a transaction not within the purview of section 351 non-
recognition treatment?310 Shouldn't the continuity-of-interest principle
be dredged up to take the transaction outside section 35 1?3 11
(2) If the corporation grants the option and the optionee is not a
transferor (at least not prior to the exercise of the option), then the op-
tionee transfers property (usually cash) to the corporation in exchange
for his stock. If his participation is part of an overall plan to provide the
corporation with assets in exchange for its stock or securities, it seems
then that he ought to be counted as being a transferor of property for
stock, and his shares ought to be counted in measuring the 80% control
test.3
12
310. Bradshaw v. United States, 683 F.2d 365 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Piedmont Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 388 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1968) (held to be sale); Harbour Properties, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 580 (1973) (held not to be a sale); see also Six Seam Co. v. United
States, 524 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1975); Labrot v. Burnet, 57 F.2d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1932); B. Brrr-
KER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, . 3.04.
311. See Chapman v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 451 U.S.
1012 (1981); Dennis v. Commissioner, 473 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1973); Golden Nugget, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 28 (1984). For further discussion, see generally B. BlTrKER & 3. Eus-
TicE, supra note 29, % 3.04.
312. As the language of section 351 explicitly recognizes, there is sometimes more than one
transferor of property. Usually such cases are pursuant to a plan, and therefore, the transac-
tion qualifies as tax-free under section 351 if the transferors as a group pursuant to this plan
satisfy the 80% control test immediately after the exchange. See B. BITrKER & J. EuSICE,
supra note 29, % 3.08; Rothman, supra note 148, at A-7 to A-13. For decisions interpreting
this, see Vogel Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 497 (Ct. Cl. 1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 16
(1982); Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650
(1940); Kamborian v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 847 (1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 219 (lst Cir. 1972);
Miller Bros. Elec., Inc. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 446 (1968); Stevens Pass, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 48 T.C. 532 (1967); Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 374 (1967),
aff'd, 415 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1969); Hartford-Empire Co. v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 113
(1940), aff'd, 137 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 787 (1943); Royal Marches v.
Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 76 (1935).
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In some instances the original transferors might own an insufficient
percentage of stock to qualify for section 351, unless the optionee exer-
cises the option and the shares so acquired are aggregated with the other
shares. Including the optionee in the transferor group, therefore, would
be necessary for any part of the transaction to be covered by section 351.
Of course, the taxpayers might not want section 351 to apply.313 In other
instances the initial transferors might own 80% or more of the shares
before the option is exercised, but less than 80% afterward. If the initial
transfer and the option are not stepped together, the initial transfer
would still be covered by section 351, because the transferor would own
80% or more of the stock immediately after the exchange. If the initial
transfer and the option are stepped together, but the optionee is not
counted as part of the transferor group (an unreasonable interpretation),
no part of the transaction would be covered by section 351 (assuming
that the optionee does not receive 80% or more of the stock in exchange
for property-in-kind, in which case his exchange would be covered by
section 351). The suggested rule would "save" the latter transaction
from being disqualified, too, because the optionee would be treated as
part of the transferor group and hence the transferors would own more
than 80% of the stock. The optionee should be considered as part of the
control group only if he promptly exercises the option. If the optionee
waits a long time, at some point he must be considered outside the trans-
314feror group.
Almost assuredly somebody would object to the proposed rule, be-
cause including the optionee in the control group is conditioned on the
exercise of the option and courts often refuse to step together a series of
transactions when the latter transactions in the series are not nearly cer-
tain to occur at the time the first in the series does occur.31 5 But the
proposed rule is supported by the IRS's stance on best-efforts underwrit-
ing,31 6 an analogous situation. In a best-efforts underwriting, the move-
ment of property from the public investors to the corporation is direct
and uninterrupted. 317 The IRS has posited that the public investors
should be deemed to be transferors for section 351 purposes, provided
that the sale of stock to the public takes place in a short period of time
and the rights of the parties are clearly defined in the offering.31 ' The
313. See, e.g., Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 373; Piedmont, 388 F.2d at 889; see also LIND &
SCHWARZ, supra note 30, at 91.
314. See Mintz & Plumb, supra note 171, at 258.
315. See, e.g., National Bellas Hess, 20 T.C. at 647; American Bantam, 11 T.C. at 406.
316. See Rev. Rul. 78-294, 1978-2 C.B. 141; see also Rothman, supra note 148, at A-23.
317. See Rothman, supra note 148, at A-23.
318. Rev. Rul. 78-294, 1978-2 C.B. 142.
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incorporation and the subsequent public offering are elements in a single
transaction.319 The same can be said of an option granted as part of a
larger transaction to provide a corporation with assets in exchange for its
stock or securities.
(3) If: (a) the optionor but not the optionee is a transferor of prop-
erty to the corporation (the situation in both Hardy320 and Barker 32 )
and (b) the option results in the transferors owning less than 80% of the
shares, perhaps it would be wise to take a pragmatic approach. If the
option is exercised shortly after the transfer, the transferors could be
deemed not to have control "immediately after the exchange. ' 322 If the
option is not exercised promptly, the transferors could be deemed to have
control "immediately after the exchange. ' 323 This simple approach
would avoid several of the difficult step-transaction doctrine inquiries,
including whether the initial transfers and the option were "mutually in-
terdependent. ' 324 The most difficult question under this approach would
be determining what is "prompt," an interpretative problem that inheres
in the statutory language ("immediately after the exchange") 325 and that
seemingly could be eliminated only by congressional enactment of a
bright line rule (e.g., "for 60 days after the exchange").
A fourth issue involves the transferor of property who quickly turns
over the newly issued stock to a related taxpayer. There are numerous
permutations in the transaction raising this particular issue. For exam-
ple, if the transferor is also a corporation, it might distribute the newly
received shares to its own shareholders 32 6 or to another related entity.327
If the transferor is a natural person, he or she might make a gift of the
319. Id.
320. See supra notes 291-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of Harder.
321. See supra notes 300-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of Barker.
322. I.R.C. § 351(a).
323. Id.
324. Perhaps the single most important factor in determining the applicability of the step-
transaction doctrine is whether the transactions are so interdependent that none of the transac-
tions would have been effected without the others also being consummated. The courts have
held that when the latter transactions are the sine qua non for the former, the individual trans-
actions are treated as one unified transaction. See, e.g., South Bay Co. v. Commissioner, 345
F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1965); American Wire Fabrics Corp. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 607 (1951);
American Bantam, 11 T.C. at 406; see also Rothman, supra note 148, at A-18.
325. I.R.C. § 351(a). See, eg., Baker Commodities, 48 T.C. at 402; Overland Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 42 T.C. 26 (1964); see also Mintz & Plumb, supra note 171, at 253; Rothman, supra
note 148, at A-17.
326. Section 351(c) governs this possibility. See I.R.C. § 351(c); see also B. BITrKER & J.
EuSTICE, supra note 29, % 3.09 at 3-31 n.92, 3-35.
327. See Rev. Rul. 68-298, 1968-1 C.B. 139 (corporation transferred property to newly
formed subsidiary in exchange for all of its stock and distributed 25% thereof in redemption of
one of its shareholder's stock).
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shares to a spouse or to his or her children.32
Section 351(c) resolves one of the problems. It states that in deter-
mining control, a distribution of the newly received stock by a "corporate
transferor" (a transferor that itself is a corporation) to its own sharehold-
ers is not to be taken into account.329 In other words, the shares issued
to the corporate transferor are counted in measuring the 80% control
test, even though they are promptly distributed to the transferor's share-
holders. The distribution to the shareholders is outside the section 351
transaction, however, and must be accounted for by other Subchapter C
sections. For example, it might be treated as a section 355 spin-off distri-
bution,330 a section 302 redemption33' or a section 301 distribution.332
If a partnership transfers its assets for all of the stock of a newly
formed corporation and then distributes the stock to its partners, such
distribution does not violate the section 368(c) control requirement
either.333
The IRS has been prolific in issuing revenue rulings concerning sec-
tion 351 transactions followed by a quick disposition of the newly issued
shares by a corporate transferor to a related entity.334 Generally it posits
that these later transactions do not disqualify the initial transfer from
section 351 nonrecognition treatment. 335 The seminal ruling, Revenue
Ruling 77-449, involved successive transfers of the same assets, first,
from a corporation to its wholly-owned first-tier subsidiary in exchange
for additional shares of the first-tier subsidiary's stock and, second, from
that first-tier subsidiary to its wholly-owned, second-tier subsidiary in ex-
change for additional shares of that second-tier subsidiary's stock.336
The parent retained the shares of the first-tier subsidiary. The first-tier
subsidiary retained the shares of the second-tier subsidiary. The second-
328. See, e.g., Stanton v. United States, 512 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1975); D'Angelo Assocs., 70
T.C. at 123. See generally B. BrrIKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 3.09; Rothman, supra
note 148, at A-28.
329. I.R.C. § 351(c).
330. A spin-off distribution is a distribution by one corporation of the stock of a subsidiary
(either an existing subsidiary or a newly created one). A distribution can qualify under section
355 whether or not it is pro rata with respect to the distributing corporation's shareholders.
Id. § 355; see also B. BITrKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 29, 13.03.
331. I.R.C. § 302 (such redemption is treated as a distribution as a general rule).
332. Id. § 301.
333. See Miller Bros., 49 T.C. at 449-50.
334. See, eg., Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88; Rev. Rul. 83-156, 1983-2 C.B. 66; Rev.
Rul. 83-34, 1983-1 C.B. 79; Rev. Rul. 77-449, 1977-2 C.B. 110; Rev. Rul. 77-11, 1977-1 C.B.
93; Rev. Rul. 70-239, 1970-1 C.B. 74; Rev. Rul. 68-298, 1968-1 C.B. 139.
335. See, eg., Rev. Rul. 68-298, 1968-1 C.B. 139.
336. Rev. Rul. 77-449, 1977-2 C.B. 110.
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tier subsidiary retained the transferred assets for use in its business.337
The transaction effected what is known in tax parlance as a "double
drop-down." The Internal Revenue Service chose to view both ex-
changes as independent transactions rather than to invoke the step-trans-
action doctrine, even though both exchanges were part of an integrated
and pre-planned transaction.3 Since each of the transfers satisfied the
requirements of section 351, no gain or loss was recognized by either the
parent or the first-tier subsidiary.339
A 1983 revenue ruling extended the analysis of Revenue Ruling 77-
449 to double drop-downs to 80% owned (as opposed to wholly-owned)
subsidiaries. 34 Another 1983 ruling extended the analysis of Revenue
Ruling 77-449 to the transfer of assets by a corporation to its wholly-
owned first-tier subsidiary which in turn transferred the assets to a part-
nership in which the first-tier subsidiary and a second-tier subsidiary
were partners.341 The Internal Revenue Service again viewed the two
transfers separately. Because the transfer from the parent to the first-tier
subsidiary satisfied the requirements of section 351 and the contribution
by the first-tier subsidiary to the partnership satisfied the requirements of
section 721, no gain or loss was recognized by either the parent corpora-
tion or the first-tier subsidiary.
342
The double drop-down revenue rulings make sense. Each of the
double drop-downs was to an entity controlled by the corporation origi-
nally owning the transferred assets. It never relinquished control of the
transferred assets, because it had control of the ultimate transferee of the
assets. The transactions resulted in a change in the form of ownership
and ought not to result in a recognized gain or loss.
In Revenue Ruling 84-111, the Internal Revenue Service also es-
chewed the step-transaction doctrine in describing the tax consequences
applicable to three alternative methods for structuring the incorporation
of a partnership.343 In "situation one" the partnership transferred all of
its assets to a newly formed corporation in exchange for all of the corpo-
ration's stock and an assumption of the partnership liabilities. The part-
nership then terminated by distributing the newly issued stock to its




340. Rev. Rul. 83-34, 1983-1 C.B. 79.
341. Rev. Rul. 83-156, 1983-2 C.B. 66.
342. Id.
343. Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88.
344. Id.
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sets and liabilities to its partners, and the partners then transferred all the
partnership assets to a newly formed corporation in exchange for all of
the corporation's stock and an assumption of the partnership liabili-
ties.345 In "situation three" the partners transferred their partnership in-
terests to the newly formed corporation in exchange for all of the
corporation's stock. 46 In each situation the steps were parts of a plan to
incorporate the partnership for valid business reasons. 347 Revoking a
1970 revenue ruling, which had held that the federal income tax conse-
quences of the three situations should be the same without regard to
which of the three transactions was entered into,348 Revenue Ruling 84-
111 elected to accord independent significance to each step in the de-
scribed situations with the result that, depending on the format chosen
for the transaction, the basis and holding periods of the various assets
received by the corporation and of the stock received by the former part-
ners could vary.349 The revenue ruling stated that the government
wanted to enable taxpayers to avoid certain potential pitfalls raised by
the 1970 revenue ruling, e.g., collapsible corporation status under section
341,350 and to facilitate flexibility with respect to the basis and holding
periods of the assets and stock received in the exchange.351
In some instances a person transfers property to a newly formed
corporation in exchange for all of its shares and then gives a portion of
those shares to a family member,352 usually either a spouse353 or a
child.354 If the transferor gives away more than 20% of the stock, he has
managed to reduce his own percentage of stock ownership below the
80% level. Indeed, he may have intended to push down his percentage
of stock ownership below the 80% mark so that his transfer to the corpo-
ration avoids section 351 treatment. 355 The leading case is a Second Cir-
cuit opinion, Wilgard Realty Co. v. Commissioner,356 a case in which the




348. Rev. Rul. 70-239, 1970-1 C.B. 74.
349. Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 89-90.
350. I.R.C. § 341.
351. Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88-89.
352. See, e.g., Stanton, 512 F.2d at 14; Fahs v. Florida Mach. & Foundry Co., 168 F.2d 957
(5th Cir. 1948); Wilgard Realty, 127 F.2d at 515-16; D'Angelo Assoc., 70 T.C. at 132; Majon-
nier & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 837 (1949), non acq., 1949-2 C.B. 4; see also B.
BrrrKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 29, 3.09, at 3-34; Rothman, supra note 148, at A-28.
353. See Stanton, 512 F.2d at 14.
354. See Fahs, 168 F.2d at 958.
355. See B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 3.09, at 3-34.
356. 127 F.2d 514 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 317 U.S. 655 (1942).
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that he received them. 357 The court held that, despite the gift, the trans-
feror satisfied the control test, because he had the power to keep the
stock or give it away.358 The court was not impressed with the argument
that he had made up his mind to give away most of the stock before the
transfer. The court thought that it was "immaterial" how soon thereaf-
ter he elected to dispose of his stock by gift or otherwise and whether or
not such disposition was pursuant to a preconceived plan.35 9 Wilgard still
is good law: A gift to a family member made after the transfer does not
disqualify the transaction from section 351 treatment.3"
After Wilgard, taxpayers who wanted to avoid nonrecognition treat-
ment made the corporation issue more than 20% of its stock directly to
the donees.361 Since the donees would not transfer any property to the
corporation, the transfers presumably would not fall under section 351
because the transferors failed to own 80% of the stock of the transferee
corporation.362 This method of avoiding section 351 was recognized for
almost thirty years,363 but a 1978 Tax Court opinion, D'Angelo Associates
v. Commissioner,361 has raised doubts about the viability of this device.
In D'Angelo, a dentist incorporated his dental practice, transferring
cash and assets to the corporation.365 To avoid section 351, he made the
corporation issue its shares directly to his children instead of to him-
self.3 66 The court, however, viewed the transaction as a transfer of assets
by the dentist to the corporation in exchange for its shares followed by a
gift of the controlling stock to the children. 367 The determinative factor,
the court felt, was the absolute right of the transferor to designate who
was to receive the newly issued stock.36 The power to designate the
recipient of the stock, not the precise moment that the power was exer-
cised, was controlling. The court concluded that the possession of this
power in the transferor was the essential element for control under sec-
tion 351 and that, therefore, the transaction satisfied the section 351 con-
357. Id. at 515-16 (total shares = 200; shares given as gift = 156; therefore: percent of
shares given as gift = 156/200 x 100 = 78%).
358. Id. at 516.
359. Id.
360. See, eg., Stanton, 512 F.2d at 18; D'Angelo Assoc., 70 T.C. at 132; see also Rothman,
supra note 148, at A-24.
361. See D. KAHN, supra note 244, § 8.12, at 298 n.4; see also Fahs, 168 F.2d at 959.
362. See Fahs, 168 F.2d at 958.
363. Thirty years passed between 1948, the year of the Fahs decision, 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.
1948), and 1978, when D'Angelo Assoc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 121 (1978), was decided.
364. 70 T.C. 121 (1978).
365. Id. at 123-24.
366. Id. at 128.
367. Id. at 131.
368. Id. at 132.
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trol requirement.369
Commentators have suggested that courts should distinguish, or in a
de facto manner already have distinguished, between commercially and
intra-family motivated losses of control for purposes of section 351 dis-
qualification.370 A commercially motivated loss of control results in dis-
qualification, while an intra-family loss of control does not result in
disqualification. 371 Perhaps another distinction is as helpful-the loss of
control resulting from a transfer of stock to a nonrelated party is more
likely to result in disqualifying the full transaction from section 351 treat-
ment than a loss of control resulting from a transfer of stock to a related
party. The IRS certainly has propounded revenue rulings that bolster
the latter conclusion. 72
V. LIABILITIES
Sections 357(a), 358(d)(l) and 362(a)(1) are the primary sections of
the Code that deal with the impact of liabilities on section 351 ex-
changes.373 According to section 357(a), the transfer of property to a
corporation under section 351 does not result in recognition of a gain or
loss to the transferor, even though: (1) the transferred property is subject
to a liability; or (2) the corporate transferee assumes a liability of the
transferor.374 Section 358(d)(1) requires the transferor to reduce his basis
in his newly received stock or securities by the sum of any liabilities en-
cumbering the transferred property plus any of his liabilities assumed by
the transferee corporation.375 Section 362(a)(1) requires the corporate
transferee to take a carryover basis in the transferred assets, which basis
is likely to include any liabilities encumbering the assets (if any), because
the transferor probably included those liabilities in calculating his own
basis in those assets.376
369. Id. at 131-33.
370. See B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 3.09, at 3-34.
371. Id
372. See, ag., Rev. Rul. 79-70, 1979-1 C.B. 144; Rev. Rul. 70-522, 1970-2 C.B. 81.
373. I.R.C. §§ 357(a), 358(d)(1), 362(a)(1) (1986).
374. Id. § 357(a).
375. Id. § 358(d)(1). More specifically, section 358(d)(1) states that the liability is to be
treated as money distributed to the transferor as part of the exchange. Id. Section
358(a)(1)(A) provides that the transferor is to take the substituted basis decreased by, among
other things, the amount of any money distributed to the transferor. Id. § 358(a)(1)(a)(ii). In
other words, the liability is treated as money distributed to the transferor and this distributed
money results in a decrease in the transferor's basis in his stock. Id.; see also id. § 358(d)(1).
376. Id § 362(a)(1). The cost of property, and therefore its basis under section 1012 of the
code, includes payments with borrowed funds as well as the amount of obligations given or
assumed by the purchaser as part of the price period. See 7 Fed. Taxes (P-H), 1 31161, 31164
(1989). It includes the amount of any mortgage encumbering the property at the time of the
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Section 357(a) is the successor to section 112(k)3 7  of the 1939
Code,37 8 which was the congressional response37 9 to nullify the United
States Supreme Court case of United States v. Hendler.80 In Hendler,
the Court characterized the assumption of liabilities in an otherwise tax-
free reorganization as the distribution of boot to the transferor.81
Hence, the transferor's realized gain was recognized to the extent of as-
sumption.38 2 The Internal Revenue Code likewise could treat the
amount of the liabilities as boot, tax it according to the boot rules, and
allow the unencumbered portion of the transaction to pass tax-free. But
in enacting section 357(a), (and its predecessor, section 112(k) of the 1939
Code), 83 Congress decided not to do this. Instead, like its predeces-
sor,38 4 section 357(a) accords total nonrecognition to the transaction, de-
spite the transfer of liabilities.3 85
Section 357(a) nonrecognition treatment is sound. As noted in the
congressional reports for section 357(a)'s predecessor, it is not customary
in the typical transaction changing the form or entity of a business to
liquidate the liabilities of the business; such. liabilities are almost invaria-
bly assumed by the corporation that continues the business.3 86 If assum-
ing liabilities would result in the recognition of a gain, then the purpose
of the reorganization sections, as well as section 351, which is to postpone
the recognition of gain, would largely be nullified.38 7
Moreover, the shareholder in such cases has not really cashed in on
purchase, whether the buyer takes subject to the mortgage or becomes personally liable for it.
See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947).
377. I.R.C. § 112(k) (1939), amended by I.R.C. § 357(a) (1986).
378. See generally Greiner, Behling, & Moffett, Assumption of Liabilities and the Improper
Purpose-A Re-Examination of Section 357(b), 32 TAx LAw. 111, 112 (1978).
379. See H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1939), reprinted in 1939-2, C.B. 504,
518-19; see also Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 223, 232 (1977), acq. 1980-2 C.B. 1. See
generally Greiner, Behling, & Moffett, supra note 378, at 112-13.
380. 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
381. Id. at 566.
382. Id. at 566-67.
383. I.R.C. § 112(k) (1939), amended by I.R.C. § 357(a) (1986).
384. See id.; H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1939), reprinted in 1939-2 C.B.
504, 518-19.
385. I.R.C. § 357(a). Sections 357(b) and 357(c) contain statutory exceptions to the non-
recognition rule of section 357(a). See infra notes 407-504 and accompanying text for a de-
scription of these exceptions. Section 113(a)(6) of the 1939 Code contained the rule now
contained in section 357(b). See I.R.C. § 113(a)(6) (1939), amended by I.R.C. § 357(b) (1986).
See generally Surrey, Assumption of Indebtedness in Tax-Free Exchanges, 50 YALE L. J. 1
(1940).
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his investment because of the transferred liability. For instance, take the
case of the transferor of encumbered property. Before the transfer he
owned property subject to a liability; now he owns stock in a corporation
that owns the same property subject to the same liability. There is no
real change in the shareholder's net worth, because the value of the stock
is diminished by the amount of the liability. He has exactly the same
"equity" in his stock that he had previously in the transferred asset. For
example, suppose that Anne bought a piece of property for $100. She
paid $15 in cash and granted a mortgage of $85 to cover the balance of
the purchase price. According to settled tax law, her basis in the prop-
erty included the $85 mortgage as well as the $15 cash payment,388 i.e.,
the basis was $100. She later transferred the property for 100% of the
stock of a newly formed corporation, X Corp. At the time of the transfer
the property had appreciated in value to $120, and Anne had paid $15 on
the mortgage, reducing the unpaid balance to $70. Immediately prior to
the transfer, $50 of her net worth was traceable to her ownership of the
property, i.e., her equity in the property ($120 fair market value minus
$70 unpaid mortgage = $50 equity). Immediately after the transfer, $50
of her net worth was traceable to her ownership of the shares, i.e., the
book value of her shares, which should have matched X Corp's equity in
the transferred property ($120 fair market value assets minus $70 liabili-
ties = $50 book value). Obviously, Anne has yet to cash in on her prop-
erty. Whether or not she has placed the property in corporate solution,
the asset is worth $50 to her.
According to section 357(a), the liability encumbering the trans-
ferred property does not prevent the usual nonrecognition rule of section
351(a) from applying to Anne.389 Hence, Anne doesn't recognize a gain
on the transfer. According to section 358(a) and (d),390 Anne's basis in
X Corp is $30: A substituted basis minus the liability encumbering the
transferred property39 1 ($100 Anne's basis in transferred property minus
$70 liability encumbering transferred property = $30). As determined
under section 362(a), X Corp's basis in the property is the same as the
388. See generally Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of
Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. Rnv. 69 (1969). See also supra note
376 and accompanying text.
389. I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 357(a).
390. Id. §§ 358(a), (d).
391. Id. Section 358(a)(1) also requires the shareholder to decrease her basis in her newly
received shares by the amount of money and the fair market value of any other property
received by her in the exchange. Id. § 358(a)(1). She increases her basis by any gain she
recognized on the exchange. Id. § 358(a)(1)(B).
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basis that Anne had in the property,392 i.e., a carryover basis of $100.
The reduction in basis required by section 358(d)(1) is the primary
mechanism for preventing the transferor of encumbered property from
excluding the liability from his amount realized upon a later disposition
of his stock.39 3 Such an exclusion would distort the actual gain that he
realized on the sale of his stock, because the tax law permits him to count
the liability as part of his basis in the transferred property, 394 and he
takes that basis in the transferred property as his basis in his shares.395
To illustrate, suppose that in the hypothetical above, Anne had sold her
X Corp stock to Bob for $50 (the book value of her stock). Without the
basis reduction required by section 358(d)(1), Anne's basis in her stock
would have been $100, i.e., a substituted basis.396 Not only would she
have avoided recognizing a gain caused by the appreciation in value of
the property on the sale of the stock to Bob, she even would have recog-
nized a loss of $50 ($50 amount realized minus $100 basis in stock = $50
lOSS)! 397 Section 358(d)(1) required Anne to reduce her basis in her stock
from $100 to $3039' ($100 substituted basis minus $70 liability = $30
basis in X Corp stock); however, she recognizes a $20 gain on the sale of
the X Corp stock to Bob ($50 amount realized minus $30 basis in stock
- $20 gain).399 The property appreciated in value by $20 while she
owned it, and thus, she is properly being taxed on that $20 upon sale of
her stock. She also would have recognized a $20 gain if instead of trans-
ferring it to X Corp she had sold it, subject to the $70 mortgage, directly
to Bob. According to Crane v. Commissioner,4° Anne's amount realized
would include the $70 mortgage as well as the $50 cash payment and
thus would have been $120. 41 Since she had a basis of $100 (which in-
cluded the original amount of the mortgage),4 2 she would have recog-
nized a gain of $20.4°s The system works out so that Anne recognizes a
$20 gain when she cashes in on her investment in the property, whether
392. Id. § 362(a)(1). If the transferor recognized a gain on the exchange, the transferee
corporation increases its basis in the transferred property by the amount of the recognized gain
by the transferor. Id.
393. Id. § 358(d)(1).
394. See supra notes 376 and 389 and accompanying text.
395. See I.R.C. § 358(a)(1).
396. Id. §§ 358(a)(1), (d)(1).
397. See id. § 1001(a).
398. Id. § 358(d)(1).
399. Id. § 1001(a), (c).
400. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
401. See id. 331 U.S. at 12.
402. See supra notes 376, 388 and 394 and accompanying text.
403. See I.R.C. §§ 1001(a), (c).
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she does so through a direct sale of property or through sale of the stock
of a corporation owning the property.
The encumbrance or the assumption of liability has no impact on
the basis that the transferee corporation takes in the transferred assets.
According to section 362(a)(1), which is silent about liabilities, the corpo-
ration takes the basis that the transferor had as its basis in the prop-
erty.' This rule makes sense. Because the section 351 transfer is
considered to be merely a change in the form of ownership, 4 ' the trans-
feree corporation should be standing in the same shoes as the transferor
with respect to the transferred property. That means that it should have
the same basis in the property that the transferor had. To the extent the
transferor included the liabilities in calculating his own basis in the trans-
ferred assets, the corporation does the same, but it does so because it
takes a carryover basis" 6 and not because the transferred property is en-
cumbered or it assumes a liability.
Section 357(b) contains one of the statutory exceptions to the gen-
eral nonrecognition rule of section 357(a).4°7 Section 357(b) denies the
nonrecognition treatment accorded by section 357(a) to the transferor
where it appears that the principal purpose of the transferor with respect
to the transfer of the liability was to avoid federal income tax on the
exchange," 8 or, if not for such purpose, at least was not a bona fide busi-
ness purpose." 9 If the government argues that section 357(b)(1) applies,
section 357(b)(2) requires the transferor to prove the absence of the for-
bidden purpose by a "clear preponderance of the evidence."' 410 Using a
bit of hyperbole, the regulations declare that the absence of a tax avoid-
ance purpose or the presence of a bona fide business purpose must be
"unmistakable"! 411 If the government prevails with respect to the pur-
pose, section 357(b) dictates that the liability must be treated as money
distributed to transferors as part of the exchange.4a 2 In other words, it is
404. Id. § 362(a)(1). If the transferor recognizes a gain on the exchange, the transferee
corporation increases its basis in the transferred property by the amount of the gain recognized
to the transferor. Id.
405. The transfer of assets to a corporation only changes the form of ownership as the
owner still controls the transferee corporation (80% control) in a section 351 exchange. See
id. § 351.
406. Id § 362(a)(1).
407. Id. §§ 357(a), (b). The other statutory exception is contained in section 357(c) of the
Code. Id. § 357(c).
408. Id. § 357(b)(1)(A).
409. Id. § 357(b)(1)(B).
410. Id. § 357(b)(2); see also Greiner, Behling, & Moffett, supra note 378, at 114-15.
411. Treas. Reg. § 1.357-1(c) (1961).
412. I.R.C. § 357(b)(1).
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to be considered boot, and is to be taxed according to the boot rules of
section 351(b).413 In such cases, the total amount of transferred liabili-
ties-not just the liability with a tax avoidance purpose-is to be consid-
ered boot.414 A tainted purpose as to one liability causes all transferred
liabilities to be considered boot.415
Section 357(b) is deceivingly subtle. It is the transfer of the liability
to the corporation,416 not the origin of the liability or the use of the pro-
ceeds derived from it,417 that must be tainted with the improper purpose
for section 357(b) to apply."1 8 Neither the liability itself nor the use of
the proceeds need have a business purpose.419 Thus, theoretically, the
transferred liability might be a loan that had absolutely nothing to do
with the business world at the time of its creation. The transferor might
have used the loan proceeds for purely personal reasons, e.g., to finance
the college education of his children; and yet, the transferor would not
run afoul of section 357(b) if he can show that the purpose of transferring
the liability to the corporation was not to avoid the boot rules and that he
had a business purpose for transferring the debt to the corporation.420 Of
course, it may be improbable that anyone, much less the government, is
going to believe the transferor's protestations that he had a legitimate
413. According to section 351(b), a transferor in a section 351 exchange must recognize his
or her realized gain if he or she has received, in addition to stock or securities permitted to be
received under section 351(a), other property or money, but only to the extent of the amount
of money received plus the fair market value of such other property received. Id. If the trans-
ferred liability is governed by section 357(b), it is to be considered as money received by the
transfer on the exchange for purposes of section 351. Id.
414. Id. If the transferor had an improper purpose in transferring the liability, section
357(b) requires the "total amount of the liability" transferred to be treated as money received
by the transferor on the exchange. Id.; see also Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra note 378, at
114.
415. See Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra note 378, at 114. See also I.R.C. § 357(b)(1).
The regulations declare that in such cases the total amount of the liabilities and not merely a
particular liability with respect to which the tax avoidance or nonbusiness purpose existed
shall be treated as money received by the transferor upon the exchange. Treas. Reg. § 1.357-
1(c)(1961).
416. See I.R.C. § 357(b)(1); see also Easson v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 653, 659 (9th Cir.
1961); Thatcher v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 28, 35 (1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 533
F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1976); Wiebusch v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 777, 780 (1973), aff'd, 487
F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); ISC Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1216, 1218
(1971); Estate of Stoll v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 223, 243-44 (1962), non acq., 1961-1 C.B. 3.
417. See Drybrough v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1967); Easson, 294 F.2d at
659; see also Lavya, Corporation-Assumption of Liabilities, 233-3d T.M. A-19 (1985).
418. See I.R.C. § 357(b)(1); see also Thatcher, 61 T.C. at 35; ISCIndus., Inc., 30 T.C.M. at
1218; Estate of Stoll, 38 T.C. at 246-47; Greiner, Behling & Moffet, supra note 378, at 117, 122.
419. See ISC Indus., Inc., 30 T.C.M. at 1218-19; see also Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra
note 378, at 123-24; Lavya, supra note 417, at A-19.
420. See I.R.C. § 357(b)(1)(A), (B); see also Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra note 378, at
121-24; Lavya, supra note 417, at A-17 to A-20.
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business purpose for the transfer of the liability in such a case.421 More-
over, section 357(b) saddles him with the difficult burden of proving his
proper purpose by a clear preponderance of the evidence. 422 Still, ac-
cording to the statute, the key is the transferor's principal purpose in
transferring the liability, not the origin of the liability or the use of the
proceeds derived from it.423 One of the tainted purposes under section
357(b) is the avoidance of federal income tax on the section 351 ex-
change.424 As section 351 exchanges produce gain to the transferor only
when he receives boot (cash or property other than the transferee's stock
or securities),42 5 this part of section 357(b) is aimed at transfers of liabili-
ties that in effect are substitutions for the distribution of boot to the
transferors. Without section 357(b) an owner with some equity in his
property could take out a mortgage on it, stick the loan proceeds in his
back pocket, and transfer the property tax-free under sections 351 and
357 in exchange for stock of his controlled corporation, which then takes
over the burden of paying off the loan.426 No part of the transaction
would result in taxable income for the transferor. The granting of a
mortgage is not taxable.427 The transfer of the property and the assump-
tion of the mortgage would be protected by sections 35 1(a) and 357(a).42 8
The problem is that, except for the order of the steps, the transaction is
exactly the same as a transfer of unencumbered property to a controlled
corporation followed by the granting of a mortgage by the corporation
and a distribution of the loan proceeds by the corporation to the trans-
feror. The distribution of the loan proceeds to the transferor in this sec-
ond transaction clearly would be considered a distribution of boot, and
would be taxed to the transferor under section 351(b).429 No matter
421. See, eg., Drybrough, 376 F.2d at 358; Thompson v. Campbell, 353 F.2d 787, 788 (5th
Cir. 1965); Campbell v. Wheeler, 342 F.2d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 1965); Harrison v. Commis-
sioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1384 (1981); Wolf v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 652 (1965), aff'd, 357
F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1966).
422. I.R.C. § 357(b)(2); see also Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra note 378, at 125.
423. See I.R.C. § 357(b)(1).
424. Id. § 357(b)(1)(A).
425. Id. § 351(a), (b).
426. See Lavya, supra note 417, at A-16; see also Thompson, 353 F.2d at 789; B. BIrrKER &
J. EUSIcE, supra note 29, at 3.06, 3-22.
427. The granting of a mortgage is neither a sale nor an exchange of the property. There-
fore the mortgage is not taxable. Moreover, if the mortgage does not have cash equivalent
value, it is not taxable in the year of receipt. See Olster v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 456, 469
n.14 (1982), aff'd, 751 F.2d 1168 (11th Cir. 1985).
428. I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 357(a).
429. See id. § 351(b). The proposition in the text assumes that each of the three steps is
part of an integrated transaction that will be linked together through the step transaction
doctrine. If the distribution of the loan proceeds by the corporation to the transferor is consid-
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which of the two structures is chosen for the transaction, however, the
transferor starts out with property and ends up with stock of a controlled
corporation and cash in exchange for his property. The corporation ends
up with new property and, ultimately, less cash. Section 357(b) makes
the transfer of the mortgage result in boot income, too, unless the trans-
feror can show that the transfer of the mortgage was not to avoid the
boot income he would have been required to report had the corporation
taken out the mortgage and distributed the loan proceeds to him after the
transfer.430
Even if the purpose of transferring the liability was not to avoid
federal income tax on the section 351 exchange, section 357(b) applies
when the transferor cannot prove a bona fide business purpose for the
transfer of the liability.431 This rule is aimed at the transfer of personal
liabilities that are unconnected with the corporation's business. 4 32 For
example, if the transferee corporation assumes the payment of a loan that
was used to furnish a college education for the transferor's child, the
transferor will be hard pressed to prove a business purpose for the as-
sumption of the loan by the corporation.433 In one case, the court con-
cluded that the assumption of the obligation to pay the personal taxes of
the transferor served no business purpose.434 The transferred liability,
therefore, constituted boot to the transferor.435 The courts and the gov-
ernment look askance at the transfer of a liability when the transferor
retains the proceeds of the loan for personal use, rather than using them
in the business, or retains encumbered assets while transferring the
liability.
436
Section 357(c)(1) 437 contains the other statutory exception to the
general nonrecognition rule of section 357(a).4 38 Unlike section 357(b)
which provides a subjective test of motive,439 section 357(c)(1) applies a
ered a separate and independent transaction, it would be a distribution governed by sections
301 and 316 of the Internal Revenue Code. See id. §§ 301, 316.
430. See id. § 357(b)(1)(A).
431. Id. § 357(b)(1)(B).
432. See, e.g., Thompson, 353 F.2d at 788; Campbell, 342 F.2d at 840-41; Estate of Stoll, 38
T.C. at 245; see also B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTiCE, supra note 29, 1 3.06, 3-22.
433. See, eag., Thompson, 353 F.2d at 788.
434. See Campbell, 342 F.2d at 840-41.
435. Id. at 839.
436. See, eg., Campbell, 342 F.2d at 840-41; Estate of Stoll, 38 T.C. at 244-45; Eck v.
United States, 70-2 U.S. Tax Cases 84,019, 84,022 (1969); see also Greiner, Behling & Moffett,
supra note 378, at 123.
437. I.R.C. § 357(c)(1).
438. Section 357(a) states that a transferred liability is not to be treated as money and does
not prevent the exchange from being covered by section 351. Id. § 357(a).
439. Id. § 357(b)(1); see also Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra note 378, at 127.
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strictly objective test. 4 Section 357(c)(1) requires the transferor in a
section 351 exchange to recognize a gain to the extent that the sum of the
transferred liabilities exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of the prop-
erty transferred to the corporation as part of the exchange.44' For exam-
ple, if in a section 351 exchange Anne transfers property subject to a $40
mortgage, with an adjusted basis in her hands of $15, she must recognize
a gain of $25, the excess of the transferred liability over her adjusted
basis in the transferred property.' 2
The reasons for section 357(c) and its workings can be seen through
another illustration.443 Suppose that Anne owns property that is worth
$320 and is subject to a mortgage of $250 and in which she has an ad-
justed basis of $90. Her equity in the property is thus $70 ($320 fair
market value minus $250 mortgage = $70 equity). If she sells the prop-
erty to Bob for $320 ($70 cash and an assumption of the $250 mortgage),
440. Id. § 357 (c)(1); see also Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra note 378, at 127. Some
commentators state that another difference between sections 357(b)(1) and 357(c)(1) is that
while section 357(b) limits recognition on account of the transferred liability to the gain real-
ized on the exchange, section 357(c)(1) taxes the excess of liabilities over the adjusted basis of
the transferred property as gain, regardless of the amount of gain realized and even if there is
no gain realized at all. See Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra note 378, at 128; see also B.
BrrriER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, % 3.06. These statements are of questionable validity,
mostly because they seem to ignore the rule of Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947).
The Greiner, Behling & Moffett article offers the example of a transfer of assets with an ad-
justed basis of $20,000 and a fair market value of $25,000, subject to liabilities of $35,000 in
exchange for the stock of a newly formed corporation. Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra note
378, at 128. The article mentions that the stock is worthless for valuation purposes because the
corporation has a negative net worth. Id. Further, it states that the transferor would recog-
nize a gain of $15,000 on the transaction by virtue of section 357(c)(1). Id. The article is
accurate about the gain recognized by, the transferor, but it is incorrect in stating that the
transferor did not have a realized gain, too. According to Crane, the transferor must add the
transferred liability of $35,000 to the fair market value of the stock received (which happens to
be zero in the example) in computing his amount realized. Crane, 331 U.S. at 14. Thus, his
amount realized is $35,000 (zero fair market value of stock received plus $35,000 transferred
liability), a figure $15,000 more than his adjusted basis in the transferred property. Thus he
has realized a gain of $15,000. See Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra note 378, at 128.
Bittker & Eustice make exactly the same mistake. See B. BrrrIER & J. EUSTICE, supra
note 29, 3.06, at 3-25 to 3-26. These authorities seem to ignore the fact that a change from a
deficit position to a zero position is indeed an economic gain. Indeed, the combination of the
Crane rule and the language of section 357(c)(1) seems to make it impossible for a transferor
not realizing a gain to have a gain recognized on account of that section because: (1) amount
realized includes transferred liabilities; (2) section 357(c)(1) taxes the excess of transferred
liabilities over adjusted basis of the property transferred; and (3) at least one component of the
amount realized, the transferred liabilities, must exceed the adjusted basis of the transferred
property for section 357(c)(1) to apply. Doesn't section 357(c)(1) then result in a taxable gain
only when the transferor has a realized gain? I.R.C. § 357(c)(1); see also Crane, 331 U.S. at 14.
441. I.R.C. § 357(c)(1).
442. See id.
443. The hypothetical is based on the facts of Easson, 294 F.2d at 654.
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she would recognize a gain of $230 ($320 amount realized minus $90
adjusted basis = $230 recognized gain). 4 If section 357(c) did not exist
and she transferred her property to a newly formed corporation in ex-
change for all of its shares, sections 351(a) and 357(a)445 would accord
her nonrecognition treatment on the exchange, and her basis in her
newly received shares, as computed under section 358(a) and 358(d),44 6
would be $90 substituted basis minus $250 transferred liability, equalling
a negative basis of $160. If the tax law had been willing to require Anne
to take a negative basis in her stock, the system could have worked prop-
erly without section 357(c). 47 Presumably Bob would be willing to buy
Anne's shares at book value, which would be the same as the corpora-
tion's equity in the transferred property, i.e., $70 ($320 fair market value
property minus $250 mortgage = $70 equity in property or book value
of Anne's shares). When Anne sells her shares to Bob for $70, she would
recognize a gain of $230 ($70 amount realized minus a negative adjusted
basis of $160 in Anne's shares = $230 recognized gain)," the same gain
Anne would recognize if she did not incorporate and instead sold the
property directly to Bob." 9 The negative basis concept, however, dis-
quieted the tax bar (including the judiciary), which had difficulty concep-
tualizing a basis below zero.450 Hence, in the mind of some, Anne's basis
would have to be left at exactly zero.45" If Anne has a zero basis in her
stock, her recognized gain on the sale of her shares to Bob for $70 would
444. See I.R.C. § 357(c)(1); see also Crane, 331 U.S. at 14.
445. See I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 357(a).
446. See id. §§ 358(a), (d).
447. For substantial commentary on the problems associated with a negative basis, see
Crane, 331 U.S. at 9-10; Easson, 294 F.2d at 657-58; Cooper, Negative Basis, 75 HARV. L.
REv. 1352 (1962); Greenlee & Kramer, The Mortgagor with a "Negative Basis," 27 TAXES 887
(1949); Johnson, "Negative Basis" Problems in Oil and Gas Transactions, THIRD ANN. INST.
ON OIL AND GAS TRANSACTIONS (1952); Kahn & Oesterle, A Definition of "Liabilities" in
InternalRevenue Code Sections 357 and 358(d), 73 MICH. L. REv. 461, 471 n.51 (1975); Lurie,
Taxing Transfers of Mortgage Property, 39 CORNELL L. Q. 611, 630 (1954); Comment, Section
357(c) and the Cash Basis Taxpayer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1154 (1967); see also B. BrTIcER & J.
EUSTICE, supra note 29, % 3.06, at 3-25; Lavya, supra note 417, at A-22.
448. See I.R.C. § 1001(a), (b). For a discussion of computation of negative basis, see gener-
ally Cooper, supra note 447.
449. See supra notes 443-44 and accompanying text.
450. See Lavya, supra note 417, at A-22-23; see also Easson, 294 F.2d at 657-58 (tax court
was not willing to accept the negative basis thesis); First Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 26
T.C.M. (CCII) 608 (1967), aff'd, 404 F.2d 1182 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied., 394 U.S. 1014
(1969).
For a discussion of this issue prior to enactment of section 357(c), see Crane, 331 U.S. at
6-11 (1947); Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 459-60 (1st Cir. 1950) (Magruder, J., concur-
ring) (computed gain on repossession of mortgaged property using negative basis), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 926 (1951).
451. See Lavya, supra note 417, at A-22.
1048 [Vol. 22:985
June 1989] FEDERAL TAX LAWS AND INCORPORATION
be only $70 ($70 amount realized minus zero basis in shares = $70 rec-
ognized gain).4 2 The $70 gain would be $160 less than the $230 gain
that she would recognize if she did not incorporate and instead sold the
property directly to Bob.4 53
In economic terms, of course, the sale of the property directly to
Bob and the sale of the stock after incorporation are identical transac-
tions. In both situations Anne receives cash in an amount equal to her
equity in the property ($70) and is relieved of the obligation to pay the
mortgage ($250). In the case of the incorporation, Anne is receiving
stock, equal in value to her equity in her property, and is being relieved
of a liability. If she has a zero basis when she sells her stock, she will be
taxed only on the book value of her stock (the $70 paid by Bob).454 Con-
gress could have remedied the problem by making Anne take a negative
basis in her stock at the time of the section 351 exchange,455 which would
have resulted in Anne recognizing a gain, as computed above, of $230.456
Instead Congress elected to tax the excess of the liability over the ad-
justed basis at the time of the section 351 transfer, declaring that "such
excess shall be considered as a gain from the sale or exchange" of the
transferred asset.457 Thus, under section 357(c) as currently constituted,
Anne must recognize a gain on the excess of the transferred liability over
her adjusted basis, which, when computed, results in recognized gain of
$160 at the time of the section 351 transfer ($250 transferred liability
minus $90 adjusted basis in Anne's shares = $160 recognized gain).45"
Anne then plugs the recognized gain and the assumed liability into the
regular section 358 formula to compute her basis in her newly received
stock.4 59 According to section 358(d) the liability is counted as cash dis-
tributed by the corporation to Anne as part of the section 351 ex-
change. 460  The computation results in Anne taking a zero basis in her
stock ($90 substituted basis minus zero dollars fair market value prop-
erty-in-kind distributed to Anne minus $250 cash distributed to Anne
[the mortgage] plus $160 gain recognized by Anne = zero dollars Anne's
basis in her stock).461 When Anne sells her stock to Bob for $70, she
452. See I.R.C. §§ 1001(a)-(c).
453. See supra text accompanying notes 443-44.
454. See supra text accompanying notes 443-44.
455. See Kahn & Oesterle, supra note 447, at 447; see also Easson, 294 F.2d at 658; Parker,
186 F.2d at 459 (Magruder, J., concurring); Cooper, supra note 447, at 1359.
456. See supra text accompanying notes 447-48.
457. See I.R.C. § 302(c)(1). See generally Kahn & Oesterle, supra note 447, at 471.
458. See I.R.C. § 357(c)(1).
459. See Id. §§ 358(a), (d).
460. Id. § 358(d).
461. See id. §§ 358(a), (d).
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recognizes a $70 gain,462 because her adjusted basis in her stock is zero.
When Anne adds the $70 recognized gain on the sale of her stock to the
$160 section 357(c)(1) recognized gain, she has a total recognized gain of
$230 for the two transactions. That matches the amount of recognized
gain that she would have had, if she had not incorporated and instead
had sold the property directly to Bob for $230.463 It also matches the
gain that she would have recognized, had she been required to take a
negative basis in her stock.4 4
-Neither section 357(b)465 nor section 357(c)(1)4 66 attempts to class-
ify the type of gain recognized on account of their applicability. While
section 357(b1)4 67 is silent, section 357(c)(1) expressly leaves the classifica-
tion of the gain to the other general definitional sections of the Internal
Revenue Code, declaring that the recognized gain shall be treated as gain
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset or a noncapital asset, "as the
case may be. ' 468 The determination of whether a recognized capital gain
is long-term or short-term is made by referring to the holding period of
the transferor in the transferred assets.469 If a transferor conveys more
than one piece of property and those pieces, if sold by him, would pro-
duce more than one type of gain for him, e.g., a long-term capital gain
and a short-term capital gain, he must prorate the gain recognized on
account of section 357(c)(1) between those different types of gain accord-
ing to the fair market values of the transferred items.4 70 A possible result
of this proration rule is that in one transaction a transferor could recog-
nize a gain that is divided into ordinary income, short-term capital gain
and long-term capital gain.471 For example, suppose that Anne recog-
nized a gain of $30 on account of section 357(c)(1). Based on their fair
market value at the time of the transfer, noncapital assets constituted
one-half of the assets that Anne transferred to the corporation, capital
assets held for less than six months constituted one-third of the assets
and capital assets held for more than six months constituted one-sixth of
the assets. Of Anne's $30 recognized gain, $15 is ordinary income, $10 is
a short-term capital gain and $5 is a long-term capital gain. Moreover, a
462. See id. §§ 1001(a)-(c).
463. See supra notes 443-44 and accompanying text.
464. See supra notes 447-48 and accompanying text.
465. See I.R.C. § 357(b)(1); Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra note 378, at 127.
466. See I.R.C. § 357(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.357-2(a) (1980); Greiner, Behling & Moffett,
supra note 378, at 127.
467. See I.R.C. § 357(b)(1); Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra note 378, at 127.
468. See I.R.C. § 357(c)(1); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.357-2(a) (1980).
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revenue ruling has applied section 1239 to turn a capital gain recognized
on account of section 357(c)(1) into ordinary income.472 Similarly, the
Tax Court has applied section 1245 recapture rules to section 357(c)(1)
gain.473 It is likely that other recapture rules, e.g., section 1250, also
apply.474
Section 357(c)(2) requires section 357(b) to be applied over section
357(c)(1) in those situations when the transfer falls under both sections
357(b) and 357(c)(1). 475  The predominance of section 357(b) over
357(c)(1) more often than not is to the government's advantage, because
section 357(b) is likely to produce a bigger recognized gain than would
section 357(c)(1). Though the transferred liability produces recognized
gain under section 357(b) only to the extent that the transferor has a
realized gain,476 the realized gain often covers the full amount of the
transferred liability. When it does, the recognized gain produced by sec-
tion 357(b) (the full amount of the transferred liability) obviously is
greater than the gain that could be produced by section 357(c)(1), which
taxes only the excess of the transferred liability over the adjusted basis of
the transferred assets.477 Because the subjective motive of the transferor
472. Rev. Rul. 60-302, 1960-2 C.B. 223.
473. See Rosen v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 11, 20 (1974), aff'd mein., 515 F.2d 507 (3d Cir.
1975); see also Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140.
474. See also Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra note 378, at 127-28. The recapture of the
investment tax credit under Internal Revenue Code section 47 likewise might apply. I.R.C.
§ 47.
475. Id § 357(c)(2)(A).
476. See id. §§ 351(b)(1)(A), 357(b)(1).
477. Id. § 357(c)(1)(A). For example, suppose that Anne owns property that is worth $320,
is subject to a mortgage of $250, and in which she has an adjusted basis of $90. If she transfers
the property to a newly formed corporation in exchange for all of its shares and the transfer of
the liability is for neither of the tainted purposes of section 357(b), section 357(c)(1)(A) re-
quires Anne to recognize a gain in the excess of the transferred liability over her adjusted basis,
which, when computed, results in recognized gain of $160. On the other hand, if the primary
purpose of the transfer of the liability was one of the tainted purposes under section 357(b)-
e.g., to avoid income tax on the exchange-section 357(b)(1) requires Anne to treat the mort-
gage as money distributed to Anne as part of the exchange. See id. § 357(d)(1)(A). According
to section 351(b)(1), Anne must recognize her realized gain to the extent of the amount of
money she received-i.e., the transferred mortgage. See id. § 351(b)(1)(A). Assuming that the
shares have a fair market value equal to the corporation's equity in the transferred property,
i.e., $70, ($320 fair market value property minus $250 mortgage = $70 equity in property or
book value of Anne's shares)-Anne's amount realized on the exchange is $320 ($70 fair mar-
ket value of shares plus $250 transferred mortgage = $320 amount realized). She realizes a
gain of $230 ($320 amount realized minus $90 adjusted basis in transferred property = $230
realized gain). Section 357(b)(1) requires Anne to treat the mortgage as cash book distributed
to her. According to the usual boot rule of section 351(a), Anne must recognize a gain on the
lesser of the boot received or gain recognized. See id. § 351(b)(1). In this example, the real-
ized gain of $230 is lesser than the boot of $250. Thus, Anne would recognize a gain of $230.
Unfortunately for Anne, the $230 recognized gain under section 351(b)(1) is $70 greater than
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is a factor under section 357(b),478 it is virtually impossible to predict in
advance whether a court will find for the taxpayer or the government
,when section 357(b) is at issue. Consequently, the government will
launch a two-pronged attack against the transferor of the liabilities.479
When it looks like section 357(c)(1) applies, it is possible that section
357(b) applies also. In an attempt to treat the entire amount of the trans-
ferred liabilities as boot,480 the government will argue that section 357(b)
applies. If the government loses on the section 357(b) issue, it next will
invoke section 357(c)(1) to tax the excess of transferred liabilities over
the adjusted basis of the transferred assets.481
According to section 357(c)(3), a transferred liability is not counted
as a liability in applying the general rule of section 357(c)(1) if the trans-
feror would have been entitled to a deduction had he discharged the lia-
bility himself.482 Section 358(d)(2) contains a corresponding exclusion
for determining the basis of the transferor in the stock or securities re-
ceived in the exchange: the liabilities excluded under section 357(c)(3)
are not used to reduce the transferor's basis in the stock or securities he
receives in the section 351 transfer.
48 3
Section 357(c)(3) 48 codified the rule of Focht v. Commissioner, a
case in which the Tax Court overruled 485 the harsh stance it had taken in
Raich v. Commissioner.486 In Raich, a cash method taxpayer incorpo-
rated his sole proprietorship, transferring both trade accounts receivable
and trade accounts payable in exchange for all of the stock of a newly
formed corporation. The transferred receivables nearly doubled his
transferred payables. The other transferred assets were negligible.487
The Commissioner successfully claimed that the payables were liabilities
the gain of $160 that Anne would be required to recognize under section 357(c)(l), if that
section were applicable.
478. Id. § 357(b)(1).
479. See Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra note 378, at 128-29; see also Alderman v. Com-
missioner, 55 T.C. 662 (1971); Rev. Ruling 68-629, 1968-2 C.B. 154.
480. See Greiner, Behling & Moffett, supra note 378, at 128-29.
481. Id. at 128.
482. I.R.C. § 357(c)(3)(A)(i). See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE REVENUE AcT OF 1978, H.R. 13511, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 217-20 (1978).
483. I.R.C. § 358(d)(2).
484. Id. § 357(c)(3).
485. Focht, 68 T.C. at 227-28 (1977), acq., 1980-2 C.B. 1. Subsequent to the Revenue Act
of 1978, the service acquiesced in the Focht decision and issued two Revenue Rulings in re-
sponse. See Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113; Rev. Rul. 80-199, 1980-2 C.B. 122. These
revenue rulings revoked the Internal Revenue Service's position on Rev. Rul. 69-442, 1969-2
C.B. 53.
486. 46 T.C. 604 (1966).
487. Id. at 605.
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within the meaning of section 357(c) and that the receivables had a zero
basis in the hands of the transferor.488 Thus, the sum of the transferred
liabilities (mostly the payables) exceeded the basis of the transferred as-
sets (mostly the receivables which had a zero basis).489 The Tax Court
applied section 357(c) literally, holding that the proprietor had to treat
the excess of the transferred liabilities over the adjusted basis of the assets
as a recognized gain.490
The Raich decision drew "reams" of adverse criticism, leading even-
tually to its overruling by both Focht and section 357(c)(3).49 1 Its prob-
lem was its failure to abide by a primary supposition of the tax system:
For income to be stated clearly, revenues and expenses should be
matched. By counting the revenues but not the expenses, the Raich
court distorted the income position of the proprietor.4 92 The result was a
taxable gain for something that was not in fact an economic gain.493 The
proprietor had not cashed in on his business; he had merely changed its
form from a proprietorship to a corporation. Moreover, the transfer of
the deductible obligation of a cash method taxpayer should not result in
a recognized gain to him because that taxpayer would have been entitled
to an additional benefit (a deduction) if he had paid the obligation; it
would be inequitable to simultaneously treat the transferred liability as
income to that taxpayer and to deny him the tax benefit for satisfaction
of that debt.494
Despite its origin as a balm for the cash method taxpayer who trans-
fers both trade accounts receivable and trade accounts payable,495 the
exclusion of section 357(c)(3) is by no means limited to transferred trade
accounts payable or to cash method taxpayers. It also applies to other
488. Id. at 610.
489. Id. at 610-11.
490. Id. at 611.
491. Focht, 68 T.C. at 227-29 (citing Thatcher v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir.
1976) rev'g 61 T.C. 28 (1973); Bongiovanni v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972)); see
also I.R.C. § 357(c)(3).
492. Raich, 46 T.C. at 608-10.
493. See Focht, 68 T.C. at 229. See generally Kahn & Oesterle, supra note 447; Lavya, supra
note 417, at A-28; Manning, The Service Corporation-Who is Taxable on its Income: Recon-
ciling Assignment of Income Principles, Section 482, and Section 351, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV.
657, 663-66 (1983).
494. See Kahn & Oesterle, supra note 447, at 462-66.
495. The Revenue Act of 1978 and the Technical Corrections Act of 1979 discuss the
changes made to section 357(c) after the Focht decision. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978); S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Technical Cor-
rections Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-222, § 103(a)(12), 94 Stat. 194 (1980); S. REP. No. 498,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (discussing changes after Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 223
(1977)); see also Lavya, supra note 417, at A-28.
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deductible expenses (such as accrued interest, taxes, rental or salaries4 96)
and to accrual method taxpayers. Section 357(c)(3) does not apply to a
liability that results in the creation of, or an increase in, the basis in any
property.497 The section's legislative history offers the example of a cash
method taxpayer who purchases small tools on credit and, prior to pay-
ing for the tools, transfers them along with the related obligation to pay
for them to a new corporation in a section 351 exchange. 98 While the
transferor would have been entitled to a deduction if he had paid off the
obligation, pending payment, he has a basis in the tools equal to the
amount of the unpaid obligation. 499  According to section
357(c)(3)(B), 5°° that obligation does not constitute a liability for purposes
of section 357(c)(1)5 °1 More generally, the liabilities excludable under
section 357(c)(3) are to be excluded from section 357(c) and 358(d) only
because the definition of "liability" contained in section 357(c)(3) is not
intended to affect the definition of the term "liabilities" for any other
provision of the Internal Revenue Code, including section 357(a) and
357(b).50 2 Finally, 357(c)(3) also excludes liabilities from the general
coverage of section 357(c)(1) if a payment to discharge the liability would
be described in section 736(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.1 3 Section
736(a) governs payments made to a retiring partner, or to a deceased
partner's successor in interest, in liquidation of the partner's active inter-
est in the partnership. 5"
A final issue is who, if anybody, is entitled to a deduction for the
liabilities. It once was feared that the right to a deduction would be lost
to both the transferor and the transferee if the transferee corporation as-
sumed and paid the payables 5  Hence, tax counsel traditionally advised
cash method clients incorporating their businesses to retain trade ac-
496. I.R.C. § 357(c)(3); see Kahn & Oesterle, supra note 447, at 473; Lavya, supra note 417,
at A-28.
497. See I.R.C. § 357(c)(3)(B).
498. S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6761, 6948 n.7.
499. Id.
500. I.R.C. § 357(c)(3)(B).
501. Id. § 357(c)(1).
502. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 365, 92 Stat. 2763, 2854 (1978). See
generally Kahn & Oesterle, supra note 447; Lavya, supra note 417, at A-14, A-27.
503. See I.R.C. §§ 357(c)(3), 736(a). For further explanation, see generally Lavya, supra
note 417, at A-27.
504. I.R.C. § 736(a).
505. Keller, The Midstream Incorporation of a Cash-Basis Taxpayer: An Update, 38 MD. L.
REv. 480, 495-96 (1979).
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counts payable and pay them outside of the corporation. °6 It was be-
lieved that the transferee corporation was not entitled to the deduction
for those payables, either at the time of their assumption or at the time of
their subsequent payment, because the assumption of the liabilities was
regarded as part of the purchase price it paid to acquire the transferor's
assets.50 7 Moreover, the corporation could not even increase its basis for
accepting the transferred liabilities in the transferred assets, except to the
extent that those liabilities caused the transferor to recognize gain under
sections 357(b) or 357(c)." 8 The cash method transferor was not entitled
to deduct the payables either, because it was the corporation, not he, who
paid the expense.5 9 Eventually, however, the IRS altered its private rul-
ing policy so that a corporation could deduct cash basis payables as-
sumed in a section 351 transaction if: (1) the transferor also contributed
zero basis accounts receivable; and (2) the corporation agreed in the clos-
ing agreement entered into prior to the transfer to report the income on
collection of the receivables.5 10 Then, in a 1978 Technical Advice Mem-
orandum, 511 the IRS suggested that a closing agreement was no longer
necessary as long as a completed transaction met the criteria to which the
government would look if an advance ruling was sought with respect to
the transaction.5 12 Additionally, a 1980 revenue ruling mentioned that a
transferee corporation under the cash receipts and disbursements method
of accounting is allowed deductions under section 162 for the payments it
makes to satisfy the assumed trade accounts payable when such pay-
ments are made.513 While authority is lacking as to what should happen
when the corporate transferee is an accrual method taxpayer, it seems
probable that the transferee corporation also would be allowed to deduct
the payables, although the timing of the deduction could become an is-
506. See id. at 495; see also Z. CAVITCH, TAx PLANNING FOR CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS § 4.03[2][d][i], at 4-36 (1974).
507. See Keller, supra note 505, at 496, 506, 511; see also W.P. Haden Co. v. Commissioner,
165 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1948); Holdcroft Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.
1946); Rodney, Inc. v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1944); M. Buten & Sons, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 178 (1972); Leavitt v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 453
(1972).
508. See Keller, supra note 505, at 506 n.112; see also I.R.C. §§ 357(b), (c), 362(a).
509. See Keller, supra note 505, at 496, 505, 512-13; see also Doggett v. Commissioner, 275
F.2d 823, 827 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960); Citizens Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank v.
Welch, 119 F.2d 717, 719 (9th Cir. 1941); Kniffen v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 553, 565-67
(1962).
510. See Keller, supra note 505, at 506; Worthy, IRS Chief Counsel Outlines What Lies
Ahead for Professional Corporations, 32 J. TAx'N 88, 90 (1970).
511. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-30-010 (Apr. 14, 1978); see Keller, supra note 505, at 507.
512. See Keller, supra note 505, at 506-07.
513. Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113, 114.
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sue.514 Thus, it now seems clear that the corporation is entitled to a
deduction for payment of the transferred trade accounts payable.
While most pitfalls that impeded the transfers of payables to the
corporation have now been eliminated, incorporators might perceive a
change as an opportunity to save taxes by retaining all or a part of either
or both the receivables or payables. For example, if the transferor has
losses and the corporation has income, the parties might be tempted to
make the transferor retain the receivables and have the corporation as-
sume the payables.515 Section VIII discusses these devices and their like-
lihood of success.-16 Suffice it to say at this point, however, that the
government is well-armed with the statutory anti-tax avoidance rules
contained in sections 357(b), 446(b) and 482517 to combat schemes that
distort the proper reporting of income and deductions.5 18 The govern-
ment, of course, has at its disposal the usual panoply of nonstatutory
weapons (for example, the assignment of income doctrine 19) to combat
purely tax-motivated schemes. 2
514. The most sensible solution is to let the transferee corporation deduct the payables
when paid and include the receivables in income when collected, even though ordinarily it is
an accrual-method taxpayer. This process is what would happen if the cash-method transferor
had not placed the payables and receivables in the corporation in the first place.
515. See Keller, supra note 505, at 536-37.
516. See infra notes 583-713 and accompanying text. See generally Keller, supra note 505,
at 526-38.
517. I.R.C. §§ 357(b), 446(b), 482.
518. See Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113, 115; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(5) (as amended
in 1968); see also Rooney v. United States, 305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962); Central Cuba Sugar
Co. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952); National Sec.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943); Foster v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 34 (1983), aff'd in relevant part and vacated inpart, 756 F.2d 1430 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986). See generally Adess, The Role of Section 482 in
Nonrecognition Transactions-the Outer Edges, 57 TAXES 946 (1979); Berger, Gilman & Sta-
pleton, Section 482 and the Nonrecognition Provisions: An Analysis of the Boundary Lines, 26
TAX LAW. 523 (1973); Keller, supra note 243, at 533-38; Knobbe & Ridenour, Mid-Stream
Incorporation in Agriculture: Deflection of "Income" to Corporate Transferee, 7 U. TOL. L.
REV. 863, 866-70 (1970); Miller, The Application of IRC Section 482 to Transfers Under Sec-
tion 351: The National Securities Risk, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 227 (1976); Comment, Section 482
and the Nonrecognition Provisions: Resolving the Conflict, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 670 (1982).
519. See, eg., Brown v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940); Weinberg v. Commis-
sioner, 44 T.C. 233 (1965), aff'd in part and remanded in part for recomputation sub nom.,
Commissioner v. Sugar Daddy, Inc., 386 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 929
(1968); see also Keller, supra note 505, at 531-33. But see Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States,
490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
520. For some of these nonstatutory doctrines, see, Stewart v. Commissioner, 714 F.2d 977
(9th Cir. 1983) (section 482 not applicable, but used "substance over form" doctrine and
"court holding" doctrine enunciated in Commisioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331
(1945)). The other doctrines include the tax-benefit rule, the business-purpose doctrine and
the step-transaction doctrine. See generally Schwarz, supra note 30.
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VI. THE "BOOT" RULES
If, in addition to stock or securities of the controlled corporation,
the transferor receives cash or other property "to boot," section
351(b)(1) requires him to recognize his realized gain (if any), but only to
the extent of that cash plus the fair market value of that other prop-
erty.521 According to section 351(b)(2), the transferor is not allowed to
recognize a realized loss on account of the receipt of cash or other prop-
erty.5 22 This recognition property, the cash and other property, is known
vernacularly as "boot." Boot includes stock of other corporations52 3 as
well as debt of the transferee corporation not amounting to a security.
524
Other nonrecognition code sections have similar rules that require a rec-
ognition of gain to the extent of the boot received by the taxpayer.5 25 In
effect these rules require the taxpayer to recognize a gain on the lesser of
the gain realized or the boot.
526
Section 351(b)(1), 527 like the other boot rules, tries to ease the fric-
tion between two tenets of tax law: (1) when a taxpayer sells or ex-
changes his property, he has "cashed in" on it and ought to recognize his
gain for federal income tax purposes;528 and (2) mere changes in form of
ownership should not result in a taxable gain or loss. 529 As mentioned
521. I.R.C. § 351(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1986).
522. Id. § 351(b)(2).
523. See KAHN, supra note 244, at 310. Section 351(a) provides nonrecognition treatment
only for transfers of property to controlled corporations in an exchange corporation. I.R.C.
§ 351(a).
524. See, eg., Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Tur-
ner v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 94 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 922 (1962), on remand, 23
T.C.M. (CCII) 952 (1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1965); Pacific Pub. Serv. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 154 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1946); Neville Coke & Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d
599 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 326 U.S. 726 (1945); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60
F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932), cer denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933); Sisto Fin. Corp. v. Commissioner,
47 B.T.A. 425 (1942), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 139 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1943). For
a fuller discussion on the distinctions between a debt amounting to a security and a debt not
amounting to a security, see supra notes 72-140 and accompanying text.
525. See, eg., I.R.C. § 103 1(a) (like-kind exchanges), § 356(a)(1) (boot received in reorgani-
zations and in section 355 transactions), § 1031(b).
526. Typically, these code sections require the boot recipient to recognize his gain, "if any,"
but "not in excess of" the boot received. Id. §§ 351(b)(1), 356(a)(1), 1031(b). The first part of
this language limits the recognized gain to the amount of the boot received. The realized gain
and the boot received both act as caps on the amount of gain that can be recognized by the
boot recipient.
527. Id. § 351(b)(1).
528. See, eg., Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1959); Port-
land Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940);
Bolker v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 782, 806 (1983), aff'd, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985); see also
supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
529. See, e-g., Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., 316 U.S. 527, 533 (1942); Hempt Bros.,
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elsewhere, 3' the general nonrecognition rule of section 351(a) is based
on the theory that the transfer of property to a controlled corporation in
exchange for its stock or securities is just a change in the form of owner-
ship.531 Because the transferor controls the corporation5 3 2 and is merely
receiving something that amounts to an investment in the corporation in
exchange for his property,533 he is not cashing in on the transferred prop-
erty. If the transferor receives cash or other property to boot, however,
he is doing more than merely continuing his proprietary interest in that
property. He is partly cashing in because he is receiving something other
than a piece of paper that says he owns the company that now owns the
property he transferred. The transferor is not cashing in completely,
though, because he still controls the corporation since at least part of the
consideration received by him in the transaction consists of a long-term
investment in the corporation that owns the property that he just trans-
ferred. Section 351(b) takes what amounts to an intermediate position.
The transferor recognizes a gain to the extent that he is cashing in, and
he is cashing in to the extent that he receives boot.534 The transferor is
not cashing in to the extent that he receives what amounts to an invest-
ment in his controlled corporation, and so the transferor does not recog-
nize a gain to the extent that his realized gain is attributable to the stock
or securities he receives.535
Because section 35 l(b)(1) requires the transferor to recognize a gain
on the lesser of gain realized or the amount of the boot received, 536 he
must compute his realized gain and compare it to the amount of boot he
received. This rule requires a four step computation, which works as
follows:
Step 1. To determine his realized gain, the boot recipient must first
compute the amount realized. 537 Thus, he must add up everything that
he received in the transaction,538 including the nonrecognition property
Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d at 1176-77 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974); E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d at 1214-15 (Ct. C. 1973); Portland Oil, 109
F.2d at 488; Halliburton v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1935); American Com-
press & Warehouse Co. v. Bender, 70 F.2d 655, 657-58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 607
(1934); see also supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
530. See supra text accompanying notes 21-32.
531. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 528.
532. See supra notes 171-372 and accompanying text.
533. Section 351(a) requires the transferor of property to receive the stock or securities of
the transferee corporation. I.R.C. § 351(a).
534. See id. § 351(b)(1).
535. The transferor recognizes a gain, but only to the extent that he has received boot. Id.
536. Id.
537. See id. §§ 1001(a)-(b).
538. See id. § 1001(b).
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he received. The formula for amount realized is as follows: Fair market
value of stock received plus fair market value of securities received plus
sum of cash received plus fair market value of each item of other boot
property feceived equals amount realized.539
Step 2. To determine his realized gain, the transferor then must sub-
tract the adjusted basis of the property that he transferred to the corpora-
tion in the exchange from his amount realized. 5" The formula for gain
realized is as follows: Amount realized (step one) minus transferor's ad-
justed basis in property transferred to the corporation equals realized
gain (or loss).54' The transferor is not allowed to recognize a realized
loss.542 If the computation in step 2 shows a realized loss, the transferor
need not bother with steps 3 and 4.
Step 3. The transferor next computes the sum of the boot he re-
ceived. This computation would be as follows: Sum of cash received543
plus fair market value of each item of other boot property received 5 "
equals sum of boot received.545
Step 4. The transferor takes whichever is lesser, the realized gain
(step 2) or the boot (step 3), as his recognized gain.5 46
The boot rules become more complex when the boot recipient trans-
fers more than one asset in the exchange. A 1968 revenue ruling,54 7 gen-
erally approved by the commentators, 548 requires the boot recipient to
determine the amount and character of his recognized gain on an asset-
by-asset basis.549 Hence, it is improper to total the adjusted basis of the
various assets transferred by one transferor and to subtract this total
from the total amount realized by the transferor on the exchange. 550 In-
539. See id.
540. Id. § 1001(a). When the boot recipient has transferred more than one asset to the
corporation, the Internal Revenue Service requires him to allocate the boot received to the
transferred assets on an asset-by-asset basis in proportion to their relative fair market values to
determine both the amount and the character of the gain to be recognized. B. BrrrKER & J.
EUSTICE, supra, note 29, 3.05, at 3-18 to 3-19.
541. Id.
542. See id. § 351(b)(2); see also Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140.
543. See I.R.C. § 351(b)(1)(A).
544. See id. § 351(b)(1)(B).
545. See id. § 351(b)(1).
546. Id.
547. Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140.
548. See B. BrrTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 3.05, at 3-18 & n.51; KAHN, supra note
244, at 310; Kahn & Gann, supra note 46, at 571; LIND & SCHWARZ, supra note 30, at 74;
Rothman, supra note 148, at A-38. See generally Rabinovitz, Allocating Boot in Section 351
Exchanges, 24 TAx L. REv. 337 (1969).
549. Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140.
550. See id.; see also Rabinovitz, supra note 548, at 339.
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stead, each asset transferred is considered as separately exchanged for a
proportion of each type of consideration paid to the transferor. 1s The
proration is made according to the relative fair market values of the
transferred assets.552 In other words, each asset is considered to be ex-
changed for its pro rata share of both the stock (or securities) and the
boot received by the transferor.
The first step in this process is to determine the aggregate fair mar-
ket value of all the assets transferred to the corporation by the party
receiving boot by adding the fair market value of each asset and to divide
the aggregate fair market value into the fair market value of each as-
set.553 This computation provides a percentage for each transferred asset
that is to be used in apportioning the boot and the total amount realized
among the transferred assets.5 4 Chart I in the example below shows the
results of such a computation. The transferor then, seriatim, multiplies
the appropriate percentage by the total amount realized by the transferor
to figure the amount realized for each asset transferred.5 55 The trans-
feror also, seriatim, multiplies the appropriate percentage by the total
boot received by him to figure the boot allocable to each transferred as-
set. 56 He then determines the gain realized on each asset by subtracting
his adjusted basis in it from the amount realized. 5 7 The transferor takes
as his recognized gain' on that asset the amount realized on an asset or
the boot allocable to it, whichever is lesser.55 8 The transferor adds the
recognized gains so computed on each transferred asset to determine his
total gain recognized on the exchange.55 9 If he happens to realize a loss
on one (or more) of his transferred assets, the boot recipient cannot use
that loss (or those losses), which must go unrecognized because of section
351(b)(2), to offset the recognized gains.5"
Example.
In an exchange satisfying the requirements of section 351, Anne, the
551. See Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140; see also Rabinovitz, supra note 548, at 339;
Rothman, supra note 148, at A-38.
552. See Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140; Rabinovitz, supra note 548, at 339-40; see also
Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945); Johnson v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 441
(1964), aff'd, 355 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1965).
553. See Rabinovitz, supra note 548, at 339.
554. Id. at 340-46.
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. Id. at 346-50.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 351(b)(2) (1986)).
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sole shareholder of X Corp, transferred the following assets to X Corp in
exchange for X Corp stock worth $120 and $80 cash:
CHART I
Percent of Total Fair
Adjusted Fair Market Market Value of
Character Asset Basis Value Assets Transferred
Asset #1 capital asset $ 70 $ 80 40%
held for more
than 6 months
Asset #2 capital asset $180 $ 60 30%
held for more
than 6 months
Asset# 3 asset $ 10 $ 40 20%
held for less
than 6 months
Asset #4 asset which 0 $ 20 10%
would produce
ordinary income
or loss on sale
Aggregate Fair Market Value of
Assets Transferred $200
According to section 35 1(b)(1),"6' Anne must recognize her realized gain
to the extent of the boot. According to a 1968 revenue ruling,562 Anne
must determine the amount and character of the gain on an asset-by-
asset basis. Chart I shows the results of the first step of the process (de-
scribed above), which produces a percentage to be used to apportion the
boot, which was the $80 cash, and the total amount realized, which was
$200 ($120 fair market value of X Corp stock plus $80 cash boot =
$200), to each of the transferred assets. Column four lists this percentage
for each of the four transferred assets. Anne next multiplies these per-
centages by the total amount realized to determine the amount realized
for each of the four transferred assets. She also multiplies these percent-
ages by the aggregate amount of the boot to determine how much of the
boot to allocate to each of the four transferred assets. The results of
these computations are as follows:
561. I.R.C. § 351(b)(1).
562. Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140.
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CHART II
Amount Realized per Asset Boot Per Asset
Asset #1 $80
(40% x $200 total amount realized) $32 (40% x $80 total boot)
Asset #2 $60
(30% x $200 total amount realized) $24 (30% x $80 total boot)
Asset #3 $40
(20% x $200 total amount realized) $16 (20% x $80 total boot)
Asset #4 $20
(10% x $200 total amount realized) $ 8 (10% x $80 total boot)
Anne subtracts her basis in each asset from the amount realized for
each asset to determine the realized gain or loss for each asset. The
computations are as follows:
CHART III
Asset #1: $80 amount realized - $70 adjusted basis = $10 gain realized
Asset #2: $60 amount realized - $180 adjusted basis =($120) loss realized
Asset #3: $40 amount realized - $10 adjusted basis = $30 gain realized
Asset #4: $20 amount realized - 0 adjusted basis = $20 gain realized
Anne recognizes her $10 realized gain on asset #1, because the $10
gain is lesser than the $32 of boot allocable to it. She recognizes a $16
gain on asset #3, because the $16 boot is less than the $30 realized gain.
She recognizes an $8 gain on asset #4 because the $8 of boot is less than
the $20 gain realized. The character of the recognized gain is determined
by the character and the holding period of the transferred assets.5 63
Thus, the gain recognized on asset #1 is a long-term capital gain, 5 " the
gain recognized on asset #3 is a short-term capital gain,5 6 and the gain
recognized on asset #4 is ordinary income.5 66 Anne cannot use the $120
loss realized on the transfer of asset #2 to offset the recognized gains.5 67
To allow her to do so would in effect allow her to recognize her loss,
563. See Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140; Rabinovitz, supra note 548, at 354-56; cf. Easson
v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961); Weaver v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 411 (1959),
aff'd, Bryan v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 931 (1961).
564. See I.R.C. § 1222(3); Rabinovitz, supra note 548, at 355; cf Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1
C.B. 140.
565. See I.R.C. § 1222(1); Rabinovitz, supra note 548, at 354-56; cf. Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-
1 C.B. 140.
566. See I.R.C. §§ 1239, 1245(a), 1245 (b)(3), 1250(a), 1250(d)(3); Rabinovitz, supra note
548, at 356.
567. See Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140.
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which, according to section 351(b)(2), must go unrecognized. 68 Thus,
for the full transaction Anne recognizes a gain of $34 (the sum of the
gains recognized on assets #1, #3 and #4),569 even though the aggre-
gate adjusted basis of the assets transferred by Anne, which was $260,
exceeded the aggregate fair market value of the consideration paid to
Anne,57° which was $200.
VII. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER SUBCHAPTER C SECTIONS
Each of the topics covered in Subehapter C (incorporations, 71 dis-
tributions,5 72 redemptions, 573 liquidations, 574 reorganizations 575 and a
few discrete tax avoidance transactions, e.g., preferred stock bailouts5 76)
has its own complex set of rules. Incorporations, for example, are cov-
ered by sections 351, 357, 358, 362(a), 1032(a) and a few other sec-
tions.57 7 Distributions are covered by sections 301, 311, 312, 316 and a
few other sections.5 78 As complex as each set of rules, standing by itself,
is, a particular transaction sometimes is covered by more than one of
these sets. Unfortunately, these overlaps deepen the complexity of what
already is an arcane area of the law. The tax professional, of course, is
568. I.R.C. § 351(b)(2); see Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140.
569. See Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 C.B. 140; Rabinovitz, supra note 548, at 354-56.
570. See Rabinovitz, supra note 548, at 354-56.
571. See I.R.C. §§ 351, 357, 358, 362(a), 1032(a) (1986).
572. See id. §§ 301, 305, 306, 307, 311, 312, 316, 317(a).
573. See id. §§ 301, 302, 303, 304, 306(a)(2), 311, 312, 317(b), 318.
574. See id. §§ 331, 332, 334, 336, 337, 338. See also I.R.C. § 381(a)(1).
575. See id §§ 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 361, 362(b), 368, 381, 382.
576. See id. § 306. Other Subehapter C sections primarily aimed at loophole-closing are
sections 304, 341 and 382. Section 304 is aimed at disguised distributions achieved through
stock transactions involving related corporations. See id. § 304. Section 341 turns a share-
holder's gain on certain dispositions of stock in a collapsible corporation from a long-term
capital gain into ordinary income in certain circumstances. See id. § 341. Section 382 im-
poses limitations on the carryover of operating losses from one corporation to another to pre-
vent shopping for loss corporations. See id. § 382. Virtually every code section in Subchapter
C has at least one subsection designed to inhibit or prevent a particular tax abuse. See, e.g., id.
§ 357(c)(1) (gain recognized to transferor in section 351 or section 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization
to the extent that transfer of liabilities exceed basis in transferred assets); id. § 337(b)(1)(A)
(liquidating corporation not entitled to section 337(a) nonrecognition treatment on sale of in-
ventory). Some of the primary weapons for curbing the tax-avoidance machinations of close
corporations and their shareholders are completely outside Subchapter C. Notable are the
sections on the accumulated earnings tax and on a personal holding company tax. See id.
§§ 531-537 (accumulated earnings tax); id. §§ 541-565 (personal holding company tax).
577. See id. §§ 351, 357, 358, 362(a), 1032(a); see also id. § 1245(b)(3) (extent that section
1245 recapture overrides section 351); id. § 1250(d)(3) (extent that section 1250 recapture
overrides section 351); id. § 1223(1) (transferor's holding period in stock or securities received
in section 351 exchange); id. § 1223(2) (transferee corporation's holding period in assets re-
ceived in section 351 exchange).
578. See id §§ 301, 311, 312, 316.
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required to master the most arcane of the arcane! The purpose of this
section is to discuss the overlaps between section 351 and the other Sub-
chapter C rules.
A. Preemption of Section 304 Over Section 351
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982111 (TEFRA)
struck a compromise between conflicting provisions of sections 304 and
351.580 The most troublesome overlap occurred when a shareholder in
control of two corporations transferred his stock in one of them to the
other in exchange for newly issued stock of the other plus cash (or any
other form of boot property).5 81 To illustrate, suppose that Anne, who
owns 100% of the stock of both X Corp and Y Corp transfers some of
her Y Corp stock to X Corp in exchange for more X Corp stock plus $10
cash. If section 304(a)(1) controls,5"2 the fair market value of the new X
579. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
580. See id. at § 226 (codified at I.R.C. § 304(b)(3)(A)-(B) (1986)). For detailed discussions
of the TEFRA changes to section 304, see generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 409, 541-44, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1190, 1315-18. For
discussion on TEFRA changes involving sections 304 and 351, see Belier, New Anti-Bailout
Rules Require Careful Attention in Planning Stock Transfers to Related Corps., 30 TAx'N FOR
AccT. 12 (Jan. 1983); Conner & Hable, Selected Tax Considerations in Bank Holding Com-
pany Formations: Charting a Course Through the Section 304/351 Labyrinth, 72 KY. L.J. 595
(1984); de Kosmian, Partial Liquidations, Section 311(d) Redemptions and Section 304 Under
TEFRA, 61 TAXES 918 (1983); Faber, How the New Tax Law Changes the Rules Effecting the
Bail-out of Corporate Earnings, 57 J. OF TAX'N 281 (Nov. 1982); Javaras & Sheffield, Bailouts
and the Bootstraps After TEFRA: Section 304, Section 306 and Consolidated Return Rules, 61
TAXES 555 (1983); Kess, Congress Eliminates or Narrows Chances for Earnings Bailouts, 189
N.Y. L.L at 1, col. 6 (Jan. 24, 1983); Siboni & Munz, Intra-group Sales of Foreign Subsidiaries
Requires New Thinking After TEFRA, 59 J. OF TAX'N 290 (Nov. 1983); Steiner, supra note
171; Tiger, Redemptions Through Use of Related Corporations: New and Old Problems Under
Section 304, 39 TAx L. REV. 79 (1984). For further changes to TEFRA in sections 304-351,
see The Technical Corrections Act of 1983, §§ 102 HI of H.R. 3805; 612 KI of H.R. 4170
(1983). Subsequently, § 612 KI of H.R. 4170 (1983) became part of § 712(1) of Tax Reform
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No., 98-369 (amending I.R.C. § 304 (1982)). See Pub. L. No. 98-369,
§ 712(1) (amending I.R.C. § 304(b)(2) (1982)); see also Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 712(2) (amend-
ig I.R.C. § 304(b)(3)(A) (1982)); Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 712(3)(A)(i) (amending I.R.C. § 304
(b)(3)(B)(i) (1982)); Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 712(3)(B) (amending I.R.C. § 304 (b)(3)(B) (1982)
by adding (iii)); Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 712(4) (amending I.R.C. 304(b)(3)(C) (1982)). For a
discussion of these changes, see generally Baker & Hostetler, The Tax Reform Act of 1984-An
Overview, 30 PRAC. LAW. No. 6, 9 (Sept. 1984).
581. See, eg., Brams v. Commissioner, 734 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1984); Coates Trust v. Com-
missioner, 480 F.2d 468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Commissioner v. Hase-
rot, 355 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1965), on remand, 46 T.C. 864 (1966), aff'd sub nom.
Commissioner v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968); Paparo v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 692
(1979); Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974), aff'd, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); see also Rev. Rul. 80-239, 1980-2 C.B. 103; Rev. Rul. 78-422,
1978-2 C.B. 129; Rev. Rul. 73-2, 1973-1 C.B. 171.
582. Section 304(a)(1) applies when a person controlling one corporation transfers some of
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Corp stock plus the cash payment to Anne is treated as a distribution in
redemption of Anne's Y Corp stock583 (subject to special earnings and
profits rules).5 84 Since Anne owns 100% of the Y Corp stock both before
and after the transaction, this fictional redemption fails each of the sec-
tion 302(b) tests. 585  Hence, Anne would treat her amount realized as
dividend income to the extent that it is matched by earnings and prof-
its.586 To its credit, before TEFRA the government applied section 304
treatment only to the cash and let the stock pass tax-free to the share-
holder. 87 Still the cash payment would be ordinary income to the share-
holder, provided it was covered by earnings and profits.588 If section
351(b) controls, however, the $10 cash would be boot, and Anne would
recognize a gain on the lesser of realized gain, if any, and the $ 10 boot.
89
Moreover Anne's gain would be a capital gain, because under section
351(b) the character of the recognized gain depends on that of the trans-
ferred property, 9° and Anne has transferred a capital asset (her Y Corp
stock).5
91
his stock in that corporation to another controlled corporation in return for "property."
I.R.C. § 304(a)(1). In the transaction described in the text, Anne did exactly that.
583. Id. At one time the government treated both the cash and the value of the stock as a
taxable distribution, see Stickney, 399 F.2d at 833, but later withdrew the claim as to the stock.
See Rev. Rul. 73-2, 1973-1 C.B. 171; see also B. WOLFmAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
BusiNEss ENTERPRISE 508 (2d ed. 1982).
584. See I.R.C. § 312(n)(7).
585. The tests contained in section 302(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3) all require a reduction in the
shareholder's proportionate interest in the redeeming corporation. I.R.C. §§ 302(b)(l)-(b)(3);
see also United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970) (meaningful reduction in share-
holder's proportionate interest and corporation required for section 302(b)(1)). Section
302(b)(4) does not require a reduction in the shareholder's proportionate interest in the re-
deeming corporation. Instead it requires a genuine contraction of the corporation's business.
I.R.C. §§ 302(b)(4), (e)(5); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.304-2 (example (4)) (as amended in 1968).
586. See I.R.C. §§ 302(d), 301(c)(1).
587. Id. § 304(a)(1); Rev. Rul. 73-2, 1973-1 C.B. 171; see also Coates Trust, 480 F.2d at
471; B. WOLFMAN, supra note 583.
588. See Stickney, 399 F.2d at 833-34; REP Sales, Inc. v. United States, 86-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9387 (S.D. W. Va. 1986); Rev. Rul. 78-422, 1978-2 C.B. 129; see also Rev. Rul. 70-
496, 1970-2 C.B. 75; cf Rev. Rul. 72-569, 1972-2 C.B. 203.
589. I.R.C. § 351(b). Anne transferred property (her Y Corp stock) to a corporation (X
Corp) in exchange for stock of the transferee corporation (the newly issued X Corp stock),
and, since she owned 100% of the X Corp stock, she was in control of the transferee corpora-
tion immediately after the exchange. Hence, the transaction satisfied the requirements of sec-
tion 351(a). See id. § 351(a). Since she also received cash, she must recognize a gain equal to
the lesser of her realized gain or the amount of cash received. See id. § 351(b)(1). See also
Beller, supra note 580; Faber, supra note 580; Javaras & Sheffield, supra note 580; and Tiger,
supra note 580.
590. See Stickney, 399 F.2d at 831; see also Bowen, supra note 171, at 927.
591. Stock is a capital asset. See 4 A. FRIED, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-TAXATION OF
SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS § 2.04(1), 2-15 (1980).
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Section 304(b)(3)(A), new with TEFRA,5 92 broadly states that sec-
tion 304(a)(1) preempts section 35 1.13 However, the preemption of sec-
tion 351 is not complete. It is subject to two major exceptions. The first
is that section 351(a) still applies to the extent that the transaction con-
sists of an exchange of stock for stock in the acquiring corporation.5 94
Hence, in the hypothetical above Anne would not treat the X Corp stock
that she received in exchange for her Y Corp stock as part of a section
301 distribution. Instead, she would treat the stock-for-stock part of the
transaction as a tax-free exchange under section 351 and would use sec-
tion 358 to determine her basis in her new X Corp stock. Only the cash
payment made by X Corp to Anne would come within the section 304
rules. 95 The second exception is that section 357 supercedes section 304
when (1) a liability encumbers the stock transferred to the acquiring cor-
poration596 or (2) the acquiring corporation assumes a liability of the
transferring shareholder.597 The section 357 preemption applies only if
the debt was incurred by the shareholder to acquire the transferred stock
that he transfers in the exchange.5 98 The transferred liability does not
count as part of the fictional distribution in redemption of the share-
holder's stock in the acquired corporation. 99 Congress elected to allow
the transferred debt to pass tax-free under section 357 rather than to tax
it under section 304, because the transfer of the debt is an alternative to a
debt-financed direct acquisition by the acquiring corporation.6 °°
592. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 226, 96 Stat. 324, 490 (codified at I.R.C. § 304(b)(3)(A) (1986)). See H.R. CONF. REP. No.
760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 409, 543, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
1190, 1317. This rule carries forward the pre-TEFRA common-law rule. See Coates Trust,
480 F.2d at 473; Rev. Rul. 73-2, 1973-1 C.B. 171; and B. WOLFMAN, supra note 583.
593. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cohg., 2d Sess. 409, 541-43, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1190, 1315; see also Beller, supra note 580, at 14; Faber,
supra note 580, at 282; Javaras & Sheffield, supra note 580, at 560.
594. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 409, 542, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1190, 1316; see also Javaras & Sheffield, supra note 580, at 560.
595. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 409, 542, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1190, 1332; Rev. Rul. 73-2; Javaras & Sheffield, supra note
580, at 560; 1973-1 C.B. 171.
596. I.R.C. § 304(b)(3)(B)(i)(II).
597. Id. § 304(b)(3)(B)(i)(I).
598. Id. § 304(b)(3)(B).
599. Id. §§ 304(a)(1), (b)(3), 357(a); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
409, 543, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1190, 1317; Tiger, supra note
580, at 108-10.
600. See H.R. CONF. REP. No 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 409, 543, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1190, 1317.
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B. Preferred Stock Bail-outs and Section 351
Section 306,1 the preferred stock bail-out section, and section 351
intersect at several points. The first is the transfer of section 306 stock
for stock of a controlled corporation-a section 351 exchange. °2 The
transferred stock retains its taint in the hands of the transferee corpora-
tion. °3 Additionally, the transferor must treat the newly received stock
of the transferee corporation as section 306 stock,6" even if those shares
are common stock. °5 For example, if Anne transfers ten shares of sec-
tion 306 stock of Y Corp to X Corp, her controlled corporation, in ex-
change for six shares of X Corp common stock, X Corp must treat those
ten Y Corp shares as section 306 stock. 1 6 Anne also must treat the six X
Corp common shares as tainted section 306 stock." 7 If Y Corp disposes
of its ten Y Corp shares, its tax consequences will be measured by section
306(a)." Similarly, if Anne disposes of her tainted six shares of X Corp
common stock, section 306(a) will determine the tax consequences. 6°9
Section 306(c)(3), new with TEFRA,61° is a second intersection be-
tween sections 306 and 351. It is designed to thwart a type of preferred
stock bail-out accomplished by causing a newly created holding company
to issue preferred stock in a section 351 exchange.6 1 To illustrate, sup-
pose that Anne is a 100% shareholder of Y Corp, a corporation with
$100 of earnings and profits. Anne forms a holding company, X Corp,
and transfers all of her Y Corp stock to X Corp in exchange for all of
601. I.R.C. § 306 (1986).
602. Stock in another corporation constitutes property for purposes of section 351. See
Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
Thus, the exchange between Anne and the transferee corporation meets all the requirements of
section 351-a transfer of property to a controlled corporation in exchange for stock of a
controlled corporation. I.R.C. § 306(c)(1)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(e) (as amended in 1978).
603. See Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(d) (as amended in 1978); see also Javaras & Sheffield, supra
note 580, at 565.
604. See Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(d) (as amended in 1978); see also Javaras & Sheffield, supra
note 580, at 565.
605. Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3 (as amended in 1978).
606. See Treas. Reg. § 1.306(3)(d) (as amended in 1978); see also Javaras & Sheffield, supra
note 580, at 565.
607. See Treas. Reg. § 1.306(3)(d) (as amended in 1978); see also Javaras & Sheffield, supra
note 580, at 565.
608. See I.R.C. § 306(a), (b).
609. Id.
610. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 226(b)(3), 96 Stat. 324, 492 (codified at I.R.C. § 306(c)(3) (1982)).
611. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 409, 542-43, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1190, 1316-17. For discussion of TEFRA changes to section
306, see generally Faber, supra note 580; Javaras & Sheffield, supra note 580; Tiger, supra note
580.
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both X Corp's common and preferred stock. The preferred stock is
worth $75. Although the issuance of the X Corp preferred stock pro-
vides her with the same bail-out opportunity as would a preferred stock
dividend by Y Corp,6 12 the X Corp preferred stock would not have been
section 306 stock under pre-TEFRA law, because the issuing corpora-
tion, X Corp had no earnings and profits at the time of the issuance.613
Moreover, while the government might have been able to argue that,
technically, the fair market value of the X Corp stock, both common and
preferred, should be treated as a distribution in redemption of Anne's Y
Corp stock under section 304, neither pre-TEFRA nor post-TEFRA law
applies section 304 to a stock-for-stock exchange. It instead allows the
exchange to be tax-free to the transferring shareholder under section
351.614
Consonant with the general approach of section 306, section
306(c)(3) does not make the exchange taxable to Anne.615 Instead it dic-
tates a test that in Anne's case results in tainting the X Corp preferred
shares as section 306 stock. The first step in the section 306(c)(3) test is
to hypothesize that the transferring shareholder, Anne, received money,
$75, instead of the X Corp preferred stock that she actually did re-
ceive.616 As a result of this fictional receipt of money, Anne is brought
within the overlap between sections 304 and 351.617 As described
above,618 section 304 would require Anne to treat the $75 cash as a distri-
bution in redemption of her Y Corp stock.s19 Such a redemption would
612. See H.R. CONF. REIP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 409, 542, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 1190, 1316. In both situations she would be receiving the
preferred stock in a tax-free transaction. Unless the preferred stock grants participation rights
to its holders, it doesn't offer the prospect of cashing in on future corporate growth. Thus,
Anne can sell the stock without diluting her interest in that future growth. Moreover, the
stock probably will be redeemed at some future date anyway. See Chamberlain v. Commis-
sioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954); see also Rev. Proc. 74-
26, 1974-2 C.B. 478. At best, there would have been a temporary interruption of some of her
economic rights in the corporation. See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 409, 542, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1190, 1316.
613. See REP Sales, Inc. v. United States, 86-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9387 (S.D. W. Va.
1986); Rev. Rul. 78-422, 1978-2 C.B. 129; see also Rev. Rul. 70-496, 1970-2 C.B. 75; Rev. Rul.
72-569, 1972-2 C.B. 203; Faber, supra note 580, at 284.
614. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 409, 542, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 1190, 1316; Javaras & Sheffield, supra note 580, at 560.
615. Section 306(a) determines the tax consequences on disposition of "section 306 stock,"
a term defined in section 306(c). See I.R.C. § 306(a), (c).
616. See id. § 306(c)(3).
617. See id.; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 409, 542, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 1190, 1316.
618. See supra notes 581-94 and accompanying text.
619. See I.R.C. § 304(a)(1), (c)(3).
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fail all of the 302(b) tests, because Anne owns 100% of the Y Corp stock
both before and after the transaction (by dint of the section 318 attribu-
tion rules after the transaction).620 Thus, according to section 302(d),
the cash would be treated as a section 301 distribution. 621 According to
section 304(b)(2), the amount of the distribution to be treated as a divi-
dend is determined as if the cash were distributed by the acquiring corpo-
ration to the extent of its earnings and profits622 and then by the issuing
corporation to the extent of its earnings and profits;623 i.e., it is a divi-
dend, if covered by the earnings and profits of either or both of the corpo-
rations. For purposes of the section 306(c)(3) test, the fictional $75
distribution would be considered a dividend, because it is matched by Y
Corp's $100 of earnings and profits.624 As mentioned above, this fic-
tional finding does not mean that Anne actually has dividend income
from this transaction, since the purpose of this test is merely to determine
whether the X Corp preferred stock is to be section 306 stock.62 Be-
cause Anne would have had a dividend if she had received money instead
of the X Corp preferred stock that she actually did receive, that X Corp
preferred stock is section 306 stock.
626
C. Reorganizations and Section 351
The most elaborate and abstruse overlaps in all of Subchapter C, if
not in all tax law, are those between the reorganization sections627 and
section 351 and its related sections. Although the themes supporting
each of these two systems is similar,628 the applicability of one of the
systems over the other can sometimes present different tax conse-
quences.629 Unfortunately, the Internal Revenue Code itself offers no
620. See id. §§ 302(b)(I)-(3), 318(a)(2)(C); see also United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301,
313 (1970); Treas. Reg. § 1.304-2(c) (example (4)) (as amended in 1968).
621. See I.R.C. § 302(d).
622. Id. § 304(b)(2)(A).
623. Id. § 304(b)(2)(B).
624. Id. § 306(c)(3). Section 306(c)(3) makes non-common stock acquired in a section 351
exchange "section 306 stock" if the receipt of money in lieu of stock would have been treated
as a dividend under the rules of section 304(b)(2).
625. See id.; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 409, 543, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1190, 1317.
626. Id.
627. See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(A)-(G) (1986).
628. The theoretical underpinning for the nonrecognition rules of section 351 exchanges
and section 368(a)(1) reorganizations is that the transactions governed by those sections are
changes in the form and not in the substance of ownership. Hence, they should not be taxable.
See id. §§ 351, 368(a)(1).
629. For example, section 357(c)(1) applies to section 351 exchanges and D reorganizations,
but not to other types of reorganizations. Id. § 357(c)(1). Neither section 351 nor the reor-
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help in resolving the conflicts between the two systems. Moreover, the
little other authority on the topic is shady and conjectural.63
The following represent the basic overlapping patterns:
1. B reorganizations
Anne transferred all of her Y Corp stock to X Corp in exchange for
X Corp voting stock. Immediately after the exchange Anne owned stock
possessing 80% or more of the voting power in X Corp and 80% or more
in number of each other class of X Corp stock. The exchange met the
requirements of both sections 351631 and 368(a)(1)(B).6 32 Anne trans-
ferred property (her Y Corp stock) to a corporation (X Corp) in ex-
change for stock in such corporation (the newly issued X Corp stock)
and controlled the transferee corporation (X Corp) immediately after the
exchange, thereby meeting all the requirements of section 351(a).6 33 The
transaction also met all the requirements for a B reorganization: the ac-
quiring corporation (X Corp) acquired the.stock of another corporation
(Y Corp), the acquiring corporation used only its own voting stock to
acquire that stock, and it controlled that other corporation (Y Corp) im-
mediately after the acquisition.634
ganization sections contains a subsection analogous to section 304(b)(3), which expressly coor-
dinates sections 304 and 351. Id. §§ 304(b)(3), 351, 368.
630. For example, compare Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-39-060 (June 28, 1978); I.R.S. Ltr. Rul. Rep.
(CCH) No. 83 (Oct. 4, 1978); Rev. Rul. 76-123, 1976-1 C.B. 95 with Rev. Rul. 80-284, 1980-2
C.B. 117; Rev. Rul. 80-285, 1980-2 C.B. 119. Indeed, no cases have squarely addressed the
issue as to whether section 351 prevents recognition of gain in a transaction that fails to qualify
for nonrecognition treatment under the reorganization provisions. Samuels, supra note 171, at
961. For other sources on this issue, see Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., 316 U.S. 527
(1942); Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Rooney v. United States, 305 F.2d 681 (9th
Cir. 1962); Berner v. United States, 282 F.2d 720 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d
809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60
F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
Commissioner, 57 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1932), aff'd, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Kass v. Commissioner,
60 T.C. 218 (1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1974); Curry v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 667
(1965); Rev. Rul. 80-284, 1980-2 C.B. 117; Rev. Rul. 79-274, 1979-2 C.B. 131; Rev. Rul. 78-
294, 1978-2 C.B. 141; Rev. Rul. 76-188, 1976-1 C.B. 99; Rev. Rul. 76-123, 1976-1 C.B. 94;
Rev. Rul. 74-502, 1974-2 C.B. 116; Rev. Rul. 73-54, 1973-1 C.B. 187; Rev. Rul. 70-433, 1970-2
C.B. 82; Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1967); Tax Equity and Fiscal Repon-
sibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 226, 96 Stat. 324, 490 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 304 (1982); BOWEN, supra note 171; Bowen, Corporate Acquisition Techniques, 32 U. oF S.
CAL. TAX INST. 1 (1980); Gabinet, Section 351 in Acquisitive Reorganizations: Cutting the
Giant Down to Size, 32 CASE W. REs. 857 (1982); Greenberg, The Use of Holding Companies
to Obtain Tax Advantages, 57 TAXES 847, 855 (1979); Mintz & Plumb, supra note 171, at 274.
631. I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 368(c).
632. Id. §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (c).
633. Id. §§ 351(a), 368(c).
634. Id. §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (c).
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2. C reorganizations
Anne was the 100% shareholder of Y Corp. Y Corp transferred all
of its assets to X Corp in exchange for X Corp voting stock. Immedi-
ately after the exchange, Y Corp owned stock possessing 80% or more of
the voting power in X Corp and 80% or more in number of each other
class of X Corp stock. Y Corp liquidated, distributing its sole asset, its X
Corp stock, to its sole shareholder, Anne. The exchange met the require-
ments of both sections 351635 and 368(a)(1)(C).6 36 Y Corp transferred
property (all of its assets) to a corporation (X Corp) in exchange for
stock in such corporation (the newly issued X Corp stock) and controlled
the transferee corporation (X Corp) immediately after the exchange,
thereby meeting all the requirements of section 351(a).637 Y Corp
promptly lost control of X Corp by distributing its X Corp stock to
Anne, but under section 351(c) a distribution of the transferee corpora-
tion's stock by a corporate transferor to its shareholders is disregarded in
determining control for purposes of section 35 1.638 The transaction also
met all the requirements for a C reorganization: It was an acquisition by
one corporation (X Corp), in exchange for all or part of its voting stock,
of substantially all of the properties of another corporation (Y Corp's
assets), and the acquired corporation (Y Corp) distributed the stock it
received (its sole asset) as part of the reorganization plan.639
3. D and G reorganizations
Anne is the 100% shareholder of X Corp. X Corp incorporated Y
Corp and transferred all or a part of its assets to Y Corp in exchange for
all of Y Corp's stock. X Corp then distributed its Y Corp stock to Anne
in a transaction qualifying under sections 354 or 355. The transaction
met the requirements of both sections 3514 and 368(a)(1)(D). 1 X
Corp transferred property (all or a part of its assets) to a corporation (Y
Corp) in exchange for stock in such corporation (all of the Y Corp stock)
and controlled the transferee corporation (Y Corp) immediately after the
exchange, thereby meeting the requirements of section 351(a).1 2 X Corp
promptly lost control of Y Corp by distributing its Y Corp stock to Anne
immediately after the exchange, but under section 351(c) a distribution
635. Id. §§ 351(a), 368(c).
636. Id. §§ 368(a)(1)(C), (c).
637. Id. §§ 351(a), 368(c).
638. Id. § 351(c).
639. See id. § 368(a)(1)(C), (G).
640. Id. §§ 351(a), 368(c).
641. Id. § 368(a)(1)(D).
642. See id. §§ 351(a), 368(c).
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of the transferee corporation by a corporate transferor to its shareholders
is disregarded in determining control for purposes of section 351.143 The
transaction also met all the requirements for a D reorganization: a cor-
poration (X Corp) transferred all or a part of its assets to another corpo-
ration (Y Corp), and, immediately after the transfer, the transferor (X
Corp) was in control of the transferee corporation (Y Corp): pursuant to
the plan of reorganization, the transferee corporation (Y Corp) distrib-
uted its stock (to Anne) in a transaction qualifying under section 354 or
355.644
The transaction also would have met the requirements of a G reor-
ganization, if it were part of a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding. If it
were, then it would have involved a transfer by a corporation (X Corp) of
all or part of its assets to another corporation (Y Corp) "in a title 11 or
similar case;" 645 pursuant to the plan of reorganization, the transferor
corporation (X Corp) distributed its stock (to Anne) in a transaction
qualifying under section 354 and 355.646
4. F reorganizations
The C and D reorganizations described above would also qualify as
F reorganizations, if they constituted a "mere change in identity, form,
or place of organization of one corporation, however effected." 64 7 Since
they also qualified as section 351 exchanges, a transaction can qualify
both as an F reorganization and a section 351 exchange as well as a C or
D reorganization. 68
643. Id. § 351(c).
644. Id. §§ 354, 355, 368(a)(1)(D), (C).
645. Id. § 368(c)(3)(D)(i)(II).
646. See id. §§ 354, 355, 368(a)(1)(G), (c).
647. The quoted language in the text is the language of section 368(a)(1)(F). Id.
§ 368(a)(1)(F). See Sachs, Subchapter "C" Overlap Problems, N.Y.U. 40TH ANN. INST. ON
TAX'N 48-1, § 48.03 (1982); Schwarz, supra note 171, at 242 n.41; Solomon, The Judicially
Expanded "F'" Reorganization and its Uncertain Operating Rules, 7 J. CORP. TAX'N 24, 36
(1980); B. BITTK=ER & J. EusicE, supra note 29, 14.18. For further discussion of "F"
reorganizations see, e.g., Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 811 (2d Cir.
1977); Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018
(1967); Holliman v. Commissioner, 275 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Ala. 1967); Denbaum, FReorgani-
zations: The Amended Definition Under TEFRA, 8 J. CORP. 725 (1983); Metzer, An Effective
Use of Plain English-the Evolution and Impact of Section 368(a)(1)(F), 32 TAx LAW. 703
(1979).
648. The hoariest of these larger transactions is the liquidation-reincorporation device. The
retransfer of the assets in the reincorporation, the second step in the device, is the part of the
larger transaction that ostensibly meets the requirements of section 351. See Stevens Pass, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 532 (1967); Rev. Rul. 80-284, 1980-2 C.B. 118; Gabinet, supra note
630, at 862; Mintz & Plumb, supra note 171, at 274.
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5. A section 351 exchange as a step in a larger transaction, including
a "flunked" reorganization
A section 351 exchange can serve as a step in innumerable larger
transactions. To take an illustration adapted from a pair of controversial
1980 revenue rulings,' 9 suppose that X Corp wanted to acquire Y Corp
for cash or securities. The holders of 81% of the Y Corp stock were
willing to sell their Y Corp stock to X Corp for cash or securities, but
Anne, the holder of the other 19% of the Y Corp stock, had a low basis
in her shares and wanted to avoid a taxable sale or exchange of her
shares. Because Y Corp's articles of incorporation contained a stock
transfer restriction that effectively granted Anne a veto power over the
sale or exchange of Y Corp stock, X Corp and Y Corp constructed a plan
designed to accommodate Anne as well as to achieve the X Corp's acqui-
sition of Y Corp.6"' Pursuant to the plan, X Corp and Y Corp organized
a new corporation, Z Corp. X Corp transferred cash for all of the Z
Corp common stock, and Y Corp transferred all of its assets to Z Corp in
exchange for all of the Z Corp voting preferred stock and Z Corp securi-
ties. The Z Corp common stock held 90% of the voting power in Z
Corp. 5 The voting preferred held the other 10% of the voting power.
It was this part of the transaction-the transfers of cash by X Corp and
assets by Y Corp to Z Corp in exchange for Z Corp stock and securi-
ties-that was intended to qualify as a section 351 exchange. As part of
the overall plan, Y Corp thereafter redeemed the Y Corp stock not held
by Anne for the Z Corp securities that it received in the section 351
exchange. 652 After all of the exchanges had been completed, Z Corp
owned all of the assets of Y Corp, X Corp owned all of the Z Corp
common stock, Y Corp owned all of the Z Corp voting preferred stock,
Anne owned all of the Y Corp stock, and the other former Y sharehold-
ers owned Z Corp securities received in exchange for their Y Corp
stock.65 3
The problem was that Y Corp's exchange with Z Corp literally qual-
649. See Rev. Rul. 80-285, 1980-2 C.B. 119 and its companion Rev. Rul. 80-284, 1980-2
C.B. 117. For commentary on these revenue rulings, see generally Bowen, supra note 171;
Gabinet, supra note 630; Samuels, supra note 171.
650. This particular fact was not in Rev. Rul. 80-285, 1980-2 C.B. 119.
651. This particular fact was not in Rev. Rul. 80-285, 1980-2 C.B. 119.
652. See Rev. Rul. 80-285, 1980-2 C.B. 119.
653. See id; see also Rev. Rul. 80-284, 1980-2 C.B. 117. The IRS will rule favorably on the
tax-free status of a reorganization when the shareholders in the target corporation receive
stock in the acquiring corporation equal in value to at least 50% of the target corporation's on
the date of the transfer. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. In both revenue rulings 80-284
and 80-285, the shareholder of the target (Y Corp) received too great a percentage of non-
stock consideration for the transactions to satisfy the continuity-of-interest test. Hence, the
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ified as a section 351 exchange, but the larger transaction, X Corp's ac-
quisition of Y Corp, flunked as a tax-free C reorganization for failing the
continuity-of-interest requirement. Should Y Corp's exchange with Z
Corp have been viewed as a tax-free section 351 exchange or a taxable
step in a flunked C reorganization? Taking a position inconsistent with
several earlier rulings, 65 4 the 1980 revenue rulings viewed the overall
transactions as taxable reorganizations, eclipsing the purported section
351 exchanges.655
The 1980 rulings hardly can be said to be dispositive of how to deal
with all section 351 exchanges that are part of a larger transaction. For
one thing, they have been criticized for how they dealt with the factual
situations discussed in them. 6  No case has held that section 351 does
not apply to a transaction that fails to qualify as a reorganization.65 7 In-
deed, some authority suggests that the appropriate characterization of
the transactions described in the two 1980 revenue rulings not as failed
reorganizations, i.e., sales, but instead as overall section 351 transactions
with the newly formed holding company (Z Corp) as the transferee cor-
poration and the other parties as the transferors.5 8 Moreover, the fac-
tual permutations for these larger transactions are so extensive that it is
impossible to posit generalized rules to govern such situations. What
might fit acquisitions might or might not fit a liquidation-reincorpora-
tion. Even within one type of transaction, e.g., acquisitions, the patterns
are so variegated that the approach in these particular revenue rulings
may be il-fitting. Thus, they are offered merely to illustrate the types of
problems generated when an ostensible section 351 exchange is a part of
a larger transaction.
6. Situations when section 351 and reorganization sections result in
different tax consequences
The section 351 and reorganization systems are based on similar
themes and produce mostly the same tax consequences-nonrecognition
transactions sufficiently resembled sales; thus the gain had to be recognized by the exchanging
parties. See Rev. Rul. 80-284, 1980-2 C.B. 117, 118-19; Rev. Rul. 80-285, 1980-2 C.B. 119-20.
654. Compare Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-39-060 (June 28, 1978); I.R.S. Ltr. Rul. Rep. (CCH) No.
83 (Oct. 4, 1978) with Rev. Rul. 80-284, 1980-2 C.B. 117; Rev. Rul. 76-123, 1976-1 C.B. 94.
See also Gabinet, supra note 630; Samuels, supra note 171.
655. Rev. Rul. 80-284, 1980-2 C.B. 119-20; Gabinet, supra note 630, at 861.
656. See Bowen, supra note 171; Gabinet, supra note 630; Samuels, supra note 171; B. Brrr-
KER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, at 3.19.
657. Samuels, supra note 171, at 961.
658. Gabinet, supra note 630, at 166-68. See also Curry v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 667
(1965).
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of gain or loss659 (except to recognize gain to the extent of boot re-
ceived), 6" substituted basis for transferors,661 and carryover basis for
transferees. 62 Indeed, the two systems even use some of the same code
sections, e.g., section 358. The systems nevertheless can produce con-
flicting tax consequences for a transaction qualifying under both
schemes.
The first is the section 381(a)(2) carryover of tax attributes in A, C,
D, F or G reorganizations. The "acquiring" corporation in those reorga-
nizations succeeds to the tax attributes of the "transferor" (or "distribu-
tor") corporation,663 e.g., it takes over the transferor corporation's
earnings and profits account. The section 381 carryover does not apply
in section 351 exchanges. 6 4
Second, section 351(a) generally allows the transferor to receive se-
curities tax-free.6 65 A transferor in a reorganization can receive securi-
ties tax-free only to the extent that the transferor has surrendered
securities.666 The receipt of securities, in some instances, can even cause
disqualification of the transaction as a reorganization, making the trans-
action entirely taxable to all parties. 67
Third, section 356(a)(2) requires a transferor who recognizes gain
659. Sections 351(a), 357(a) and 1032(a) provide the basic nonrecognition rules for the sec-
tion 351 system. See I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 357(a), 1032(a). Sections 354(a)(1), 355(a)(1), 357(a),
361(a) and 1032(a) provide basic nonrecognition rules for reorganizations. See id.
§§ 354(a)(1), 355(a)(1), 357(a), 361(a), 1032(a).
660. See id. §§ 351(b)(1), 356(a)(1), 356(b)(1). Section 356 is the reorganization boot sec-
tion. Id. § 356.
661. See id. § 358(a)(1) (applicable in both section 351 exchanges and reorganizations).
662. Section 362(a)(1) provides carryover basis for the corporate transferee and section 351
exchanges. !d § 362(a)(1). The transferee corporation increases its basis by the amount of
gain recognized to the transferor. Id Section 362(b) provides a carryover basis for a trans-
feree corporation in a reorganization. Id. § 362(b). Transferee corporation increases its basis
by the amount of gain recognized to the transferor. Id
663. Id. § 381(a)(2).
664. Neither section 351 nor section 381 provides for a carryover-of-tax attributes for a
section 351 exchange. See id. §§ 351, 381. See also Rev. Rul. 76-188, 1976-1 C.B. 99; Rev.
Rul. 79-289, 1979-2 C.B. 145; Samuels, supra note 171, at 959.
665. I.R.C. § 351(a).
666. See id §§ 354(a)(2)(A), 355(a)(3)(A), 356(d)(2).
667. For example, the consideration furnished by the acquiring corporation in a B reorgani-
zation must consist entirely of its own voting stock. Id. § 368(a)(1)(B). If it uses any other
type of consideration, including its own securities, the transaction fails to qualify as a B reor-
ganization. See, eg., Heveily v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451
U.S. 1012 (1981); Chapman v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 856 (1st. Cir. 1980); Bercy Indus., Inc.
v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 29 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 640 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1981);
Rev. Rul. 85-139, 1985-2 C.B. 123; Rev. Rul. 794, 1979-1 C.B. 150; Rev. Rul. 75-360, 1975-2
C.B. 110; Rev. Rul. 75-123, 1975-1 C.B. 116; Rev. Rul. 70-65, 1970-1 C.B. 77-78; Rev. Rul.
70-108, 1970-1 C.B. 78-79. See also Samuels, supra note 171, at 959.
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on account of boot to treat his recognized gain as a dividend if the ex-
change had the effect of a distribution of a dividend. 68 Section 35 1(b)(1)
has no corresponding rule.669 Instead, the character of the recognized
gain under section 351(b)(1) depends on the character of the property
transferred and, in the case of a transferred capital asset or section 1231
asset, the transferor's holding period in that asset.670
Fourth, if liabilities transferred to a controlled corporation in either
a section 351 exchange671 or a D reorganization 672 exceed the transferor's
basis in the transferred assets, section 357(c)(1) requires the transferor to
recognize a gain on the excess of the transferred liability over the trans-
feror's basis.673 Section 357(c)(1) applies only to section 351 exchanges
and D reorganizations. It does not apply to other types of
reorganizations.
674
7. Tax consequences of transactions literally qualifying as section 351
exchanges and reorganization
There are no certain approaches for determining tax consequences
of a transaction that qualifies as both a section 351 exchange and a reor-
ganization. A 1976 revenue ruling675 illustrates one approach. P Corp
transferred all of its assets to newly formed S Corp in exchange for all of
S Corp's stock. The exchange qualified as both a section 351 exchange
and a C reorganization.676 S Corp assumed P Corp's liabilities that ex-
ceeded P Corp's basis in its property transferred to S Corp. The govern-
ment determined that P Corp must recognize gain on the excess of the
transferred liabilities over its basis in the transferred property under sec-
tion 357(c)(1)(A),677 a section applicable to section 351 exchanges but
not to C reorganizations.
67
Section 357(c)(1)(A), the government reasoned, does not except
from this coverage a transaction that qualifies as a C reorganization as
668. I.RC. § 356(a)(2). The dividend portion of the recognized gain is limited to the dis-
tributee's ratable share of the distributing corporation's undistributed accumulated earnings
and profits. IM For a full discussion of section 356(a)(2), see generally Rands, supra note 171.
669. See I.R.C. § 351(b)(1).
670. B. BrrrKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 29, % 3.05, at 3-17.
671. I.R.C. §§ 351, 357(c)(1)(A).
672. Id. § 368(a)(1)(D); see id. § 357(c)(1)(B).
673. Id. §§ 357(c)(1)(A)-(B).
674. Id.; Rev. Rul. 76-188, 1976-1 C.B. 99-100; Samuels, supra note 171, at 955-56 n.5.
675. Rev. Rul. 76-188, 1976-1 C.B. 99-100. For a discussion of this revenue ruling, see
Samuels, supra note 171, at 959-60.
676. Rev. Rul. 76-188, 1976-1 C.B. 99-100.
677. Id.
678. See I.R.C. § 357(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1986); Rev. Rul. 76-188, 1976-1 C.B. 100.
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well as a section 351 exchange.679 The government also determined that
S Corp should succeed to the tax attributes of P Corp under section
38 1,6 80 a section applicable to C reorganizations but not to section 351
exchanges.681 The government again reasoned that section 381 literally
applies to a C reorganization and does not except from its coverage a
transaction that qualifies as a section 351 exchange, as well as a C
reorganization.
6 8 2
According to this approach, a specific rule contained in one system
but not the other would override a general rule contained in the other.683
For example, the specific recognition rule of section 357(c)(1)(A) over-
rides the general nonrecognition rule of section 361(a).684 This specific-
over-general approach is by no means the only approach that can (or
should) be taken.68 ' Another approach suggested by some, is to accord
preeminence to the reorganization sections in light of their greater com-
prehensiveness. 686 Yet another approach would be to evaluate each in-
stance of overlap on a case-by-case basis, looking at both the economics
of the transaction and theoretical underpinning of the two systems to
determine which system is more appropriate for the particular transac-
tion.68 7 For example, if an exchange of assets for stock is essentially an
acquisition of one corporation by another, the tax consequences would be
determined under the reorganization sections rather than under section
351 and its related sections.688
VIII. "MIDSTREAM" INCORPORATIONS
Many section 351 exchanges involve incorporations of ongoing busi-
nesses. Since these incorporations take place in the "midstream" of the
enterprise, they are sometimes referred to as "midstream" incorpora-
tions.6 9 The purpose of this section is to examine the tax issues of the
679. Rev. Rul. 76-188, 1976-1 C.B. 99-100.
680. Id.
681. See I.R.C. § 381(a)(2); Rev. Rul. 76-188, 1976-1 C.B. 100.
682. Rev. Rul. 76-188, 1976-1 C.B. 100.
683. See id.; Samuels, supra note 171, at 959-60.
684. See I.R.C. §§ 357(c)(1)(A), 361(a); see also Samuels, supra note 171 at 959-60; Rev.
Rul. 76-188, 1976-1 C.B. 100.
685. For other approaches, see generally B. BrrTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, % 3.19;
Samuels, supra note 171, at 961 (discussion of legislative history).
686. Cf Samuels, supra note 171, at 961-62.
687. See, e.g., B. BrrrKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 29, 3.19; cf Rev. Rul. 80-284, 1980-2
C.B. 117-18; Rev. Rul. 80-285, 1980-2 C.B. 119-20; Samuels, supra note 171, at 966-67.
688. Cf Rev. Rul. 80-284, 1980-2 C.B. 117-18; Rev. Rul. 80-285, 1980-2 C.B. 119-20.
689. See Note, Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code and "Mid-stream" Incorporations,
38 U. CiN. L. REv. 96, 96 (1969); see also Keller, supra note 505, at 480.
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midstream incorporation-the tax consequences of transferring, among
other things, trade secrets, goodwill, accounts payable, accounts receiva-
ble, bad-debt reserves, expensed items with useful life remaining, ahid
rights to collect deferred payments on contracts to a controlled
corporation.
A. Technical Know-how, Trade Secrets, Goodwill, and Customer Lists
The value of technical know-how, trade secrets, goodwill, customer
lists and the like is often attributable to services performed in the past or
to be performed in the future by the transferor. Since stock or securities
are not to be considered as issued in return for "property" for purposes
of section 351 if they are issued to pay for services rended or to be ren-
dered for the benefit of the corporation,69 it has been questioned whether
the exchange of such intangibles for stock or securities of a controlled
corporation ought to be covered by section 351.691 As discussed earlier
in this Article,692 however, these intangibles generally count as "prop-
erty" and hence can be transferred tax-free under section 351, even
though services were used to produce them.693
B. Accounts Payable and Receivable
As discussed earlier,694 the transfer of accounts payable to a con-
trolled corporation no longer generates section 357(c)(1) gain for a trans-
feror.695 Moreover, the transferee corporation is now allowed to deduct
payments it makes to discharge the payables.696
690. See Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1)(i) (as amended in 1967); see also I.R.C. § 351(d)(1)
(1986).
691. See, eg., Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b)(2) (example 1) (as amended in 1967).
692. See supra notes 41-71 and accompanying text.
693. See Rev. Rul. 79-288, 1979-2 C.B. 139; Rev. Rul. 69-156, 1969-1 C.B. 101; Rev. Proc.
69-19, 1969-2 C.B. 301, as amplified by Rev. Proc. 74-36, 1974-2 C.B. 491; Rev. Rul. 64-56,
1964-1 C.B. 133, as amplified by Rev. Rul. 71-564, 1971-2 C.B. 179; see also United States v.
Stafford, 727 F.2d 1043 (11th Cir. 1984); Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States,
471 F.2d 1211 (Ct. C1. 1973); United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965), on remand, 269 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. La. 1967); B. BrrrKER & J.
EUSTICE, supra note 29, 3.02, at 3-6 to 3-8. For a detailed discussion, see supra notes 41-71
and accompanying text.
694. See supra notes 373-520 and accompanying text.
695. See I.R.C. § 357(c)(3) (1986). For a detailed discussion, see supra notes 373-520 and
accompanying text.
696. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-30-010 (Apr. 14, 1978); Keller, supra note 505, at 506; see also
Thatcher v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'g 61 T.C. 28 (1973); Bongi-
ovanni v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'g 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1124 (1971);
Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 223 (1977); Raich v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 604 (1966).
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The law is clear that accounts receivable constitute "property" for
section 351 purposes and that the nonrecognition rule of section 351(a)
overrides the assignment-of-income doctrine when a cash-method tax-
payer exchanges accounts receivable for stock or securities of a con-
trolled corporation.697 The transferor has no taxable income either at the
time of the section 351 exchange or on the later collection of the receiv-
ables by the transferee corporation.698 The reasoning for this result is
that if a cash-method transferor were taxed on the transfer of the ac-
counts receivable, the specific congressional intent reflected in section
351(a), that the incorporation of an ongoing business should be facili-
tated by making the incorporation tax-free, would be frustrated.699 The
cash-method transferor has a zero basis in the receivables. 7. Thus, if he
transfers receivables only, he takes a zero basis in the stock or securities
as his substituted basis under section 358(a)(1). 70 1 Theoretically, the
transferor ultimately will recapture the income unrecognized at the time
of the 351 exchange in his recognized gain on a later disposition of his
stock, since the contribution of the receivables to the corporation in-
creases the value of his stock without increasing his basis in his stock.70 2
The postponement of this recognition, together with the capital gain
treatment accorded his gain on the sale of his stock (if ever restored to
the Code), can result in a substantial tax benefit to the transferor.70 3
Since the corporation takes a carryover basis in transferred assets7 1 it
likewise will have a zero basis in the receivables after the transfer.
70 5
697. See Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172, 1175-78 (3d Cir.), cert denied,
419 U.S. 826 (1974); Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-30-010 (Apr. 14,
1978); see also IDI Management, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 TCM (CCH) 1482, 1503-04 (1977);
Kniffen v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 553 (1962). See generally Brown, Incorporating Transfers
and Anticipatory Assignments, 38 U. Prrr. L. REv. 589, 597-99 (1977); Kahn & Oesterle, supra
note 447, at 475-77; Keller, supra note 505, at 490-95.
698. See Hempt Bros., 490 F.2d at 1178; Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113; Keller, supra
note 505, at 494.
699. See Hempt Bros., 490 F.2d at 1178; Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113.
700. See Rev. Rul. 69-442, 1969-2 C.B. 53; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 71-11-089900A (Nov. 8, 1971);
Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,339 (May 14, 1973); see also Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113;
Thatcher, 533 F.2d at 118; HemptBros, 490 F.2d at 1180; Raich, 46 T.C. at 610-11; Wilson v.
Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CC) 462, 465 (1964); Conant Mach. & Steel Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 648, 650 (1955); Pate, Professional Organization and Unrealized Re-
ceivables, 14 AiZ. L. REv. 853, 856 (1972).
701. See I.R.C. § 358(a)(1); see also Pate, supra note 700, at 860.
702. See P.A. Birren & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1940); Kniffen v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 553 (1962); Briggs v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 440 (1956).
703. See Pate, supra note 700, at 860.
704. See I.R.C. § 362(a)(1).
705. See PA. Birren & Son, 116 F.2d at 719-20; Travis v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 502, 518
(1967), aff'd, 406 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1969); Raich, 46 T.C. at 610; Ezo Prod. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 37 T.C. 385, 393 (1961); Greenberg, Special Problems of the Professional,4ssociation, 20
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Thus, it will take the full amount of any of the receivables that it collects
into its income.7 "6 Since, under section 1221(4), accounts receivable are
considered not to be capital assets,70 7 the transferee corporation must
treat the amounts collected as ordinary income.
The pattern differs for the accrual-method taxpayer who transfers
receivables. Ordinarily, he would have included the face value of the
receivables minus his bad-debt reserve in his income prior to the section
351 exchange.70 8 Thus, there is no assignment-of-income issue. The ac-
crual-method transferor takes whatever amount he included in his in-
come as his basis in the receivables. 709 According to section 358(a)(1), he
uses this basis as his basis in the stock or securities that he receives in the
section 351 exchange.710 Since the transferee corporation takes a carry-
over basis in the receivables under section 362(a)(1), 711 it uses the same
figure for its basis.712 Any amounts it collects on the receivables up to its
basis is a return of its basis and, thus, is nontaxable.713 If the transferee
corporation also uses the reserve method of treating bad debts, as likely
will be the case, 7 1 it must establish a bad-debt reserve for the transferred
accounts receivable equal to the difference between their face value and
TuL. TAX. INsT. 82, 87 (1971); Pate, supra note 700, at 860; Pennell & O'Byrne, Incorporating
the Partnershi p-FederalIncome Tax Considerations, 17 PRAC. LAW. 51, 56 (Feb. 1971); Wor-
thy, supra note 510.
706. Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113; P.A. Birren & Son, 116 F.2d at 720; Matchette v.
Helvering, 81 F.2d 73, 74 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 298 U.S. 677 (1936); Wobbers, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 26 B.T.A. 322, 327 (1932); Dauber, Accounts Receivable in Section 351 Transac-
tions, 52 A.B.A. J. 92 (1966); Pate, supra note 700, at 860.
707. I.R.C. § 1221(4).
708. See id. § 351; Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. 139; Rev. Proc. 83-59, 1983-2 C.B. 575;
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-23-056 (Mar. 10, 1988). See also O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of In-
come and the Overriding Principle of the Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders, 27 TAX L. Rnv. 215, 218 (1971); Raskind, The Tax Treatment of the Reserve for
Bad Debts on Incorporation: The Supreme Court Resolution in Nash, 31 Olilo STA'rTE L.J. 411,
412-13 (1970).
709. See Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. 139; see also Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1
(1970); Rowe v. United States, 428 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1970); Erlich v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
1231 (1970); Rev. Rul. 80-270, 1980-2 C.B. 201; O'Hare, supra note 708, at 220-21; Stoffell,
Bad Debt Reserves: Supreme Court's Nash Decision Leaves Many Questions Unanswered, 33 J.
TAX'N 92 (1970).
710. See .LR.C. § 358(a)(1); see also Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. 139, 140; Priv. Ltr. Rul.
83-51-041 (Dec. 23, 1983); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-51-003 (Dec. 26, 1980).
711. See I.R.C. § 362(a)(1).
712. See Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. 139, 140.
713. Both the accrual-method transferor and the transferee corporation usually reduce their
basis in the accounts receivable by the amount of the bad debt reserve. Rev. Rul. 78-280,
1978-2 C.B. at 139-40.
714. For the tax treatment of a transferee corporation using the specific charge-off method
of treating bad debts allowable under section 166(a), see Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. 140.
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their section 362(a)(1) basis.7" The establishment of this reserve is not
an addition to the bad-debt reserve; thus, the corporation cannot deduct
the initial amount in the reserve.716 According to a revenue ruling, col-
lections on the receivables surprisingly will not be considered income to
the corporation. 17 The corporation will not be entitled to a specific
charge-off if it is unable to collect an amount equal to its basis.7 18 In-
stead it will reflect that inability in setting a reasonable reserve' for bad
debts in future periods.719
C. Inventory and Other Property Held Primarily for Sales Customers
Inventory and other property held primarily for sales to customers
may be transferred tax-free for stock or securities in a section 351 ex-
change.720  The transferor has turned ordinary income property into
stock, a capital asset, but, since section 1223(1) denies any tacking of his
holding period,721 he must hold the stock for more than six months to
obtain a long-term capital gain treatment.72 2 Moreover, he must be wary
of the collapsible corporation provisions of section 341 if the transferor
sells his stock,723 and the Court Holding doctrine724 if the corporation
quickly sells the transferred property.
D. Services Performed for the Business Before Incorporation
Stock issued for services rendered to the corporation is specifically
excluded from section 351 treatment by section 35 l(d)(1),7zs which states
broadly that "stock or securities issued for services shall not be consid-
715. See Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. 140; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-51-041 (Dec. 23, 1983); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 83-04-082 (Jan. 28, 1983); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-33-091 (Aug. 20, 1982); see also Hempt
Bros., Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172, 1179-80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826
(1974).
716. Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. at 140.
717. Id.
718. Id.; see also Himelick v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 792 (1935).
719. See Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. at 140.
720. See I.R.C. § 351(a) (1986); see also Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and
Tree as Irrigated by the P. G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 295, 426-27 (1962).
721. I.R.C. § 1223(1) (tacking permitted to transferor taking a substituted basis in an ex-
change, but only if he transfers a capital or section 1231 asset); id. 1221(l) (inventory property
held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business-not capital assets).
722. See id. § 1222(3); see also Lyon & Eustice, supra note 720, at 426-27.
723. See I.R.C. § 341(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(3)(A) (1986); Lyon & Eustice, supra note 720, at
427; see also Katz v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 1035 (1960); Jacobs v. Commissioner,
21 T.C. 165 (1953), aff'd, 224 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1955).
724. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); see also Lyon & Eustice,
supra note 720, at 427. For a full discussion of the Court Holding Doctrine, see D. KAHN,
supra note 244, at 133-37.
725. I.R.C. § 351(d)(1) (1986).
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ered as issued in return for property."72 6 The regulations, however, con-
fine the exclusion to those services "rendered or to be rendered to or for
the benefit of the issuing corporation. 7 27 As discussed above, section
351(a) allows the tax-free transfer of accounts receivable to a controlled
corporation.7 28 Typically, these receivables are attributable to services
performed for customers (or property sold to customers) in the regular
course of business.7 29 But what about stock (or securities) that is issued
to a party who performed services for the business itself and not for cus-
tomers before incorporation? For example, suppose that Anne, a propri-
etor, hired Bob to paint the inside of her retail store. After Bob
completed the painting, Anne discovered that she did not have the cash
to pay Bob for his work. Several months later Anne decided to incorpo-
rate her retail business. Since she was cash-short and had not yet paid
Bob for his services, she persuaded Bob to accept stock in her new corpo-
ration. Technically, Bob's services were not rendered for the benefit of
the issuing corporation. They were rendered for the benefit of Anne and
her proprietorship. Does this distinction allow Bob to escape disqualifi-
cation from section 351 nonrecognition treatment? Probably not. Ac-
cording to one appellate court,730 it has been "held" that stock received
for services rendered for the "predecessor of the transferee corporation"
is not transferred for "property" and hence falls outside the coverage of
section 351.31 Bob is also likely to run amok the assignment-of-income
doctrine, 32 which is discussed immediately below.
E. Assignment-of-income Doctrine
The government and the courts have been more inclined to tax the
transferor under assignment-of-income principles, when the transfer was
of a right to collect income only and not part of an incorporation of an
726. Id.; see also Pate, supra note 700, at 861.
727. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1)(i) (as amended in 1967). According to Professor Pate,
although stock issued in return for the transfer of unrealized receivables for services rendered
to third parties might not count as property under section 351(d)(1) itself, the regulations'
narrower definition indicates that receivables should be accorded nonrecognition treatment.
Pate, supra note 700, at 861.
728. I.R.C. § 351(a); see also Hempt Bros., 490 F.2d at 1175-78; Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2
C.B. 113.
729. See Pate, supra note 700, at 861.
730. Brown v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940).
731. Id. at 339; cf. Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 115.
732. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122
(1940); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Brown,
115 F.2d at 339. See generally Manning, supra note 493. See infra note 733-44 and accompa-
nying text.
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ongoing business in which the transferor conveyed all of his business as-
sets, not just the receivables, to the corporation.733 Several of these taxa-
ble transactions have been heavily laden with a tax avoidance motive. 3
One notorious case, Brown v. Commissioner,7 3  involved a lawyer who
had filed a suit to collect legal fees owed to him. During the pendency of
the suit, he formed a corporation and assigned his chose in action to it.
73 6
The lawsuit was settled and a large payment was made to the corpora-
tion.737 The lawyer made a gift of the stock of the corporation to his
wife, who then liquidated the corporation and reported a gain from the
liquidation on her own income tax return.73 8 The lawyer reported no
income on the transaction.739 The court held that the lawyer was re-
quired to include the settlement proceeds in his gross income, because he
had made an anticipatory assignment of income.7' In another case, a
farmer was taxed on the proceeds from the sale of his crops, which pro-
ceeds he had assigned to his controlled corporations.7 4 One final exam-
ple: Shareholders-employees were held to have taxable income when the
corporation issued them stock to discharge its obligation to pay their
salaries, which were four years in arrears.742 The result in this last case
would seem mandated by the language of both section 351(d)(1)743 and
the regulations' M as the shareholders-employees received the stock in ex-
change for services rendered for the corporation.
733. See, eg., Brown v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1970); Weinberg v. Com-
missioner, 44 T.C. 233, 245 (1965), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 386 F.2d 836 (9th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 929 (1968); Davidson v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 576, 584-86
(1941), acq., 1941-1 C.B. 3; see also Keller, supra note 505, at 532.
734. See, eg., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); Foster v. Commissioner, 756
F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986); Ruddick Corp. v. United
States, 643 F.2d 747, 749 (Ct. Cl. 1981), on remand, 3 Cl. Ct. 61 (1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 168
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Eli Lilly & Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990, 999 (Ct. Cl. 1967); G.D.
Searle & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 252, 365 (1987); see also Brown, 115 F.2d at 339;
Keller, supra note 505, at 532; Note, supra note 689, at 108-09.
735. 115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940).
736. Id. at 338.
737. Id.
738. Id. at 338-39.
739. Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 115.
740. Brown, 115 F.2d at 339.
741. See Weinberg, 44 T.C. at 241-42; see also Keller, supra note 505, at 532. The govern-
ment and the courts in other cases have used section 482 to reallocate expenses or revenues
between farmers and their controlled corporations. See, eg., Rooney v. United States, 305
F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962J.
742. See Fender Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCII) 550 (1963), rev'd, 338 F.2d
924 (9th Cir. 1964), cert denied, 382 U.S. 813 (1965); Note, supra note 689, at 98-99.
743. I.R.C. § 351(d)(1) (1986).
744. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.351-1(a)(2) (example 3), 1.351-(1)(b)(2) (example 2) (as amended in
1967).
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F. Expensed Property with Useful Life Remaining
Owners of unincorporated businesses are permitted to deduct the
cost of materials and supplies on hand in the year of their purchase, if it
is reasonably expected that those supplies or materials will be consumed
within a one year period.745 Since an ongoing business is likely to have
such expensed items on hand at virtually all times, such expensed items
are also likely to comprise a part of the property transferred to the new
corporation upon incorporation of a partnership or proprietorship. Pre-
sumably, part of the value of the stock or securities received by the trans-
ferors in a section 351 exchange is attributable to value of these expensed
items: the transferors "recover" value in exchange for these expensed
items. Does the tax-benefit rule require the transferors to take the fair
market value of the expensed items into their income? There is no au-
thority to indicate that the government has ever invoked the tax-benefit
rule in this context. Perhaps the dearth of authority can be construed as
an indication that the government is willing to allow this rather common
incorporation transaction to go untaxed. The authorites closest in point
involved bad-debt reserves, which are no longer permitted for most tax-
payers.74 6 In a 1962 revenue ruling, the government posited that an ac-
crual-method taxpayer must recognize income to the extent of the bad-
debt reserve when he transferred accounts receivable to a controlled cor-
poration in a transaction that generally would qualify for nonrecognition
treatment under section 351. 7  Since the transferor based a deduction
on the reserve that he no longer needed, the tax-benefit rule required him
to bring back the amount of the bad-debt reserve into his income during
the year of the section 351 exchange. 748
In Nash v. United States,74 9 the Supreme Court rejected the govern-
ment's position.750 The rationale for the rejection, however, was more
clearly articulated by a lower court in Estate of Schmidt v. Commis-
sioner.7 1' As the Schmidt court explained, before the transfer of the busi-
745. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1960); see also Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969).
746. See sources cited supra note 710.
747. Rev. Rul. 62-128, 1962-2 C.B. 139; see also O'Hare, supra note 708, at 218.
748. See Rev. Rul. 62-128, 1962-2 C.B. 139. For a discussion of the tax-benefit rule, see
generally White, An Essay on the Conceptual Foundations of the Tax Benefit Rule, 82 MIcH. L.
REv. 486 (1983).
749. 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
750. Id. at 3-4; see also Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. at 139-40; see generally Manning,
supra note 493; White, supra note 89; Comment, An Asset-Based Approach to the Tax Benefit
Rule, 72 CAL. L. REv. 1257 (1984); Comment, The Tax Benefit Rule: Recovery Reevaluated,
36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 533 (1982).
751. 355 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1966). The Supreme Court cited Schmidt with approval in
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ness, a proprietor owns all of the business assets and is obligated to pay
all of its debts.752 The bad-debt reserve system allows him to estimate
the sum of the uncollectible receivables in advance and charge them
against his income rather than requiring him to wait until an actual loss
is incurred and then charge it off as a bad debt.753 If the amount of the
reserve is reasonable, the value of the accounts receivable is not their face
amount, but that amount less the reserve.7" 4 It is that value that the
proprietor transfers to the corporation.7 5 The value of the stock re-
ceived in the exchange equals the net, not the gross, value of the business,
and that figure can be derived by deducting the existing reasonable
reserves from the face amount of the receivables.75 6 While perhaps the
proprietor no longer "needs" the reserve, he in no sense "recovers" its
value in a section 351 exchange.757 What he "recovers" are pieces of
paper-stock certificates-representing the receivables' net value, not
their gross value.758
At this point it seems clear that the government is not particularly
anxious to tax bad-debt reserves that are transferred to a controlled cor-
poration in a section 351 exchange.759 The transferor ought to be taxed
on any unreasonable additions that he made to the reserve, but it does
not seem that the government would need to invoke the tax-benefit rule
to tax them. More properly, the transferor should be required to amend
his return for the year when he made the unreasonable additions.71 It
has been suggested that the tax-benefit rule might produce taxable in-
come to the transferor when the value of the stock or securities received
in the section 351 exchange exceeds the net value of the receivables.761 If
the transfer is not of all the assets of an ongoing business but just the
Nash. Nash, 398 U.S. at 5. For a discussion of the ambiguities in the Nash opinion itself, see
O'Hare, supra note 708, at 220-21. According to Rev. Rul. 78-280, Nash said that the tax-
benefit rule was inapplicable because there is no recovery when the stock received in the ex-
change equals the net value of the accounts receivable. Nash, 398 U.S. at 4-5.







759. For post-Nash cases involving section 351 and bad-debt reserve, see Hillsboro Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983); Beneficial Corp. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 119
(1985), rev'd, 814 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d
1172 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974); Citizens Acceptance Corp. v. United States,
462 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1972); Rowe v. United States, 428 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1970); Erlich v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1231 (1970).
760. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank, 460 U.S. at 379 n.9.
761. See O'Hare, supra note 708, at 221; see also Nash, 398 U.S. at 4-5.
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receivables of that business, any excess of the value of the stock or securi-
ties over the net of the face value of the receivables and the bad-debt
reserve ought to be income to the transferor under the tax-benefit rule:
the transferor is truly recovering value for something he deducted on a
previous tax return. But does anyone really want to tax the bad-debt
reserve when the transfer of the receivables is part of an incorporation of
an ongoing business, which includes the transfer of other assets as well as
the receivable? To do that, the taxpayers would have to allocate part of
the value of the stock or securities to the receivables and part to the other
assets.762 Nash probably precludes taxing such a transaction anyway.76 3
Nash is an inexact fit for the transfer of expensed items. A bad re-
serve is a means of valuing accounts receivable to correct an overstate-
ment of their value by factoring in the element of uncollectability. It
thus serves a valuing function. The expensed items do almost the oppo-
site. The transferor has already benefitted from a deduction and still is
getting something of value in return for them (the value of the stock
attributable to the expensed item). Under Hillsboro National Bank v.
Commissioner,7 4 the government probably could successfully invoke the
tax-benefit rule. But should it? Do we want to tax the transfer of things
such as paper clips, scissors, and stationary upon the incorporation of a
small business? Maybe not-for the sake of both administrative conven-
ience and not impeding incorporations. Anyway, in abusive situations,
the government can invoke section 482 to avert a distortion of either the
transferor's or corporation's income.765 Yet, the government has suc-
ceeded in applying the tax-benefit rule to transfers of expensed items
under other Subehapter C nonrecognition sections; 766 hence, one must be
762. See O'Hare, supra note 708, at 221.
763. Nash did involve the transfer of receivables as part of an incorporation of an ongoing
business, which included the transfer of other assests as well as the receivables. Nash, 398 U.S.
at 5.
764. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
765. I.R.C. § 482 (1986); see, eg., Dolese v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 543, 546 (10th Cir,
1987); Foster v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d 1430, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1985); Stewart v. Commis-
sioner, 714 F.2d 977, 989 (9th Cir. 1983); Ruddick Corp. v. United States, 643 F.2d 747, 749
(Ct. Cl. 1981), on remand, 3 Cl. Ct. 61 (1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 168 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Eli Lilly &
Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 990, 999 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Ballentine Motor Co. v. Commissioner,
321 F.2d 796, 800 (4th Cir. 1963); Rooney v. United States, 305 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1962);
Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214, 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
874 (1952); National Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 794 (1943); G.D. Searle & Co., 88 T.C. at 359-67; see also Adess, supra note 518, at 962-
66; Berger, Gilman & Stapleton, supra note 518, at 527; Miller, supra note 518, at 235.
766. See United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc., 704 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir. 1983); Tennessee-Caro-
lina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909
(1979); Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969).
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alert to that possibility in the section 351 context.
G. Anti-tax Avoidance Code Sections
Over the years Congress has recurringly enacted new code sections
that empower the I.R.S. to combat tax avoidance schemes. Several of
these can apply in the section 351 context.
1. Reallocations of income and deductions between related
businesses: section 482
In several reported cases, the government has successfully invoked
section 482 to require a section 351 transferor and his transferee corpora-
tion to reallocate their income or expenses between one another to clearly
reflect their income in the year of the section 351 exchange.767 In Rooney
v. United States,76 for example, a farmer transferred his farming assets,
including a growing crop, to a newly formed corporation in exchange for
all of its stock.76 9 On his tax return for the year, the farmer deducted his
expenses in planting the crop, but excluded the income for selling the
crop, which instead was reported by the corporation, which had collected
the proceeds from its sale.77 Since the farmer deducted the bulk of the
farm expenses but treated none of the farm income as his own, he
claimed a net operating loss, which he sought to carry back to prior
years.77 1 Relying on section 482, both the government and the court dis-
allowed the farmer's expense deduction and reallocated it to the corpora-
tion, which used it to offset its income from selling the crop.7 72 In Estate
of Walling v. Commissioner,773 two partners transferred their barge busi-
ness to a controlled corporation in a section 351 exchange.774 They war-
ranted that the transferred barges were seaworthy and met licensing
requirements.775 Several months after the transfer, the corporation dry-
docked the barges, repaired them and obtained appropriate inspection
certificates.776 As required by their warranty, the transferors paid the
767. See, ag., Dolese, 811 F.2d at 546; Foster, 756 F.2d at 1433; EliLilly & Co., 372 F.2d at
997-99; Rooney v. United States, 305 F.2d 681, 683-86 (9th Cir. 1962). But see Stewart v.
Commissioner, 714 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1983). See also Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113, 115.
See generally Adess, supra note 518; Keller, supra note 505, at 533-37; Miller, supra note 518.
768. 305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962).
769. Id. at 682.
770. Id.
771. Id.
772. Id. at 683-86.
773. 373 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1967).
774. Id. at 193.
775. Id. at 192.
776. Id.
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cost of the repairs.777 They deducted those payments as section 162(a)
expenses.7 78 An appellate court concluded, however, that the transferee
corporation should have borne part of the repair expenses on its tax re-
turn because those expenses were at least partly attributable to the period
following the section 351 transfer.
779
2. Changing method of accounting: section 446(b)
The government also can invoke section 446(b), which grants it the
power to require a taxpayer to change his method of tax accounting, if
the method he is using does not clearly reflect his income. 80 In Palmer
v. Commissioner, a builder using the completed-contract method of ac-
counting transferred a nearly completed construction project to a con-
trolled corporation in a section 351 exchange.782 Since the contractor
had not completed the contract prior to the section 351 exchange, he
claimed that he was not required to report any of the income generated
by the project on his individual income tax return.783 He asserted that
the income from the construction project should be taxed to the trans-
feree corporation, which, conveniently, had substantial tax losses to offset
that income.784 While the case might have been decided under assign-
ment-of-income or tax-avoidance principles,78 5 the government and the
court instead required the contractor to switch to the percentage-of-com-
pletion method of accounting, resulting in taxable income to the contrac-
tor for the work he had completed prior to the section 351 exchange.786
3. Trafficking in loss corporations: sections 269 and 382
The government can also invoke sections 269 or 269A to prevent
abusive taxpayer schemes in the section 351 area.787 Section 269 empow-
ers the government to disallow a deduction, credit or allowance to a per-
son (or corporation) acquiring control of a corporation when the
principal purpose for the acquisition is to obtain the tax benefit of a de-
duction, credit or allowance belonging to the acquired corporation.78 8
777. Id.
778. Id. at 193.
779. Id. at 194.
780. I.R.C. § 446(b) (1986).
781. 267 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 361 U.S. 821 (1959).
782. Id. at 435-36; see also Keller, supra note 501, at 535-36.
783. Palmer, 267 F.2d at 436.
784. Id. at 437.
785. See Keller, supra note 501, at 535-36.
786. Palmer, 267 F.2d at 436.
787. I.R.C. §§ 269, 269A; see, eg., Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(b)(1)(example) (1962).
788. I.R.C. § 269.
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For example, a proprietor with a profitable business might find a defunct
shell corporation with a loss carryover and purchase all of its stock from
its original shareholders at a nominal price. Shortly after the stock
purchase, the proprietor could transfer the business assets of his proprie-
torship in exchange for more stock or securities of the shell corpora-
tion-a section 351 exchange.789 Since the principal purpose for the
acquisition of control was to avoid federal income tax, the government
would invoke section 269 to prohibit the use of the shell's loss carryover
to offset the post-transfer profits of the proprietor's business. 790
Section 382 limits the use of a net-operating loss carryforward by a
corporation if the corporation has had more than a 50% change in its
stock ownership. 9 Section 382 likely would apply to the transaction
described in the preceding paragraph. Indeed, the operation of section
382 is so restrictive that it has reduced the need for section 269 when the
tax benefit at issue is a corporate net-operating loss carryforward.792
4. Personal service corporations: section 269A
Section 269A empowers the government to allocate, among other
things, income, deductions and credits between a "personal service cor-
poration" and "its employee-owners" to prevent tax avoidance, or to
more clearly reflect the income of the corporation and its employee-own-
ers.793 A corporation is a "personal service corporation," if its principal
activity is personal services "substantially perform[ed] by employee-
owners." 794  This definition obviously covers innumerable close
corporations.
Although section 269A's predecessor was originally enacted to pre-
vent profitable corporations from shopping for corporations with net op-
erating loss carryovers,795 its coverage is broader than the particular
abuse it was originally intended to curb.
IX. CONCLUSION
There is no formulaic method to conclude a lengthy and detailed
Article on one of the major systems within Subchapter C. The paper
789. Id. § 351.
790. See Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(b)(1)(example) (1962).
791. I.R.C. § 382.
792. See LIND & ScHwARZ, supra note 30, at 638-39.
793. I.R.C. § 269A.
794. I.R.C. § 269A(b)(1); see also Foglesong v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848, 851 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1982).
795. See I.R.C. § 129 (1939).
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contains no one main point to recapitulate. There is no central argument
to be driven home with a last second punch. What might be suitable is
some speculation on the future of the section 351 system.
Congress virtually has spewed out changes in Subchapter C in re-
cent years, e.g., the General Utilities repeal,7 96 but has left the section 351
system intact. This is so, because, as mentioned in the beginning of the
Article,7 97 the system is relatively coherent and sensible. It works pretty
well. Accordingly, it is unlikely that Congress will completely revamp
the 351 regime. Nonetheless, one aspect of the system is a prime candi-
date for change.
As discussed above, section 351 curiously permits non-recognition
treatment for a shareholder who transfers property to a controlled corpo-
ration in exchange for debt securities.798 The shareholder is making him-
self a creditor of the corporation when before he was the outright owner
of the property. In contrast, the reorganization rules make the change
from an equity to a debt position a taxable event. Sentiment has been
expressed in Congress that the treatment of securities in incorporations
should be conformed with their treatment in reorganizations, i.e., make
the change from an owner to a creditor a taxable event.799
Would such a change be a wise tax-policy move? Though the
change from an equity-holder to a creditor position would seem to pro-
vide a theoretical justification for taxation, perhaps the small business
owner should be accommodated and be allowed to take back securities
from his controlled corporation. The use of shareholder-held debt in a
closely held corporation's capital structure serves an important non-tax
hedge against bankruptcy (although theoretically, imposing a tax on the
receipt of securities in exchange for property in an incorporation is prob-
ably sound). Moreover, Congress should move cautiously as it probably
does not really want to begin taxing incorporations on a regular basis-
something it would do if the receipt of securities in an incorporation is
made a taxable event.
796. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935); see also B. BiTr-
KER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 29, 1 7.21.
797. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
798. See supra text accompanying note 6.
799. See Comm. Fin., The Reform and Simplification of the Income Taxation of Corpora-
tions, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., S. Prt. 98-95, at 64 (1983).
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APPENDIX
The government has prepared a detailed checklist in Rev. Proc. 83-
59, 1983-2 C.B. 575 that tax counsel can submit along with a request for






SECTION 4. INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN RE-
QUESTS FOR RULINGS UNDER SECTION 351
OF THE CODE




.02 Information regarding the transferors
1. Identification
2. Method of accounting
.03 Transfer to corporation
1. Property
2. Services and indebtedness
3. Assets and Liabilities
a. Assets
(1) Unreported Income
(2) Partners and Partnerships
(3) Patents or patent applications
(4) Copyrights
(5) Franchises, trademarks or trade names
(6) Technical "know-how"




(c) Licenses, leases, etc.
(d) Leaseback
(e) Reserve for bad debts
(f) Continuity of interest
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(g) Acquisition indebtedness









(2) Manner in which incurred and business purpose for
assumption
(3) Indebtedness between transferee and transferor









(b) Stock rights, warrants, or certificates of contingent
interest
4. Section 306 stock
.05 Control by transferors
1. Stock outstanding immediately before transaction
(a) Description of terms
(b) Total number held by transferors
(c) Total number held by large shareholders
2. Stock outstanding immediately after transaction
(a) Total number outstanding
(b) Total number and percent of each class held by each
transferor
3. Plan and date of exchanges
(a) Plan
(b) Date or dates of exchanges
(c) Escrowed or contingent stock
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(1) Total number of shares involved
(2) Underwriters involved
(c) Stock rights, warrants, or subscriptions
5. Disposition of stock by transferors
(a) Number of shares
(b) Consideration
(c) Identity of acquiring parties and relationship to
transferors
(d) Reasons for disposition
(e) Options
(f) Redemptions or other requisitions
(g) Control of transferee
.06 General
1. Business purpose for transaction
2. Value for value
3. Activities of transferee
4. Disposition of property




2. Small Business Corporation
3. Bankrupt Transferors
4. Personal Service Corporation
.08 Copies of documents to be submitted with request
1. Balance sheets







SECTION 6. EFFECT ON OTHER DOCUMENTS
SECTION 1. PURPOSE
The purpose of this revenue procedure is to update Revenue Proce-
dure 81-57, 1981-2 C.B. 674 which sets forth in a checklist questionnaire
the information necessary to be included in a request for a ruling under
section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code, relating to transfers to a cor-
poration controlled by the transferor or transferors.
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SECTION 2. BACKGROUND
The Internal Revenue Service receives many requests for rulings in
which the information furnished about the proposed transaction is not
sufficient to permit a determination to be made. In such cases it is neces-
sary to obtain additional facts from the taxpayer before the request for a
letter ruling can be considered. This procedure is time consuming for
both Service personnel and taxpayers and delays issuance of the final rul-
ing letter. This checklist will facilitate the filing and processing of re-
quests for rulings under section 351 of the Code by showing specific
information and representations to be included so the request will be as
complete as possible when initially filed. Because the information and
representations necessary to rule on a particular transaction depend upon
all the facts and circumstances, information or representations in addi-
tion to those set forth in this revenue procedure may be required.
The authority and general procedures of the National Office of the
Internal Revenue Service and of the Office of the District Directors of
Internal Revenue with respect to the issuance of letter rulings and deter-
ruination letters are outlined in Rev. Proc. 83-1, 1983-1 C.B. 545. See
also Rev. Proc. 83-22, 1983-13 C.B. 680, relating to areas in which ad-
vance rulings generally will not be issued.
SECTION 3. CHANGES
SECTION 4. INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN RE-
QUESTS FOR RULINGS UNDER SECTION 351
OF THE CODE
.01 Information regarding transferee corporation.
1. Name, taxpayer identification number, and place and date of
incorporation of the transferee corporation (transferee).
2. Description of the business of the transferee, and its method and
period of accounting.
3. Identify the District Office having audit jurisdiction over the re-
turn of the transferee and the known transferors (collectively referred to
as taxpayers). State whether, to the best of the knowledge of the taxpay-
ers, and the taxpayer's representative(s), the identical issue is in a return
of the taxpayers (or of a related taxpayer within the meaning of section
267 of the Code or a member of an affiliated group of which the taxpayer
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is also a member within the meaning of section 1504) and, if so, whether
the issue (1) is being examined by a District Director, (2) has been ex-
amined and the statutory period of limitation on assessment or refund of
tax has not expired or a closing agreement covering the issue or liability
has not been entered into by a District Director, (3) is being considered
by an Appeals Office in connection with the taxpayers' return for an ear-
lier period, or that issue has been considered by an Appeals Office and
the statutory period of limitation on assessment or refund of tax has not
expired or a closing agreement covering the issue or liability has not been
entered into by an Appeals Office, or (4) is pending in litigation in a case
involving the taxpayers or a related taxpayer. The request must contain
a statement whether, to the best of the knowledge of the taxpayers and
the taxpayer's representative(s), the identical or similar issue has been the
subject matter of a prior ruling request and whether it was ruled on by
the Service to the taxpayers or to the taxpayers' predecessor and, if so,
when and with what results. If after the request is filed but before a
ruling is issued, the taxpayers know that an examination of the issue by a
District Director has been started, the taxpayers must notify the Na-
tional Office of such an action. If a return is filed before a ruling is re-
ceived from the National Office concerning the return, a copy of the
request must be attached to the return. This alerts the District Office and
avoids premature District action on the issue.
.02 Information regarding the transferors.
1. Name and taxpayer identification number of all known
transferors.
2. State the method and- period of accounting used by such
transferors.
.03 Transfer to corporation.
1. Property-Identify and describe fully all types of property tan-
gible and intangible, to be transferred to the transferee by each trans-
feror. Identify specifically each transferor and the property being
transferred by that transferor. Also, furnish a description of the busi-
ness, if any, of each transferor and the property transferred that is related
to that business.
2. Services and Indebtedness-State whether services have been or
will be performed by any transferor for or on behalf of the transferee in
connection with the transaction. Submit a representation as follows: (i)
No stock or securities will be issued for services rendered to or for the
benefit of the transferee in connection with the proposed transaction, and
(ii) No stock or securities will be issued for indebtedness of the transferee
that is not evidenced by a security or for interest on indebtedness of the
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transferee which accrued on or after the beginning of the holding period
of the transferor(s) for the debt. See section 351(d) of the Code.
3. Assets and Liabilities.
(a) Assets-State whether any of the assets to be transferred were
received by the transferor(s) as part of a plan of liquidation of another
corporation.
(1) Unreported Income-State whether income items, such as ac-
counts receivable or commissions due, are being transferred to the trans-
feree. If so, and the transferor(s) of these items uses the cash method of
accounting, submit a REPRESENTATION as follows: (i) The trans-
feror(s) neither accumulated receivables nor made extraordinary pay-
ment of payables in anticipation of the transaction, and (ii) The
transferee will report items which, but for the transfer, would have re-
sulted in income or deduction to a transferor in a period subsequent to
the transfer and such items will constitute income or deductions to the
transferee when received or-paid by it. Further, submit a REPRESEN-
TATION as follows: The proceeds received in collection of the income
items will be included as ordinary income in computing the taxable in-
come of the transferee. (Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2, C.B. 113). If a trans-
feror is on the completed contract method of accounting, explain fully
how the transferor has reported income, costs and expenses related to
each contract and how the transferee will report such items subsequent
to the transfer.
(2) Partners and Partnerships-State whether the partners' inter-
ests in the partnership or the partnership's assets will be transferred and
whether the partnership will be liquidated.
(3) Patents or patent applications-If patents or patent applica-
tions are being transferred, submit a REPRESENTATION as follows:
The patents or patent applications qualify as "property" within the
meaning of section 351 of the Code. See Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 C.B.
(Part I) 133. Also, submit a REPRESENTATION as follows: The
transferor(s) will transfer all substantial rights in such patents or patent
applications within the meaning of section 1235 of the Code. See Rev.
Rul. 69-156, 1969-1 C.B. 101.
(4) Copyrights-If copyrights are being transferred, state whether
the copyright for all media are being transferred and whether any con-
tracts for the exploitation of a copyright in a particular media are being
transferred. Submit a REPRESENTATION as follows: All rights, title
and interests for each copyright, in each medium of exploitation, will be
transferred to the transferee.
(5) Franchises, trademarks or trade names-If franchises, trade-
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marks or trade names are being transferred, submit a REPRESENTA-
TION as follows: The transferor will not retain any significant power,
right, or continuing interest, within the meaning of section 1253(b) of the
Code, in the franchises, trademarks or trade names being transferred.
(6) Technical "Know-how"--State whether the transaction in-
volves an agreement that purports to furnish technical "know-how" in
exchange for stock. If so, submit the information required by Rev. Proc.
69-19, 1969-2 C.B. 301, as amplified by Rev. Proc. 74-36, 1974-2 C.B.
491.
(7) Stock of another corporation-State whether stock of another
corporation is part or all of the property being transferred to the trans-
feree. If so, state the percentage of the transferred stock and the percent-
age of the transferee's stock which is owned actually and constructively
by the transferor. Also, state whether the stock is being transferred sub-
ject to any liabilities or whether any liabilities of the transferor are being
assumed in connection with the transfer of such stock. See section 304 of
the Code. If the stock to be transferred is other than common stock,
submit a REPRESENTATION as follows: None of the stock to be
transferred is "section 306 stock" within the meaning of section 306(c) of
the Code.
(8) Other information.
(a) Solicitation-Submit a REPRESENTATION as follows: The
transfer is not the result of the solicitation by a promoter, broker, or
investment house.
(b) Retained rights-Submit a REPRESENTATION as follows:
The transferor(s) will not retain any rights in the property transferred to
the transferee.
(c) Licenses, leases, etc.-Describe any licenses, leases, etc., to be
granted in exchange for stock or securities.
(d) Leaseback-Describe any property to be transferred to the
transferee that will be leased back to a transferor, other shareholder, or a
related party. Furnish the terms of the lease and identify the lessee.
(e) Reserve for bad debts-Submit a REPRESENTATION as fol-
lows: The value of the stock received in exchange for accounts receivable
will be equal to the net value of the accounts transferred, i.e., the face
amount of the accounts receivable previously included in income less the
amount of the reserve for bad debts.
(f) Continuity of interest-If the exchange is part of a larger trans-
action that fits a pattern common to acquisitive reorganizations (see sec-
tion 3.0123 of Rev. Proc. 83-22), submit the following
REPRESENTATION: (i) With respect to the larger transaction, share-
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holders of the acquired corporation will receive, in exchange for their
stock of the acquired corporation, stock of the acquiring corporation
equal, in the aggregate, to a number of shares having a value, as of the
date of the exchange, of at least 50 percent of the value of all of the
formerly outstanding stock of the acquired corporation as of the same
date; (ii) There is no plan or intention on the part of the shareholders of
the acquired corporation to sell or otherwise dispose of a number of
shares of stock of the acquiring corporation to be received in the transac-
tion that would reduce such shareholders' ownership to a number of
shares having, in the aggregate, a value of less than 50 percent of the
total fair market value of the acquired corporation's stock outstanding as
of the effective date of the proposed transaction; and, (iii) There have not
been any significant changes in the stock ownership of the acquired cor-
poration in the last five years that would cause the continuity of interest
requirement not to be satisfied.
(g) Acquisition indebtedness-If stock of a corporation is being
transferred, submit a REPRESENTATION as follows: Any debt relat-
ing to the stock being transferred that is being assumed (or to which such
stock is subject) was incurred to acquire such stock and was incurred
when such stock was acquired, and each transferor is transferring all of
the stock for which the acquisition indebtedness being assumed (or to
which such stock is subject) was incurred.
(9) Formation of bank holding companies
b. Liabilities.
(1) Submit a REPRESENTATION as follows: The adjusted basis
and the fair market value of the assets to be transferred by the trans-
feror(s) to the transferee will, in each instance, be equal to or exceed the
sum of the liabilities to be assumed by the transferee plus any liabilities to
which the transferred assets are subject. See section 357(c) of the Code.
(2) Submit a REPRESENTATION as follows: The liabilities of
the transferor(s) to be assumed by the transferee were incurred in the
ordinary course of business and are associated with the assets to be trans-
ferred. If the liabilities to be assumed were not so incurred, state the
business reason or purpose for the assumption of these liabilities. See
section 357(b) of the Code.
(3) Submit a REPRESENTATION as follows: There is no in-
debtedness between the transferee and the transferor(s) and there will be
no indebtedness created in favor of the transferor(s) as a result of the
transaction.
.04 Consideration from the transferee.
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1. Stock-Describe the terms of each class and the number of
shares of each class to be issued to each transferor for:
(a) Property-See .031 above and identify the property of each
transferor.
(b) Services-See .032 above and identify the services. Indicate
those transferors who will also receive stock for property.
2. Indebtedness-State the principal amount of indebtedness and
its terms to be created in favor of each transferor for:
(a) Property-See .031 above and identify the property of each
transferor.
(b) Services-See .032 above and identify the services.
3. Other property in addition to stock and indebtedness-Ifdicate
the amount and provide a complete description of any other property
that will be issued to each transferor including, but not limited to:
(a) Cash.
(b) Stock rights, warrants, or certificates of contingent interest,
with the terms of each.
4. Section 306 stock-If any stock other than common stock will
be received in the exchange, explain why it is believed this stock is not
"section 306 stock" within the meaning of section 306(c)(3) of the Code.
.05 Control by transferors.
1. Stock of transferee outstanding immediately before transaction.
(a) Furnish a description of the terms and the total number of
shares of each class outstanding.
(b) State the total number of shares of each class held by a share-
holder who will be a transferor in the exchange.
(c) State the total number of shares of each class held by each
shareholder owning five percent or more of a class and the number of
shareholders owning the balance of each class outstanding.
2. Stock of transferee outstanding immediately after transaction.
(a) State the total number of shares of each class.
(b) State the total number and percent of shares of each class held
by each transferor.
3. Plan and dates of exchanges.
(a) Submit a REPRESENTATION as follows: The transfers and
exchanges will occur under a plan agreed upon before the transaction in
which the rights of the parties are defined. See section 1.351-1(a)(1) of
the regulations.
(b) Submit a REPRESENTATION as follows: All exchanges will
occur on approximately the same date.
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(c) State whether any of the stock issued will be placed in escrow,
or whether any of the stock will be issued later under a contingent stock
arrangement.
4. Additional stock issues.
(a) State whether any stock will be issued in the near future in
addition to that being issued under the plan. If so, give full particulars.
(b) If a public offering is planned, submit the following
information:
(1) The total number of shares of each class involved.
(2) If underwriters are involved, explain whether the underwriter
will purchase these shares for their own account or will act as agent for
the transferee. See Rev. Rul. 78-294, 1978-2 C.B. 141.
(c) If any rights, warrants, or subscriptions of the transferee are
outstanding or will be issued or offered, state the total number of shares
of each class of stock involved and explain the circumstances in which
they were or will be issued or offered.
5. Disposition of stock by transferor(s).
(a) Indicate the number of shares of each class that each transferor
will dispose of after the exchange.
(b) State the consideration to be received in exchange for the trans-
feree stock disposed.
(c) Provide the names of the acquiring parties and their relation-
ship to the transferee or shareholder-transferor.
(d) State the circumstances and reasons for the disposition, includ-
ing any agreements between the parties.
(e) If there are, or will be, any options to purchase stock from any
of the transferors, give full particulars.
(f) Submit a REPRESENTATION as follows: There is no plan
or intention on the part of the transferee to redeem or otherwise reac-
quire any stock or indebtedness to be issued in the proposed transaction.
(g) Submit a REPRESENTATION as follows: Taking into ac-
count any issuance of additional shares of transferee stock; any issuance
of stock for services; the exercise of any transferee stock rights, warrants,
or subscriptions; a public offering of transferee stock; and the sale, ex-
change, transfer by gift, or other disposition of any of the stock of the
transferee to be received in the exchange, the transferor(s) will be in
"control" of the transferee within the meaning of section 368(c) of the
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1. Business reasons or purpose-Explain the business reasons for
the transaction.
2. Value for value-Submit a REPRESENTATION as follows:
Each transferor will receive stock, securities or other property approxi-
mately equal to the fair market value of the property transferred to the
transferee or for services rendered or to be rendered for the benefit of the
transferee.
3. Activities of transferee-Submit a REPRESENTATION as fol-
lows: The transferee will remain in existence and retain and use the
property transferred to it in a trade or business.
4. Disposition of property-Submit a REPRESENTATION as
follows: There is no plan or intention by the transferee to dispose of the
transferred property other than in the normal course of business
operations.
5. Related, connected, or step transactions-Describe any loans,
sales, exchanges, or other transactions, other than recurring arm's length
sales, purchases, etc., in the normal course of business, that will occur or
are contemplated whether or not considered as related to or in connec-
tion with the exchange.
6. Expenses-Submit a REPRESENTATION as follows: Each of
the parties to the transaction will pay its or his/her own expenses, if any,
incurred in connection, with the proposed transaction.
.07 Special Corporations.
1. Investment Company-Submit a REPRESENTATION as fol-
lows: The transferee will not be an investment company within the
meaning of section 351(e)(1) of the Code and section 1.351-1(c)(1)(ii) of
the regulations.
2., Small Business Corporation-State whether the transferee in-
tends to make the election under section 1362(a) of the Code to be taxed
as a "small business corporation" as defined in section 1361(a).
3. Bankrupt Transferor-Submit a REPRESENTATION as fol-
lows: The transferor is not under the jurisdiction of a court in a title 11
or similar case (within the meaning of section 368(a)(3)(A)) and the
stock or securities received in the exchange will not be used to satisfy the
indebtedness of such debtor. See section 351(e) of the Code.
4. Personal Service Corporation-Submit a REPRESENTATION
as follows: The transferee will not be a "personal service corporation"
within the meaning of section 269A of the Code.
.08 Copies of documents to be submitted with request.
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1. Balance sheets-Latest of transferee or other business involved.
If transferee is a new corporation, submit a pro-forma balance sheet.
2. Plan or agreement of exchange-If one has been committed to
writing.
3. Securities-If it is contended that any part or all of the indebt-
edness described in 4.042(a) above is "securities" within the meaning of
section 351 of the Code submit:
(a) A brief explaining why.
(b) A copy of the note or other evidence of the indebtedness and
loan agreement, if any. However, see section 4.0112 of Rev. Proc. 83-22.
.09 Foreign Transferee-If the transfer is to a foreign corporation,
see section 367 of the Code and the regulations thereunder and Rev.
Proc. 68-23, 1968-1 C.B. 821.
.10 Taxpayer's memorandum-Submit the information required
by section 9 of Rev. Proc. 83-1, 1983-1 C.B. 545.
SECTION 5. INQUIRIES
Inquiries in regard to this revenue procedure should refer to its
number and should be addressed to the Associate Chief Counsel (Techni-
cal) Attention CC:C:R, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C.
20224.
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